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Abstract
This thesis investigates the problems posed by the existence of noise 
pollution with the use of economic concepts. The analysis is conducted 
at various levels of abstraction and includes the opening up cf some new 
fields of investigation, as well as tidying up and bringing together 
some previous work. The thesis is divided into six chapters.
Chapter cne introduces the subject and incicates the approach that is going 
to be taken in the subsequent chapters. Chapter two analyses the 
consequences for an optimum town of pollution such as noise. The necessary 
and sufficient conditions for an optimum are obtained and discussed. There 
are seme comparative static results and the question cf decentralisation 
is examinee. Finally some simulation results are presented. The work 
in this chapter is perhaps least specific to noise pollution and would 
apply tc any spatially distributed non-accumulating pollution. Chapter 
three examines the measurement of noise costs to households and compares two 
different approaches tc the problem. Chapter four discusses the control cf 
noise levels in the context of the economic analysis cf Externalities 
and Public Ears, and emphasises some of the difficulties in obtaining 
optimum noise charges. Chapter five summarises the existing empirical 
work and adds some new results.
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1.1. Scope
This thesis is concerned with an economic analysis of noise pollution^.
This means that it concentrates on those aspects of noise pollution to
which a professional economist may have something to contribute. Thus
the coverage of material is essentially selective, and perhaps it is
best to begin by stating those matters which are relatively neglected
and explaining, in so far as we can why they are so.
First, it will appear to any acoustical engineer that the issues related
to the measurement of noise and the construction of noise indices reflecting
subjective evaluations of noise nuisance have been rather cursorily
dealt with. The reason for this is simple - as economists we have rather
little to say about them. The measurement of noise is essentially a
physical problem, and as far as the construction of subjective indices is
concerned, we are interested in evaluating whether such indices can be
treated as cardinal economic quantities or whether they have to be
transformed in some way to be converted into economic indicators. In
Chapter 5 we discuss some of the evidence on this question with regard to
indicators of aircraft noise. Unfortunately the price data required to
do this is not available for other measures of noise nuisance.
Second, much of the discussion of the economics of noise pollution is
concerned with aircraft noise. When we discuss the theory of the
measurement of noise costs (Chapter 3) we illustrate the kind of problems
involved with examples from the costing of aircraft noise, and the empirical
work on this (Chapter 5) is drawn entirely from aircraft noise. We do
consider other forms of noise nuisance when the control of noise levels is
discussed (Chapter 4) and when the problems of environmental pollution
such as noise nuisance are considered within the context of optimum towns.
This bias towards aircraft noise arises from the way that noise economics
has- developed. Although, in overall terms, urban traffic noise is
2
probably the most serious noise problem in the environment today , the 
suddenness with which jet aircraft noise became a major social problem 
(over the last decade and a half) has drawn more resources and attention 
to its measurement and control. As we statp in the thesis, many of the 
techniques developed to measure the costs/aircraft noise carry over to 
the measurement of traffic noise and there is already some work in progress
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along these lines. The optimal control of surface traffic noise may, 
however, differ from that of air traffic noise and the relevant 'issues are 
discussed in chapter 4.
Third, we say very little about the physiological and psychological
consequences of noise pollution, regarding which a considerable amount 
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has been written . Although a number of physiological effects are
observed on individuals exposed to sustained traffic and industrial noise,
it has not been established that such effects are damaging. This point
is made with regard to the effects of noise on work by Kryter (1956) who
states that, "Numerous laboratory and industrial studies have been made
in attempts to show that noise has an adverse effect on the performance
of physical and mental work. By and large, the results of these studies
shew that noise per se has little or no adverse effect upon performance
provided that work does not require auditory communication of some sort.
These, results were found even in environments where the noise levels
were such that near-daily exposure over several years would cause some
permanent deafness". Arguing on more general lines, but with regard to
traffic noise the O.E.C.D. report (1971) states that, "There is at present
no conclusive evidence that exposure to urban traffic noise under normal
conditions produces harmful effects", and that, "one possible important -
but as yet unproven - effect of traffic noise concerns the hastening of
age-induced hearing loss (prebycusis)". Thus we may conclude that while
research in this field is important, there is not enough.evidence pn the
. . either or these
.effects of noise on productivity or physical health to warrant/being
considered as one of the unfortunate consequences of noise in an economic
analysis.
In a recent publication Abey-Uickrama et alia (1969) have attempted to 
establish a positive association between the incidence of mental illness 
and exposure to high levels of aircraft noise, by doing a test of asso­
ciation of admissions to mental hospitals for two similar groups of house­
holds, one in the close vicinity of Heathrow Airport and the other in a 
quiet area nearby. They find a positive association for certain classes 
of individuals, and conclude that the matter warrants further investigation. 
It appears that in this study the control group was defined with respect 
to broad categories, namely socioeconomic status, age, sex, marital status, 
population density and migration rates. The incidence of psychiatric 
illness, however, can vary considerably across other classifications such
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as profession or occupation, occupation of husband, ethnic background 
and immigrant status, and similar factors. Until a finer classification 
and further study is dene these results can only leave us with a vague 
sense of disquiet (sic) about high levels/aircraft noise. Given that 
these findings are confirmed a decision would have to be made as to 
whether the land area affected should be zoned for non-residential pur­
poses or whether individuals should be informed about the possible con­
sequences of living close to airports and allowed to make up their own 
minds. In our analysis, however, we do not consider any such deleterious 
effects.
1.2. Tne Development of Noise Pollution
Noise as a source of annoyance has been around for a long time. Being
a passing experience, it leaves no trace. This, combined with the
fact that the measurement of noise, as it is relevant to human perception,
is a twentieth century development, .has meant that as far as we know there
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is no precise documentation of noise levels before 1930, Nevertheless 
there are a number of literary references to the excessive noise levels 
in the streets going back to the eighteenth century and urban historians 
record the use of straw on streets outside hospitals or the homes of 
rich people to reduce the noise of the clatter of horses hooves^. We 
do not know, however, whether the urban environment was noisier then than 
it is now. To be sure the growth of interest can be partly explained by 
the development of measuring techniques, but the causation goes the other 
way as well; an increased concern about the noise in our environment has 
led to suitable measures. This increased concern is undoubtedly due to 
increased material living standards among the population,and as a witness 
to this, it is the richer countries of the world that are more concerned 
about noise.
The earliest full survey of noise is probably the one undertaken in New 
York City between November 1929 and May 1930 by the New York Noise Abatement 
Commission. This showed that traffic noise was responsible for 36 per 
cent of all noise complaints, public transportation for 16 per cent, 
radios for 12 per cent, collections and deliveries for 9 per cent, whistles 
and bells for 8 per cent, construction for 7.5 per cent and miscellaneous 
sources for 11.5 per cent. These figures are quoted by Anthrop (1973)
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who points out, interestingly, that the measured noise levels in New 
York then were not very different from those of today, and that smaller 
cities such as Philadelphia now have noise levels closer to those of 
New York than they did forty years ago.
In the post war years most advanced countries have conducted some survey 
of traffic and neighbourhood noise with a view to enacting appropriate 
controlling legislation. One survey, which perhaps deserves special 
mention is the Wilson Report (1963) which repcYTld owsurveys in 1948 
and 1951. This showed that the percentage of people disturbed.by noise 
external to the home rose from 23 per cent in 1948 to 50 per cent in 
1961^. This report also singled out traffic noise as the major noise 
irritant. The reports on other surveys in advanced industrial countries 
along these lines and the existing controlling legislation is summarised 
in the O.E.C.D. report (1971). With the advent of jet aircraft in 1958 
a new, identifiable and compact source of noise nuisance emerged. This 
has received considerable attention since then. K.D. Kryter developed a 
scale referred to as Perceived Noise Level (PNL) which measures aircraft 
noise while taking account of the subjective response of individuals to 
its 'noisiness'. This scale was then used by McKenrell in England to 
develop an index of aircraft noise that took account of the PNL as well as 
number of aircraft flying over head and correlated a linear combination of 
these factors with subjective noise annoyance responses. This index is 
known as the Noise and Number Index (NNI). Similar scales were developed 
in the U.S., France and Germany. Recently the (PNL) has been refined 
somewhat to produce a new scale called EPNL (Effective Perceived Noise 
Level) and this has been used in conjunction with a measure of aircraft 
numbers that takes account of the time of flight to produce an index 
called the Noise Exposure Forecast. (NEF).
Undoubtedly the most sophisticated measurement of noise costs has been 
done on aircraft noise, using the above measures. These measurements 
have so far been used to assess the noise costs of prospective airport sites 
but not,as yet, co evaluate the benefits of noise reduction in aircraft 
engines. It is to be hoped that as the economic techniques become better 
understood, it will be possible to conduct such evaluations, and, further­
more to use the techniques to evaluate alternative proposals for surface 
traffic reduction.
1.3.
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The Economists Role with Regard to Noise Pollution
We started out by stating the limitations of an economic analysis of noise 
pollution. We now consider the contribution that an economist can make 
in a field such as this.
One line of approach, and the one taken in this thesis, is that an economist 
can establish the principles by which the consequences of noise are valued 
so that they can be compared with other social costs. To do this' he uses 
a numeraire - money as it happens, although it could be Stradivariuses - 
and he defines carefully the alternative assumptions upon which this evaluation 
can be made. He also assesses the applicability of the tools of the 
economic analysis to the problem of noise pollution and evaluates the 
policy lines for dealing with problems of noise in the light of his assess­
ment. This kind of exercise is addressed to the professional or would-be 
professional economist and in it one must regard the theory and its application 
as both being under review.
The other approach that an economist can take is to set himself up as a 
champion for the 'economic' viewpoint. In this he will present the 
arguments for an evaluation of noise costs and policies towards noise by 
the application of the principles of economic theory, recognizing that in 
an essentially multidisciplinary field, the engineer, psychologist, 
geographer and aviation expert are all doing the same for those aspects of 
the problem that their speciality entails. The engineer, for example is 
always at pains to point out that the essentials of the noise problem lie 
in designing quieter engines, or ones that take-off vertically and that 
costing noise is an imprecise and effete exercise. The psychologist 
sees the noise problem as a matter of "perception" and unquantifiable in 
cost terms - a view he shares with the planner who sees the soul of 
man at stake. In this motley crowd the economist too has his caricature 
- too awful to mention - and the end result of most multidisciplinary 
projects is a function of the relative personal weights of the professional 
representatives as well as the relevance of their subjects. Thus although 
the contribution of each group to the decision making process, and the 
interactions of the groups is an interesting/3Hdimportant field of study, 
this thesis has little to contribute to it.
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1.4. The Development of the thesis
We begin our analysis by a review of some of the current developments in 
urban welfare economics. The problems of environmental externalities such 
as noise and air pollution have some bearing on the results obtained 
hitherto and in chapter 2 we discuss these externalities in the context 
of highly simplified models of towns. Some of the basic non-convexities 
that arise when such externalities are considered are discussed and we 
outline some of the difficulties in obtaining an optimum by competitive 
decentralisation.
Although the model is highly simplified it gives us some indication of the 
important trade offs in obtaining the optimum town. By parameterising 
the simple model that we construct and taking plausible ranges of para­
metric values, we obtain some numerical results of the various trade-offs 
available.
Having considered the problem of noise pollution in a simplified but 
general equilibrium framework we next consider in Chapter 3, the measure­
ment of noise costs in the context within which they might be practically 
evaluated. In this section we outline two alternative approaches to 
costing noise and evaluate them in the light of the available evidence. 
Chapter 4 deals with optimum control of noise, the analytical tools 
involved and problems inherent therein. Chapter 5 discusses some of the 
empirical evidence regarding the measurement of aircraft noise costs, 
including the appropriateness of the noise measurement indices, and in 
Chapter 6 we try and bring together what overall conclusions emerge from 
the thesis.
The bias in this study is evidently toward the theoretical and normative 
aspects of the problem.
Chapters 2 and 4 are concerned with making optimal decisions with respect 
to certain welfare criteria, and are clearly normative in their content. 
Chapter 3 is concerned with noise cost measurement and along with the 
relevant empirical evidence in Chapter 5, the analysis here is descriptive 
in so far as it is concerned with measuring what j_s. However, at the 
same time we devote some attention to the welfare implications of the 
different costs measured. Regarding these biases we can only plead 
personal preference - doubtless others would have done it differently.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 1
1. A purist might complain at the use of the term noise pollution - 
pollution being defined in the S.O.E.D. as a physical impurity. However, 
the usage of the term in this context is common and well understood. 
Another caveat that should be added at the start is that noise pollution 
refers in this context to outdoor noises. Factory and household noise
in so far as it does not affect people outside does not confer external 
disbenefit and therefore is beyond the scope of an economic treatment 
of noise as a pollutant.
2. See for example the O.E.C.D. report (1971) or the Noise Advisory 
Council (1972) (b).
3. For a survey listing much of this work see Branch (1971)
4. Kryter (1956) p.1332
5. This date refers to the noise survey carried out in Mew York 
See Anthrop (1973), Chapter 5.
6. For an interesting review of anecdotal evidence on noise in the 
Victorian cities the reader is referred to Dyos and Woolf (1973)
7. If the New York finding that surface noise has not increased over 
this sort of period holds for London, then the increased percentage of 
people reflects only, an increased awareness of noise.
.11.
The Optimum Stxuciuxe Towns with Envixonmental Pollution such as Noli?..
2. 1 INTRODUCTION.
In -t/ii4 chaptex we eonsidex the. problem o¡5 ¡Jc/unA pollution 4uc/i a4 nolie.
In xelatlon to the. optimal planning oh towns. This bxlngs togethex two pxoblems 
that have 4o {¡asi been eonsidexed 4epaxately In the litexatuxe, but. which axe 
cleaxly related. The pollution that i t  generated by the activities oh 
pxoduction and consumption hat an e^fiect on the optimal location oh the 
xesidential axeas relative to the woxk axeas, and the tize oh the town and the 
location oh the individuals in i t  ehhects the optimal eontxoi oh the pollution 
level. I t  is with these issues that we axe concexned, when the chaxactexistics 
oh the pollution axe simitax to those o'h noise - i.e . concentxated in the 
town centres and tpxeadlng out ovex the xesidentlal axeas.
■ The economic titexatuxe that deals with the welhaxe aspects oh uxban location 
is not vast. Pexhaps one oh ihe htxst attempts in this h^eld was by Solcw 
and Vickxey[1971). In this papex they analysed, in the simplest possible 
setting, the optimal allocation oh w given uxban land axea between the gen exairon 
oh tiahhic. and .the eaxxying oh txahhic.• Theyobtained a chaxactexlsation oh the 
optimal pxopcxtion oh land that should be allocated to the caxxying oh txahhic 
as a hanxtion oh the distance h^ cm the city eentxe, and shewed that ih a 
competitive maxket was used to allocate land in the absence oh congestion to lls , 
i t  would teiid to ovexallocate land hex the. use oh txahhie, especially neax 
the centxe. In a subsequent papex, Mi ’viees ( 7972), discussed the problem oh 
the optimum town mvxe hwlly. Individual pxehexences wexe xepxesented by a 
caxdinal u tility  ¿unction, the arguments oh which went a consumption good, the 
distance hxom the city centxe, and living axea occupied. Vxoductlon was
CHAPTER 2.
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organised at the. centre> with houusthe Id* located around I t ,  Fo>i a {¡ixcd
population and a ¿Ixcd amount oh output, he maxltrl*ed the ¿am oh u tilities  to
obtain the necessary and ¿u^lclent condition* {¡on. a max-irnm, and analysed
what could be *aid (¡horn this about the distribution oh the population
abound the town centre, and the distribution oh u tility  even, the population.
In general, I t  l*  not possible to *ay whether, the land area occupied by a
household Increases with the distance hrom a city centne. This depend* on
how the manglnal u tility  oh an Increase In aJiea change* a* the dl*ta.nce hrom
the centre lncnea*e*. With regard to the distribution oh utility Flirlee*
*hcwed that In general I t  l*  not optimal hon. Identical Individual* (l . e . with
the *ame pn.ehen.ence*) to be treated Identically. The extent oh the Inequality
that l* optimal, depend* on the particular cafidlnallsatlon that l*  choseti hor
the u tility  h^nctlon and on the horm oh the u tility  hunctlon. However,
the h^ nm:* oh the u tility  hwnctlon that yield equal u tility  one rather restrictive
and even In the*e ca*e* Stern (1973) ha* *hown that a *mall change In the structure
oh the problem leach to an unequal dlitnlbutlon oh u tility  being optimal again.
The Impact oh the cardinalisation cho*en on the optimal distribution oh u tility
l* note a well known problem. Fen. a u tility  hwnctlon U[.] we may dehlne a
transhorxnatlon oh I t ,  viz. 7
I - a
$>(•;,0) = T___U(.) ■
1 -  o
Such a tnan*hon>n l*  l*oelastle, with the elasticity oh $ with respect to U being•
, 1/1 ~ a.
Then a* a l*  lncnea*ed the manglnal u tility  oh the angaments oh the u tility  
hunctlon decnease mone napldly, and any Inequality l*  penalised hunthex In 
deriving the optimal condition*. In the limiting case a* a -*■ » : ce obtain 
the hauls i an well axe ¿unotccn:
15.
$ ( . , “ ) =  . U(.) ,
and In this case we get, In the Uinnlees ¿namewonk, an equal level o£ u tility  
ion. a ll individual!) as being optimal. The neason why u tility  inequalities 
can be optimal in this context is thaX individuals one indivisible and that 
any one penson can only be resident in one place. Ji we could smean: 
people oven, ¿pace, the concavity o$ the u tility  iunction would aut.omatically 
lead to an equal distnibution ofi u tility . The &once oi this impo-ttant point 
can be Seen by considening the fallowing ¿imple pnoblem:
Thene one two individuals who can each eithen be located at. a distance one
mile ¿nom thein place o{> wonk on. faun, miles faom thein place o& wonk. The 
concave u tility  {unction is
A >0, x >o , C>o
U = ( A ' *) 2 + c *
ICkene xis the distance in miles faom the place o¿ wonk, C is the amount 'o£
the consumption good and  ^is a constant. I¿ thene one $ units o& the consumption
good to allocate end we le t  A equal 5 , then i t  is clean, that tota l u t ility  is
maximised when consumption is equally allocated; i .e .
Uj = 2 + 2 = 4
U2 = 7 + 2 = 3
0$ counse the two individuals could be made to change places periodically 
so as to equate the tota l u tility  that each neceived. This, howeven, could 
only be considened wontluvlite i {  equality had some separate desinability, oven, 
and above that expressed in the u tility  function.
In view o t h e  clove discussion thene is centainly some appeal fan. the use o¿
the Rau'isian U’el^ane ¿unction in this context, ¿on i t  genenates an equal distnibution
oi u tility  when thene one good neasons ¿on tanking that equality is desinabte.
I t  is not, howeven, ovenidieininglty clean that oihen coJidinalisations with 
desinable pnopentizs should not be considened, especic&y in attemp.ting to
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examine, the extent oh inequality that is optimal {¡oh. di.hhe.rent values oh ° •
This task has been attempted by Vixit (1973) within the conhines oh a. model
where production war, organised centrally and the major consideration was a
trade-ohh between economic* oh scale in production and diseconomies oh congestion
in commuter transport. Obtaining numerical solutions hor plausible parameter
values he shewed that the extent oh inequality can become quite large hor
values oh o that are thought to be reasonable in other contexts.
The model as outlined above was extended by Wijvtees to deal with the issue
oh congestion in commuter transport, and congestion in residential location.
Regarding congestion in commuter transport, he derived the optimality condition
when there was a trade-ohh betceen an increase in land use hor roads to the
centre, which would lead to a reduction in congestion costs and a hall in
the land area available hor residential location. These optimality conditions
can be obtained by a competitive realisation where there is a land rent ¿unction,
relating land rents to the distance hrom the city centre, a distribution
oh incomes over the population, with each individual not knowing in advance
what hts position in that distribution w ill be, and a commuter subsidy ¿unction,
hixing a subsidy to a ll residents at distance r  ¿row the centre as q lrj.
Each household takes this inhormation as given and maximises its  u tility
Subject to its  budget, constraint. With the appropriate ¿auctions and distribution,
the desired optimum solution can be obtained. This is indeed an interesting
result, hor i t  establishes the possibility oh competitive decentralisation
when some oh the usual conditions ¿or such a decentralisation are not
Satis¿ied. (i . e . we have a continuum oh commodities and individuals and
competitive, decentralisation.)
a non convex consumption set, and norivally these conditions do not allow a / 
finally pi^lees introduces the problem oh the optimum size oh a town when one 
part oh a ¿ixed population has to be located in t  identical towns and the re&t 
is located in the countryside. Production in the towns takes place, in itia lly , 
under conditions oh increasing returns to scale with labour as the only ¿actor, 
and production in the country takes place at a constant average product oh
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labcuA. A simple rule can be derived ¿on the optimum size oi the town*, with
' and without externalities. This Ault suggests that tht optimum size ok the
with locally 0
town is probably one / increasing returns to ¿colt when thtAt oac externalities 
with locally
and ceAtasnly ont / increasing Attains to scal.e token externalities aAt not 
considtAtd. 71 is also possible that the Ault would not define the optimum
size oi the town uniquely, and in that cast global ccmpo/iisons aAt ntcessoAij.
Tht A ecus on ior considering incAtasing retixftns to scale is o.ppaAtni- i t  ■ 
provides the only season ior the existence ok towns in this iranwjcrk. Ji 
the maAginal pscduct oi labouA welt less than the average pAoduct, then 
dispelstd pAoducticn would save on transportation costs, possibly pAcvidt 
moAt living space ion. each household, and cause no loss oi outputi This 
point has been made cleoAly by Starrett ( 7972) who establishes the optimality 
oi incAtasing Aetuins to labcuA in determining the town size under a other 
general conditions.
The above discussion oi the importance oi increasing returns is conducted within 
the context oi only one iactor oi production - labour. When there is more 
than one iactcr oi production involved then there is the possibility oi consider­
ing increasing returns to labour alone (and diminis lung returns to the other 
fe to rs ) o* diminishing returns to each oi the iaetors and increasing returns 
to scale. Both would suHiee to provide a rationale ior the existence oi 
centralised production, but would have diHerent implications ior town size.
In his recent paper V ixlt examines the optiimm size oi a town under various 
plausible assumptions regarding the parameters, when output depends on the amount 
oi labour and the size oi the central business district. Both iactors are 
assumed to have diminishing returns, but there are increasing returns to 
scale overall. Within this irameioork Dixit obtains the optimum town size as 
a iuncUcn oi the econovits oi scale present, and- concludes that a, town size 
oi over a nulhon is diHieutt to jwstiiy. When choosing plausible values oi
the e la *tid tie *  of output with Ae*pect to labouA and land, he admit* that 
hi* choice, of paxameteA* ¿uggc.it* too low a density of wcAker* in the centAal 
buiinei* di*tAict but oAgue* that with diffcAent paAameteA* he "couJtd not 
*tu.dy economic* of * cate to any ¿significant extent without .tunning into 
incAea*ing AetuAn* to labouA alone." Thi* *ugge*t*, howeveA, that incAe,a*ing 
ActuAn* to labouA alone i*  pcAhap* the moAc typical ca*e.
2. 2 The Pnoblem of Vcitation in Optirmun Town*.
In thii chaplet we wetk vety much in the ¿implc fAameu'oAk outlined by ¡‘ujilee*
and developed by othee* to con*idet the ptoblem* of pollution in the optimal
ccn*tiuciion of town*. The pollution in thi* context can be comideted a*
a byproduct of the ptoduetion pAoce**. I t  emanate* at the centte and *pAead*
decAeu*ing and
out cvca the Ac*idential oAea,*, /eventually dieoppearing 0Ji distance fAcm the 
centte get* la ige enough. Thu* noi*e*, indu*ttial wa*te, and ait pollution 
could be typical example*. Thi* bypAcduct can be Adduced, but doing *o involve* . 
allocating Ae*cuAce* to Amoving i t .  In Section 2.3 we con*idet a town of fixed 
*ize  and define the nece**aAy condition* Aelating to the optimum allocation 
of individual* and the opiimujn leve l of pollution foA the titilitatian and 
Tawtiian Wei fate functi.cn*. We al&o inve*tigate the condition* undea  which 
a unique optimum w ill exi*t and conclude that *uch uniquene** i*  exttmely 
impAobable, even when vety ¿pedal fo-tm* of the u tility  function ate 
con*ideted. Ftom thi* i t  appeal* that the decenitaluation ptopo*ed by 
MiAlee* w ill not catty thAcugh * ttaighifoiccAdly to the ca*e whete thete i*  a 
* patial context to the pollution. In 4erne * pedal dAcnmitance* decent>LaJh*aixen 
io a local optimum i*  feasible, at long a* the govetmient check* independently 
foA the local concavity of the * urn of the marginal oppcAtudty co*t* of pollution 
in tetm* of the con*umpteen, with te*pact to the leve l of pollution. In thi*
* ection we al*c examine in the context of an additive u tility  function the 
allocation of AZiouAce* to individual* a* a function of the distance fAom the 
city cent At, and the Aelation*hi.p between the Ac*idential petition* and the woAk. 
centre a* a function of the level of pollution, and the *ize  of the woAk fcAce.
.16.
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In Se.ction 2.4 the optimum bize of the town ib conbidcned, when the population 
¿b to be allocated in a laïge number of bimiloA townb. The optimum town bize 
tb compared with that which would emenge anden, a competitive btnuctane, with 
no contnol on pollution. The conditionb anden, which the optimum town tb 
bmalien than the competitive town one btated. The de.centActibati.cn of the 
optimum town when the bize ib a vaAiable ib of couAbe eve.n moae d ifficu lt 
than that of a town of fixed bize and in genenal one would expect not to be 
able to attain bach a decentnatibation.
In Section 2.5, a panametnic AepAebentation ib bet ap and the optimum town 
bize obtained ¿on, vanioab pan.meten valaeb. Thib ib componed to the bize that 
would emenge anden, altennative competitive conditioYb. Section 2.6 offenb 
borne genenal conclubionb.
I t  will be clean to anyone who hob examined the UtenatuAe in thib field that 
the modetb abed one a gnotebque bin\plicationof the manifold neabonb fon 
the exibtence of townb. Some of thebe Aeabonb, ebpecially thobe nelating 
to the bocial and tnading abpectb of townb, one handle/ examined by any of the 
modelb. The othen pnoblemb of unban onganibationb, bach ab conmuten and 
nebidential congebtion, the tnade off betioeen tnavel time and living bpace, 
between econcnicb in pnoduction and dibeconcmicb in congebtion, between economies 
of pnoduction and cobtb of cleaning ap the pollution, and othenb, one ubually 
exanined in ¿bolaticn ¿nom each othen. The explanation that can be given 
¿on thib pantial treatment one, la) that to ccnbiden a pnoblem in ibolation 
lu.ghlightb thobe featuneb that one bpecial to itb c lf and (6) that, the btudy of 
unban welfare economicb ib btilZ in itb infancy and mone complex modelb mvubt 
follow bimple oneb., Ñeventhelebb i t  nemairb tnue that the ncbultb obtained 
mubt be intenpneied with caution. Specifically the numenical nebultb neganding 
the tnade-offb examined hene exaggenate the choiceb available, and when a ll 
the manginb of adjubtment one conbidened, the effeetb of pollution on the 
urban environment will not be bo manked ab ib buggebted hene.
2.3 An Optimum Town oj Fixed S-izc.
2.3.1 The Optimising problem and conditions defining the optimum.
In this section we consider a town with a ¿ixzd number o£ individuals with. 
ide.ntic.at tastes. Production is organized at the. centre and consists
producing a consumption good and a byproduct catlzd pollution. Somz 
thz town1 sindividuals can bz attocatzd to thz Azmoval o¿ pollution. Thus 
thz production assumptions may bz written down as,
y= ¿InjI ¿"> o ¿’> o y>. o n^ >, o (7)
Z = ¿Uj) - g(n2) g’> o i (W)^ Z> o (2)
nj + - h' hi >o [3)
where y is thz quantity ol thz consumption good, nj thz amount o{, labour
uszd in its  production, 2 thz net quantity o^  pollution, and n^  thz amount
ofi labour uszd in pollution removal. U is thz total amount ofi labour. Thz
units ol measurement pollution are so chcszn that one unit c$ output
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produces one unit o& 'gross' pollution as a byproduct . There are assumed 
to bz incsceasing returns to labour in production, but no assumption is made 
rs yet regarding returns to labour in pollution removal. Thz households 
u tility  depends on thz quantity oj thz consumption good, c, that i t  is 
allocated, thz distance ¿rom thz centre at which i t  resides, x, and thz level 
° i pollution, q, that i t  supers. q w ill depend upon thz net quantity o¿ 
pollution produced, z, and the distance ¿rom thz centre at which thz household 
is located. Thus wz may writ.e:
U = U(c, x, q(z,x}} Uc> o, Ux < o < o (4)
h’z do not consider here thz amount Oj$ living space occupied as a variable.
This can easily be incorporated into the analysis but is held constant so as 
to concentrate on the other issues. In our analysis we w ill consider u tility  
to be an increasing ¿unction o{ c and a decreasing ¿unction o¿ q and x. The 
¿unction q w ill be assumed to be an increasing ¿unction ci z and a decreasing
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¿unction o& x . .
To consider the optimisation as simply as possible we assume that households
axe located on a line with the tom at the centxe. Again i t  is possible to
examine the case token households axe located in the too dimensional
Euclidean space with the centxe the tom as its  origin. As long as x
can then be intexpxeted as the distance {\Xcm the centxe, implying that
pollution spxeads itse lf 'symmetrically' axound the tom, nothing is
gained by doing sc. The considexation oi geogxaphic and climatic ¿actors
that would lead to an asymetxic distxibution o& pollution in the neaghbowt-
hocd ci the tom Is not the concexn o£ this analysis. When we come to
considex some numexical values ¿or the optimum town then i t  Is impoxtant
whethex the town Is txeated as monocentxie ox as long and naxxow. At that
stage we will consider both shapes. Thexefioxe, tolling the additive
w el ¿axe ¿unction in it ia lly , we may wxite the maximisation as
max 21 U( c( . ) ,  x, q(x, 1) ) Mx) dx (5)
x
Whexe U is a stxictly concave ¿unction o£ e, x, and q, increasing in e
and decreasing in x and q, and whexe q is an incxeasing ¿unction o¿ 1 and
a decreasing ¿unction o¿ x. A ll the relevant partial derivatives are assumed
to exist. By the assumption that each household occupies a ¿ixe.d amount o¿
space, the ¿unction ft(x ) takes the valuers 2 or 0, i t  taking the ¿omex value
N
i¿ the value o¿ x ¿or which i t  is evaluated is assumed to be 'occupied'.
The constraints on the maximisation axe
Mf c (x ] /l(x 1 dx — y (6)
*x
y ~  F(W, 2) (7)
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Equation (7) is an explicit fonm of the. relationship between $, W and 1 
that ii> obtained from equations (7) to 13) when nj and n^  are eliminated.
I t  i t  clear that the. necessary conditions for a maximum to the above 
require that consumption be to allocated that the marginal u tility  of 
consumption i t  the tame for a ll households, no matter where they one 
located ^. I f  this were not to, then i t  would aheays be possible to 
increase the turn of u tilities  by marginally reallocating consumption. 
Furthermore the maAginal product of 1 should be equal to the tiun of the 
marginal Kates of substitution betveen the consumption good and I. This 
is the familiar condition for determining the optunum quantity of a 
Public ’bad'. Thus we. may wnite the necessary optunum conditions at,
Fok a ll x: h[x) > o, = x (g)
U. f - 111 / U ) H(x) * F (9)
l x
With equality holding in [91 when o < 1 < f[hl).
These necessary conditions w ill define one ok moKe sets of functions
hlxl, c(xl, and one ok more sets of values of V and 2. We define {P}
as the set of points x where /i(x), as obtained from the necessary conditions,
is positive. Then i f ,  the u tility  function is contiviuout in x i t  is clear
that a ll individuals who are located at extreme points of this set {P}
c
must have equal u tility  . For, consider too households at Xj.and x^  and 
suppose that U[xj) > Uix^). (We supress the. other arguments o¡$ the u tility  
functions as they are held constant.) By the definition of continuity,
V e > < ? 3  3 > o : I x - Xj 7 < 3 7 U(x) - U[Xj) 7 < e. I f  we le t
e = U(Xj| - U[x2) then we know that there is an x, sufficiently close
to Xj where the difference in u tilities  beiveen the too individuals 
would be smaller than with one of them located at x^. Since xj is an
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extreme point o{, {P}, i t  follows that thane, it, a point dote, enough to
Xj that Is unoccupied. Hence overall u tility  can be increased by 
relocating individual6.
To say anything more about the location o& the individuals, i t  i t  necessary 
to make 6ome further assumptions about the u tility  £unction. . the 
utility  function is concave in x aid c then the population density is non 
zeno over a continuous rouge o$ values o& x. To see this suppose that the 
population density Is positive ¿or x $ xQ and x  ^ xqq and zero ¿or 
Koo>x>y'o' ma^  '^ ie ui^Jhity function as:
U[c,x, q[x,2)) = P(c,x,Z) (J0)
For given Z, we have by the concavity assumption V 0<\<J :
V (Xx, * I! - x) x00, x% M l  - xl coo. Z| , (Xl/|x0 , v  Z) *
<’ - xl % 0- z> t in
V lll-X) X„ * X x00, (1-1) c„ X X t„„, Z) >, (l-X)l/(x„, c„, Z] *00‘ 0’ O'
« ' « ' W  % 0- zl ( 12)
Adding:
V (Xx0 ♦ (I-X|x00, Xc0 * [l-l)c00, Z] t mu-x lx ^ ♦ XXM ,
(l-Xlc^ - XC00, Z] >. H[*„. V  Z] « f|*M , c00, Z) 113)
Hence by redistributing c and relocating the households previously at 
xo and xoQ so that they ate closer together, we may increase the overall 
utility .
The concavity o£ the u tility  &unction in c and x requires, in addition to 
what has already been assumed regarding the u tility  function, that the 
marginal disutility o$ living ¿u/ither out does not rise as net pollution
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IncAza* e* [Li $ O ) and that the. level o i net pollution dettine* le**
fiapldly a* the datante {fiom the centre IncAtase*. >0). While
thefie l*  ¿orne evidente to suggest that the hxtte.fi might be the case {ofi
notie and ion. ¿orne {ofuns o{ pollution,  ^ thtfie li no fieason to suppose
that U < 0. A* a *peclal tene ite may tonsldeA the u tility  {¡motion that
l i  addltivehj * epanable between t and the otheA anoumenti o{ the {unction.
In that tene U = 0, and the fiequinment that the marginal u tility  o{xg
consumption be constant [equation (S)) l i  ¿atti{led when a ll Individual* 
have equal ton*amplion, and the dlitnlbution o{ u tlllt le *  { on. a tentavo 
u tility  { unction In t  and x may be represented ai ¿hoim In diagram 1, and 
■2. When the u tility  { unction l*  addltively separable, however, the 
population density tan be non zero even l {  the u tility  { unction l*  not 
concave In x. All that 1* required then, l*  that u tility  ai a { unction o{ 
x be single peaked.
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The area that 1s occupied is ¿imply the peak o{ the u tility  {unction. Since 
each individual uses a {ixed length, we may choose the units o{ x Mich that 
he occupie,i> a unit length, and the point* x^  and xq + n/2 axe chosen either 
side o{ the peak, subject to the constraint that tf{ )  = U{xQ + n/2). Thi*
constraint applies a* long a* xq i  0. J{ the residential area ¿tarts at the 
town centsit as in diagram 2, then U (xQ} * U(x + n/2).
So {ar we have only consider/$fl.e necessary conditions {¡or the maximisation o{ 
an additive welfare {unction. In the case c{ the Rawlsian welfare criterion, 
we wish to choose cU) and 1, ¿o as to maximise u tility , ¿ubject to u tility  being 
independent o{ x [i.e.constant {¡or a ll persons). The necessary condition 
relating to the choice o{ 2, {¡or given N will ¿ t i l l  be that the ¿um o{ the 
marginal rates o{ substitution betceen c and I {the marginal opportunity cost 
c{ c in teruni o{ 2 in consumption] be equal to the marginal product o{ 2, {{or 
non zero 2 and non zero antipollution). For i {  that condition were not ¿atis{ied, 
i t  would be possible to raise everyone* u tility  by marginally changing 2 and 
reallocating the change in output ¿o as to keep a ll u tilities  equal. The choice 
o{ the {unction c{x) and the location o{ individuals can be looked at in term* 
c{ the indi{{erence point* between c and x. J{ {or any given set o{ indi{{erence 
points that represent a given level o{ u tility  we choose the combinations o{ c 
and x, so as to minimise the use o{ the consumption good to locate n/2 individuals, 
then we w ill obtain the necessary ecnditi.cn* {or an optimum, {or this procedure 
will allow us to choose the highest indi{{erence curve {or a given level o{ 
outfit. I t  seems intuitively clear that i {  the u tility  {unction Is continuous, 
a ll individuals located by the above procedure such that they have no ’neighbours' 
on at. least one side must have equal consumption. For i {  they did not, we may 
consider too such households located at xQ and where the consumption o{ 
the {ormer eQ, is greater than that o{ the latter e0Q. I t  would then be possible
?4
to move the individual at x su{{ici.ently close to x , such that he obtainedU OC
the ¿aim u tility  as begone, but used less consumption resources. Hence the 
original allocation could not have been optimal. Formally we mau state 
this proposition as,
Let the set o{ points at which individuals are located be { P7}. I { 
the u tility  function is continuous in x and c and increasing in c then a 
necessary condition {or maximising a Raaolsian welfare {¡unction is that 
consumption at alt extreme points be equal.,
Proo{.
Let x and x 6c. too extreme points and le t c > c . J{ we can show 0 00 0 00 u
that there exists a c* < cQ , such that {or some unoccupied x U[x, c*) =
U[xo, cQ) then we have established our proposition.
By continuity in the neighbourhood o{ xqq we have that
V e>o} 6 : 1 x - x00 1 < 6 = > I U(t00, x) - u|c00, x j  ! < e
Since x is an extreme point, given e , there exists an unoccupied x:00 **
either 0 < U x| - u,coo- ‘oo1 < e (14)
or 0 < U < < W  V , 1 - utc-oC xl < E (75)
In case (74) ulcoo' xl > (i(c , x )^ and there{ore there exists a
c* < cQo < e0 : ulc*, x) = Ufc^, In case (75) e >
li(c , x ) - U(c ,x) > 0 and there{ore by making e small enough we can
make the di{{ercnce betveen U(coo, xoo) and Ui-00> *) su{{iciently small so
that, since U is increasing in c, there exists a c*, c > c* > c and
0 00
ulcoo’ 00 U(c*,.x). ( 16 )
.25.
In the case where U is concave, in x the indifference curves bet/jeen c and x 
may be drawn a-i Ahem In diagrams 3 and 4. The location of the individuals 
will be continuous In both caAes, with consumption failing in itia lly  with 
distance and then rising in diagram 3 and /Using continuously in diag/iam 4.
So far in cun. analysis we have only considered the necessary conditions for. 
an optimum to an additive u tility  welfare criterion and to, a Rau'lsian welfare 
criterion, h'e new examine with what additional conditions the necessary 
conditions derived above combine to represent a global optimum.
The sufficiency conditions can pe/ihaps best be discussed with reference 
to diagrain 5 below. This represents the production and welfare trade-offs 
between V, the total quantity of the consumption good, and 1 the net quantity 
of pollution. The production constraint is represented by the bold Line. In 
general a positive output is possible with no pollution, the point V ocoining 
when the maximum amount of labour is allocated to pollution removal. The
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tn a d z -o^  between V and 2 .ie.pAtee.nt the. amouiU o$ extna y the 
community needs, given a manginal increase In Z, to keep total welfiane constant 
token the location of, the Individuals is optimally chosen ¿on each V and Z.
I t  is clean, that conditions (S) and (9) M ill be su^icien t ¿on a maximum i£ the 
pnoduction constnaint and the ¿unction nepnesenting the «.^¿ane t>lade-c¿¿ oac 
both concave. We thene¿one have to investigate the conditions unden tvkich 
these ¿unctions M ill be concave.
The Pnoduction Corstnaint
With ineneasing netunns in the pncduction sectcn an essential assumption on 
the pncduction side o¿ the model, the concavity o¿ F(W,Z] with nespect to 1 
is couAse not guaAantecd.it is possible, hcMtven, to obtain necessany and 
Su¿¿icient conditions on the ¿(.) and g(.) ¿unctions ¿on F(^Z] to be concave 
in Z. intuitively F(.) M ill be concave in 1 i¿ as the output level V ineneases, 
the net pollution 1 ineneoses at an inc'i easing note. blow with ineneasing netunns
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in production, as V increases -it w ill absorb less and less cf the labour, 
force per uniX. increase in Y. Tkis w ill take labour away from ■the antipollution 
acXivitij aX a declining rate and the effect on the net level of pollution w ill 
depend on hew the antipollution activity declines. If there are increasing 
return in that activity then its output wilt decline at a declining rate 
(recall that labour i t  being withdrawn from i t  progressively mere slowly) 
and consequently 2 wilt increase at a decreasing rate. However i f  there cute 
increasing returns in production and decreasing returns in pollution removal 
then the rate of increase of 1 w ill depend on how slowly labour is being 
withdrawn ¡Jrom i t  as V increases, relative to how fast its  output declines 
as labour is transferred to producing V. In this regard we may state the 
following condition:
Given equations (1) -- (3), the production constraint Y - F[K',2) w ill be
concave in 1 i f  and only i f ,
for a ll feasible values of iij and [One prime denotes the firs t derivative 
and too princes denotes the second derivative.)
Proof. . ..V.
From equation (I) - (3) tt'e obtain,
9 [17)
Y < -
¥ [V - 2) + <f> M  - W = 0
2 1
For concavity tve require that 8 Z / 9 Y > 0. Differentiating 2 Jbn\plicitl.y
[ 2 0 )
n = const.
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Vifácaentiating again,
32ZÄQYl - -7T ** *ÓQíl
3r
1 M • f i ji
y <t> + 4> y ir - ] (2/;
¿ubótituting ¿nom (73)
¿gn a2Z
3^
¿3n (Y )2 $" + (tj/)2 Y" ( 22 )
Since the ivvbt txpActóion in baacketi ¿i negative (75) w¿¿£ bt positive i¿ :
(23)
I /? »
(Y ) <J>
i o ir
< ($ ) Y
o-'i aitcAnatively
I
JL
( o '  )2
Y
7772
(24)
ttalking back to the invented ¿unctiont we /;aue
7  = _L
1$’
vKlcf Cf) ”
u
± _  • r
» 13
and Y' = _7_ and Y" 
„ » (g’)3
idiidi tjiaidi
J1 <
Í’
JSl
(25)
(26)
Condition ( 17}ka¡> to hold facA a ll ieaòible valutò o& n^  and n^ . 
Since 1 ^0 , tkiò implicò that i t  hat to hold {¡on.
n1 > -«*
n2 K
» ^
W - Hj* , tc'iCAe ííj í/za ¿a£a£¿or. -to
¿(»j) - g(w - Hj) = o (27)
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Condition (77) has a na-tuAal inteApnetation. The tcAms h" / h '
and g" / g ’ axe measuAes oh the coehhictent oh absolute risk awision i.n
the theoAy oh risk.
TheiA propenties oAe explained in Aaacu) (1965) but essenttally they attempt 
to captuAC the dega.ee oh concavity ok convexity oh o: hunction. In oua context 
they may be inteApActed cm measuAing the extent oh decAeasing on. ¿ucAea.scng 
KetuAnò to ¿caie, and condition (JO) ¿ay6 that V will be concave in 1 ih and 
only ih the decAcaAing aetuAns to pollution Amoved., as measuAed by the 
'absolute coehh'latent oh Attains' oac gAcateA than the incAeasing Activuvs to 
pneduct ion.
The (ielhatc function.
The welhaie ¿unaiccn whose ttade-ohh between Y and 1 we aae inteiestcd in, 
may be m itten as
max 21 U(c(x), x, q(x,Z))h(x) dx (28)
xx
s. t . N. / c(x) h(x) dx -  y (29)
x
We may AehcA to the maximum as w (Y, 2). 71 is unhontunctcly tAue that
eueu with the simplest hoAm oh u tility  hunction theae oac no azasenable conditions 
hoA the concavity oh w (.). This can be seen by considering the additiveiy 
sepaAable u tility  hunction, that has been discussed above,
U(c, x, q(x, Z)) = V(c) + R(x, q(x, 7))
in this case i t  hollows d-iAectly h^ om (8) that c.(x) h(x) 
and a ll individuals have equal consumption. lh we ¿uAther 
assume that R(.) ts single-peaked in x hoA a ll 1, the Aesidential aAea can 
be expACSòed an InteAval oh ihe Aeal tine. As stated above the concavity oh K
(30)
V Mx), 
W
• }0.
in x is cent, ¿0/1 this, although i t  is not nzzzssaay.
TheAz&cnz, consideAing an additivzly iz.pcuia.bZz u tility  function that Li single .
9
pzakzd in x, u'z my unite w (.) ai ,
u (V, 2)
x > 0.o
*  (Z) + N/« 
° f  Z 
xo [Z) {
y } 
w )v £ + R (x, q(x, Z))} dx (37
Wke.xz u'z have chosen the unit* maiuAemnt o& x, ¿uch that zach individual 
occupies a unit length.
I t  may bz aeadily vzni^Lzd that,
tOy  ^ 0 and y^y  ^  ^> and
to-
x ^ l) + W/2
x (Z)0
f-J_ R(*> dx •* [e (xo* m/2 i, ,(X(jt W/2,Z|)
 ^ 9Z
R( v  < (V  z*j) rfxc0
Sincz thz utility at all exttme points is zqual this neduces to 
x (Z) + M/2
CO,
xo (Z)
R (*> i fx ,  Zlj.ctx < 0
(32)
(33)
and -¿4 i/ien givzn by,
( j _  R((xQ.+ N/2), q( (xQ + W/Z
l  SZ (
xo (Z) + W/2 
+ / 
xo (Z)
9 k
— f 3Z¿
dx
Z) )
)
_1
9Z
R((x ), q(x ,2) Adx 
( ° 0 ) — £ 
'  dZ
( 3 4 )
Thz secand pant oj thz RHS oq (34) ccc££ have the sign given by,
• }1«
V ZI ' W Z ,
¿511. / i *  ¿x
xo (Z] 3ZZ
< 0 ^ 0
undztznminzd othzAicxtz
Thz {\iAtf paAt c  ^ thz RHS 0$ (3 4) ha6 thz ¿amz ¿ign at,
(35)
¿gn. $ —  R(x + H/„, Z) 
l  3Z °
s dxn
' 7T  r ‘ v  2|^
= ¿gn. C 32R 
\dX 3Z
dX0\ (36
i r i
> 0 U  qa  £ 0 R 5 0 xq
undztznminzd cthznicitz
Fok thz la.it paopo-iition wz AzquiJiz the Kztult that dxQ > 0 ¿1 q^  £ 0.
a r
Thit ib 4hewn in thz next ¿zcti.on when ¿ctnz ccmpanativz 4tatlz 0b6ZA.vatd.ciu 
CLAZ ditCU66Zd.
11 appzaA6 tkzAzfioAZ that zvzn in thit ¿hr.ptz ca6z wz cannot ¿ign thz zxpnzt6ion 
¿of1 u'^ 7, and hzncz wz cannot ettablith thz concavity thz wzZ&oaz ¿unction.
One '4ped a l1 ca6z ti'hzn i t  w ilt be concavz ¿6 when thz boundadet 0$ thz town.. 
oaz indzpzndznt 0$ Z, and q^j 5 0 . Hcwzvzn, i t  would bz zxtAzmziij 
¿Ontuiticut i{i thz ¿OAmZA. WZAZ to be tAUZ.
Fca thz Azwioni given abovz thz nzczt6any condition14 (8) and (9) cannot 
guanaatez a global maximum. Thz po66ibilitij o$ multiple zquilibnia i t  tkzAz^onz 
inhzAznt in thz 6tAuctuAZ c$ thz pAoblzm. Thit mean4 that thz wzl^xxz chitznion 
hat to bz evaluated at each point S.V, Z} whzxz thz nzczt6aAtj condition aA.e 
¿uliiiizd and ovZAall maximum cho6cn. A local concavity condition that i i
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su^icicnt ¿or a locai maximum, howevex, can bc obtained. Fieni diagxam 5 
i l  it cleax that at a locai maximum thè uscitale indi^^exence Suxfiace rnu-S-t bc
locally concave. The ■ilepe this curve i t  given by,
-, Xc,(Z) + W/2
dV
di
v
2 ./
x0 (Z) Z dx fi­
co = comi
Hence its io le  o¡{ change i t  given by
d2v' 
di2
1 3 
3Z
xo (Z) + W/2 
/
xo (Z)
co = cenni
U ,z dx.
TT
c
(37)
In the cate o^  the u tility  function (30] thin requirement o£ local concavity 
may be expressed cs :
( ( M  z ! - RZ| >Z ) i d.x , 0
*  + W/2 v 1
+ ? 2 H i
U  ' c "e J
d l x V . o c
< o,
[SS)
evaluated at the relevant V and Z. The ¿irst term within brackets i t  the 
1 marginal' change in the MRS between 1 and c, due to an alteration in the 
optimal location o{) howseholds when 2 increases and the second term with the 
integral is tine change in sum 0$ the MRS between 7 and c when 1 in areata and 
the locations axe held constant. With a xeatonably well behaved u tility  function 
and pollution distribution function, ^  the ¿ tu t term w ill be positive and the 
second negative. 'Me require that the sum be negative.
55.
2.3.2. Some Comparative Static Observations
I t  Is of -som£ interest to ask how the. allocation of consumption would vary 
across the town, and how the choice o^ residential locations would respond to 
changes In the net level of pollution produced. In the case of the additive 
welfare ¡5unction, we consider, the changes In consumption over a range of 
values of x when Individuals are continuously located. I¡5 the ¿unction c(x), 
Is pleceivlse differentiable and we consider I t  over one such differentiable 
range, then differentiating [8] with respect to x we obtain
dc 
d x
U qcq x^ cx
Ucc
for xa > x > (37)
Where xa and x^  represent one range over which c[x] Is differentiable.
Whether or not c Inereases with x depends on the sign of the nmerator, which 
In turn depends on the complementarity avid substitutability relationships between 
the consumption good and net pollution suffered (c. and q) and between the 
consumption good and distauice from the centre (c and x). In general there 
Is no reason to assume a particular relation betiveen these goods and ' bads’ 
and so I t  Is not possible to make any general statement regarding how 
consumption varies with distance from the centre.
When the u tility  function Is addltively separable betveen c and the other 
arguments, then consumption Is equal for all. Individuals. In diagrams (1) 
and [2) we showed the distribution of u tility  this would imply when the u tility  
function was concave In x. I t  Is Interesting to note that In this case any 
Increase In the town's population w ill lead Individuals being located both
i¿uathea out and cloiea in, me.ne.vta this i i  poaible [i . t . mheneveA x t  o). 
Fuatheamoae any incaease in tht level o& pollution 2 m ill not necosiaail.y lead 
to the totem hip moving ¿uathea out [i.e . dxQ may be eithea iig n ).
T T
Thai, can eerily be ¿ten in diagaam 6 belom. At level o{> pollution 2^  the temn 
i i  cptin-iallij located beiiceen xq and xq + N/^ . At an incaeased leveJL ofi 
pollution I q + A Z the nem u tility  cuave m ill l ie  belom the oaiginal. cuave, 
and be concave. Hcmevea, i t  may be that the change in u tility  l i  gneatea 
d a ta  to the centae than i t  i i  ¿uathea out [caie (a) in diagaam 6), oa i t  
may be that the change i i  gaeatea ¿uAthea out, than i t  i i  neaa the centae.
[Case (fa') in diagaam 6). In the ¿omea caie i t  i i  cleaa that the iame population 
can be beit located by ihinting eveaycne a l i t t l e  2uathea. out. In the lattea 
caie, hemevea, the aevease i i  taue. Thui the neiult dependi on the iign efi the 
paatial deaivative U By di^eaentiating the u tility  ¿unction i t  i i  cleaa 
that > 0 i £ i  o. Thii coaaeipondi to caie (a). Homevea ifi
U^ < 0 then q^  > o, ai in caie (fa).
Theaeficae ¿oa i t  to be optimal ¿oa the neiidential aactvto be moved ¿uathea ¿aom 
the centae, the change in the distaibution c¿ pollution ai a aeiult ci an incaeaie 
in the level paoduced hoi to be iuch that aaeai ¿uathea out aae aelatively 
no moaie a¿¿ected, Whethea q  ^ > o i i  o¿ couaie an emplaical queiticn. ,
In the caie o¿ t ie  Ramliian mellaae ¿unction me note that the allocation o¿
the consumption good i i  iuch ai to hold u tility  constant. Thui mheae u tility
¿aom
mould incaeaie mith an incaeaie in the distance / the cen-tae, the coniumption 
allocated deciinci moth the diitance, and mheae -utility mould decacaic mith.
u (*. o
k fa ,fa iô l )) if)
U ( * ,  (p)
distance, ¿'torn the centre, the consumption allocated increases. With insistence 
on complete equality o& u tility , the locations chosen will depend both on the 
level oi pollution Z and the level o& output /. The latter witl be the case 
even when the u tility  ¿unction is additiveiy separable between c and x '
When the u tility  function is concave in c and x i t  is possible to analyse 
the ejects o& qualitative changes o$ x , the distance fitom the centre o& the 
town that the residential d istrict starts, with respect to 1 and V. In 
general this is rather involved and the answers appear to depend on third 
order partial derivatives o$ the u tility  £unction, which cannot reasonably 
be signed. However i£ the u tility  function is additiveiy separable in c and 
x, then
x^o < o as < o
3Z
and dx > o__o
The ¿irst result is exactly the same as ¿or the utilitarian welfare ¿unction 
and arises because the relative distribution cp o llu tion  over the space is 
important,. as well as the absolute level. The second result indicates that as 
real income increases, the marginal opportunity cost o& nearness to the centre 
rises in terms c$ the consumption good, ¿or a given distance ¿rcm the centre. 
Hence to obtain the maximum equal u tility  i t  is now relatively more desirable 
to locate everyone ¿urther out.
»¿6.
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2.3.3 TTte. Attaiment oj the Optimum by Decentralisation.
In this ¿action we examine the conditions under which the optimum can be attained
when the households and the producers make independent decisions. We consider
optimal
in itia lly  the case where the ¡location ol individuals is continuous [i.e . the 
set { P } can be represented by intervals cl the real line), the levels 0$ 
y and 1 are lixed, and the welfare criterion is the additive u tility  one.
For tlris case we may obtain the optimum by defining a rental lunction p (x), 
over the range where we desire to locate the households, and a distribution 
cl income such that households maximise their u tilities  at the given rental 
£unction to choose the optimum consumption function c(x):
¡.‘ax U[c, x, q lx, Z)) 
s.t. c + p (x) = M (3 S)
The lirs t order conditions lor an optimum are
U
13
*£.
dx U (391
To obtain the optimal value ol plx),
, U* U*dp = __x = __x
dx U* X 140)
Where the staT indicates optin:al values ol the partial derivatives.
Uft
[ 4 1 ,Therelorz X d£ 
dx
U* dc c —
dx
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where ' t '  indicate* the toted, derivative o{ (j with respect to x. 
Jnte.Qfuiti.nQ (41) yield*
p (x) = uix) - c(x) [42)
A
Fen. the rental {¡unction to yield the optimuir i t  ha* alto, to be true that no 
other. {easible combination o{ c and x gives greater. u tility  than the Combination 
represented by the {vast order conditions 139). Such {easible combination* 
are given by
c + p(X) «? c*(x) + p(x*) (43)
Where the x* indicate-* the optimum choice. Substituting (42) give*:
c(x) U[x) - c(x) 
X
cU* U (x C X’
U(x) s; U(x*) (44)
which establishes the defined proposition. A similar result can be obtained
{on. the Raids i  an welfare cnltenlon . We note that the decentrailsall.on doe*
¡¡1
not depend in either case on hew U varies with x .
The above competitive realisation. 1*, however, a very limited result, {or i t  
dee* net deal with the choice o{ V and Z. When the production constraint 
1* concave a local maximum can only be reali*ed competitively, a* long a* 
care i*  taken to ensure that a condition similar to (3£) is *ati*{ied. For, 
i {  the government agency place* a tax on the pollution Z o{ P^ , and the wage 
per unit o{ labour {orce 1* so determined that the whole labour {orce i*  always 
mployed, then the producer may be required to maximise pro{its at given prices.
tt = ¿Uj) ' Pz.UUj) - Q(n2) ) - W . (taj + n2) (45)
The {irs t order conditions yeiid,
?!
d ^ 7 .
(46)
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and i t  may be readily verl{ied that the second order conditions w ill be 
satisfied l { h i  < o and W is chosen so that demand {¡on. labour. Is equal to
M.
Setting Pj V n/22. f° L dx, we obtain the necessary
condition (9) {on a local optimum. The sufficiency condition {on local
optimality, however, is that the surn o{ the manglnal nates o{ substitution
between 1 and c be Increasing with 1 In the neighbourhood o{ the maximum. ■
This has to be Independently verified to ensure sufficiency. In the case
o{ the additlvely separable u t ility  {unction we have -seen that I t  entails
expression {35) being satisfied and we can Intenpnet the terms Involved. In
dlagnam (7) below we illustra te  such a, local optimum, At  price p ^  the
( 2 ) ^producer w ill choose a and at price p he w ill choose 6. The la tter Is a
.2
local minimum and the {onmen Is a local maximum.
In the above we have assumed that the production constraint Is concave, and
as we have seen this w ill otly be true In special circumstances. I f  the
concavity o{ the production constraint Is not satis {led then the price décentralisa
tien will, not guarantee even a local optimum, in diagram (g) below we Illustrate
such a case, a and 6 ojlc the points chosen at prices p ^  and p ^
respectively. They are not local optima and the (global] optimumi Is attained
(21by pro{it minimisation at y with the p-rlce p^  {or 2.
This section may be conluded by observing that there are substantial
r
di{{icu ltles In the way o{ a price decentralisation c{ both producer and consumer 
decisions. A local optimum Is possible l {  the production constraint is 
concave, providing that the concavity o{ the wel{are criterion in ■the 
neighbourhood o{ the optimum, is independently verified. Without concavity In 
the production constraint a local optimum Is not necessarily attainable by 
price decentralisation.
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2 , 4 .  An Optimum Ge.oflfia.pluj oh S im ila r  Towns.
2,4,1 Conditions deUninq the optimum size oh town.
In this ¿action we develop our analyst& to taka account oh a variable tom
6iza. This ¿¿> dona by a66u.ru.ng that tha population is to ba divided Into a 
number oh identical towns ¿o as to maximise soma welhare criterion ho a. the 
whole population. lh the number oh such towns is large, than we may 
conveniently represent the choice oh this number by a continuous variable.
We w ill assume that this is so.
The total population oh the country is P, and i t  is to be located in t  towns 
oh size W each. lh the welhare criterion hor society is additive then we may 
represent i t  as
147)
\ 4 i )
We may write the Lagrangian as
_P r ( ) r
L = 2. u \ / ( U(c(x), x, q [x ,l) - X (cU) - F(fJ,Z) ) )  h{x)l dx
1 x ( n ) '
(49)
The necessary conditions hofl a local max-imum are (S) and (9) above, and in 
addition,
ft IV,2,N) = 
?
2. jj J U{clx),x,qlx,l'i[Jilx) dx 
x
s .t 2. w / j c(x) - F i M l j M x )  dx = 0
x N
iL
3N
o
(50)
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We may obtal.n (50) expticltl.y and InteApaet I t  when the utility function
L6 addltively ¿epaAable be.tice.en x and c, and i t  ¿6 ¿Ingle peaked In x.
Ai 6toted eafiLlet- the*e condition* Imply that the optimal location* w ill be 
an Interval oh the keal tine. Then (49) may be newhttten a*,
L
x +o
f
X
N/,
V ( C . ( X ) ) + r (x , q ( x , Z ) ) j  - X | c [ x )  - F ( W , Z )j dK
W
[51)
VlhheAcntiating with fietpect to W give*,
3 L
aw
x0 + N/2
~ + 2.- / 3 . i X. F(W,Z)| dx
W ■ W  X  377 ' W  'o
* *•;; i 7 - 7 ‘ i 1 * 7 ^ ’)
(52)
2 . - ( 7  R U o + K/Z- «] • 7  c( *„ + w' 'z + -  F[N,Z)J 
2 W )
* r  ‘ 7 ’ F|N'z , } i
ft
W (53)
FAom condition [S] we obtain,
c[x0 * W/2) = F(W,Z). (541 Hence 3]- = 0 =>,
w aw
2. - .  ! -  R((x ♦ W /  ),Z) * i  ¡ F  W  - F ( W , Z ] j  
W  1 2 0 Z Z N [ N J
W.ft )
-----„ 1 " 0
P.2.XT'  '
(55)
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Rearranging, this givCJ,
( M. n M R (x + w/: ,z) X ( NF, F(N,Z)
(56)
CondUM.cn (56) may be interpreted as ¿ollows,
7  ^eoe ¿afce a<ew people ¿lem each tom and ¿et up a new torn, then the gain o/
u tilità  to the residents at a constant level', o/ù consumption Is , W.ft.The
P
loòò oi u tility  ¿icm existing tornò ts, W.R( (xo + W/^), 2). Hzncz the nzt
u tility  gain iò thz le {t  hand ¿idz ojJ (56). However ¿uch gain was calculated
on thz basts that no change in consumption per head occult,. Thz loòò in output
to a ll exacting towns is HF^ , and thz gain in output to thz new town is
F(M,Z). Thz u tility  valuation o& tlus change is thz light hand side o¿ (56).
the
Thz marginal condition requires /gain in locational u tility  to be equal to the 
less in consumption u tility , sc that no ¿urther marginal subcUvisicn o$ the 
population is dutiable.
Conditions (S), (9) and (56) eue only necessaiy ¿or a locally optimum 
geography. By an argument similar to that used in thz previous section, these 
conditions, along with the concavity .ol ft in V, 1 and W and the concavity o / 
F(N, 2) in h and 1 would bz su^iclent ¿¡on. a global maximum. However, as with 
the problem when H was held constant, theAe afte no reasonable conditions to -■ 
guarantee the concavity oi fi. The concavity ol F(.) in N and 1 requires that
UM II ' ' . v / z z (57)
Using thz same notation as (19) and taking the implicit ¿ortii 0(J F(.) g-cuen 
in (IS), the last condition reduces to,
Sgn ZZ “ rl l  1 = Sgn l ’J'" l<1>' + ) < 0 (5S)
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[58] is negative, since with decreasing returns to ¿acute. In pollution removal 
and Increasing returns to ¿calc. In production $' and ty" arc oi opposite signs. 
I t  would appear thereiore that even local concavity conditi.o)t& cannot be 
satis iied ior the function F(.). A local optimum would then be defined ai> 
a point when conditions (8), (9) and (56) are satlsiled, and where U.) I t  
locally concave In V, 2 and H.
2,4.2, Some Comparative Static Ohte.Ava.tLoM.
The i-irst point that we note heA.e l i  that the necessary condition!) {¡oa an 
cptimwr,i, and hence the optimum she oi town,, o.Ae Independent. oi the th e  ofi 
the population P. Thlt h  o{ counte becaute we have not considered any 
cveAall land area constraints, and any variation In the area occupied pen 
Individual. l i  such variation were considered, then the th e  oi the popula­
tion would be relevant.
l i  I t  oi tome Interest alto to compare the lu ll optimum with the equilibrium 
which would prevail when there was no control on pollution and the town she 
was determined by competi-tive iorcet. Under these condlti.cns an equilibrium 
town size, well only exist, l i  the production procets Is such that the Increaslyig 
returns postulated hitherto, only last up to a certain level oi output, and 
beyond that level diminishing returns set In. Such a case is Illustrated 
In diagram 8 below. There are Increasing returns up to town she hi*, and 
then daiuintshing returns set In, the uncontrolled town she Is then given by 
hi**. The whole production structure may then be represented as:
45.
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f* (59)
{60)
( 6 1 )
in the long tun
Kcw hi the, competitive, situation¡the numb et o¿ townt will expand to the. point
'whete zeto excels profit,s one. being made. Tivù implies a competitive 
equilibtium, òubicnipted by c, cut which we have
c U** 6lh'**) yc ¿{u**l
nIc o; FIMC,ZC) W F,,(,C h! r2 t. IÍ2]
At the ¿all optimum i t  ú  clean, that the pn.opon.tion o¿ the labou/i ¿once
employed in pollation nemoval cannot ¿all, but i t  i t  not cleat whethet the town
nelative to the competitive equilibnium. 
òize w ill ni-òe on ¿all/ Thene ate two ¿otcet at wonk. On the one hand
a ¿mallet town me.am that thete i t  a matginal commpticn loòò ¿nom ¿utthet
6ubcUvition to cancel the marginal locational gain, but on the othet hand a
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larger town may mean that more people can be allocated to pollution removal 
and hence the locational, gains axe ¿mallet from ¿citing up mote towts. We 
may obtain the conditions under which the town ¿ize w ill not expand when we 
move from a competitive equilibrium to an optimum as follows. At the optimum 
the conditions defining b! and l  ate given by
,V.FW - F(.V,Z) = A* > o ¡63)
Fz = B * > o (64)
Where A and B axe determined by bl, I and the optimal locations, blow i f  ¿tatting
at bl** with A - B = a, we find that 3W and 3W ate negative, then
3 A SB
16
the optimum cannot be attained at an bl > N**, when A* and B* 'one ¿mall numbers 
To examine the conditions under which the too partial derivatives are negative,
we obtain the ¿allowing expressions by implicit differentiation of (63) and
[64):
JW = h i  , *!t = " ' Fbiz + Fz (65)
' 3 A W 9 * |pf
Where, •
m  = WiFM  F2Z • 4 '  + rw Fz (66)
From ¡65) and ¡06) tee note that i f ,
(a) The production constraint is concave in Z and bl In the neighbourhood of
(61 Fm » o ■ « '
then ,
M < o and dbl < o. 
dA dS
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Undex. ttieie clxcumitancei the l i t l  optimum ti chanactexlied by a no laxgex 
town ¿Zze than the. ¿ace. competitive equiilbnlwn with a no imaltex p’lcpoxtlon 
ol the. population erptoyed Zn pollution Aemcval. Hence, the. quantity ol net 
pctiati.cn at ¿uc.li an optimum L4 not gAeateA than that at a competitive 
cquZtibAtum. When the tom size. undeA a competitive equZlibAlum ¿4 ¿malZeA 
than undent the optimum, however, the net level, ol pollution muit be lower Zn 
the latter c.aie than Zn the lornier. For ZI thZ6 were not ¿c, the competitive 
equitibAium would represent a gAeateA level cl wellare with le a  net pollution 
and gAeat.eA output pel head.
By Introducing, Zn the above cLL&cai^ jZcn, a Aange ol the pAoducticn function 
where tlieie oac decA.ea.iZng retuxni to the pAoducticn pAocea, Zt would ¿eem 
to be ImpcA.ta.nt to recomlder the ¿uUZclency condZticiu du caned Zn the 
previous ¿ubsectZon. Thti Zi because, a.i we have ¿een above the luIZ. optimum 
may tie  Zn the Aange where thexe are decreasing returns ox Zn the Aange whexe 
thexe axe increasing returns to ¿(.). T-i the optimum IZe.i Zn the loAmer Aange 
then F (.) t i  concave, and a local cp.tlmum Zi defined by the concavity ol 
F(.), and ol q. It Zi cl ccuxie ¿ tZ ll not poiiZble to deline a global 
optimum by conditions [&}, (9) and (56), as thexe is no way ol eniuxing the 
concavity cl n, end there Zi aluays the ponZbZZlty ol an equilibrium in the 
Increasing aetarns Aange. Thai the pxcblem ol multiple equZIZbAia Aernalm 
a/4 Znportant ai evex.
2.4.3
.40.
Some. Comments on the attainment o ^  an Optimum by Pri.ee Vecentrclisation
1t  would appear ¿tom the. discussion ¿0 ¿at, that the, chances o¿ attaining
the optimum by price decentralisatton ate rather bleak. The ¿¿¿¿icxlties
that arise do ¿0 on account o¿ the non concavity o¿ both the F(.) ¿unction
and o¿ ^ . 11 is always possible to allocate the individuals optin\ally
in the space atcund the town by competitive decenttalisation, when V, I and
hi ate ¿ixed. When V and 1 ate variable, but hi is ¿ixed, ptice
decentralisation to a local optimum is possible as long as the production
constraint is concave in 1, and as long as the local concavity o¿ w
is independently veriiied. When hi is also voAiable we have seen that
in the increasing returns region ¿or the production activity, the concavity
c¿ F(.), in hi and 1 will not be satis ¿led. In the region when nj > hi*
concavity will be satis ¿led. Since we wish to control the level o¿ two
variables hi and I to obtain the optimum, i t  would be natural to. think in
terms c¿ two instruments; one, a pollution tax equal to the sum o¿ the
marginal rates c¿ substitution between 1 and C when the community is
optimally located, and the other an employment tax, varying with the level
c¿ employment (and probably also with the level o¿ pollution), and based
oh the di¿¿etence beticeen the average and marginal u tilities  in an optimally
located town. However, ¿emulating the problem in this manner i t  is easy
to see that i¿ ¿ims act competitively to maximise pro ¿its, and if, the
equilibtiwn is one o¿ zero pro ¿its, then . the
not
second order pro ¿it maximisation conditions wiillbe satis¿ied i¿ the optimum
value o¿ n^  is less than hi*. They will be satis¿ied under certain
conditions i¿ nj > H*. There¿ore i^ the optimum consists o¿ a
town size greater than that at which the increasing returns set in, then the
may be /7
production decentralisation / ¿easible as suggested above . Jt s till, 
remains true however that the concavity o¿ in 1 and N will 
s t i l l  have to be veri¿ied independently to ensure that the necessary
.49.
conditions do not reprebent a constrained minimum, but rather a constrained 
to cat maximum.
Overall then i t  appeal that the problems oi optir>ial downs cannot in  gQ.ncAaJt 
be bolved by mimiding the competitive model, when ccnbidexationb oi 
pollution ate impcAtant and when thoAe are inexejablng returnb in  the 
pAoducticn process, ior ¿erne nange oi output. I t  would be o¡$ ¿erne benefit 
to know just hew muck and with Aspect to which parameters the town size and 
the tevel oi pollution ate e je c ted  in  order to attain the optimurri, in  
compaAlion with the uncontrolled equltibrtmu Foa i£ the diHexences axe 
laAge, then the iirpoAtance oi diAcct controls on W and 1 axe to be 
enpkasised mcAe strongly. 1i , on the othex hand the optimum town size i t  gAeatex 
than M*, then ¿erne decentralisation may be ieaUble. I t  i t  to an examination oi 
such diHerences, wit!iin a plausible paxametAic iramework, that we new pAoceed.
2 . 5 .  A Parametric FcAir.ulxticn o j Optimum Towns with Environmental Externalities.
2 , 5 , 1  Introduction
In this section we bet cut the pAcblem examined in the rest oi the chaptex 
within a parametric iramework and caxxtj out borne simulations to obtain the 
optimum .town size and the optimum allocation c { laboux between the 
production and the cleaning sectors under varying asiu.mp.ticus Aegarding 
the iocial welfare CAitcu.cn and the 'geography', and ior.various parameter 
values. The point oi Aeierence in betting up the iAcmewoAk and Intexpxetlng 
the Aebultb w ill be the "uncontrolled competitive town." This is  the town 
with no control oi pollution, and with the bize determined by the level oi 
employment at which the average product oi labour in the production sector 
ib maximised. Ii we iix  the level oi employment at. which the decreasing 
reXurnb to bcale bet in at 500,000, then the. point, at which the average 
product ib maximised can be obtained irom this iiguxe and the paramet.eX6 oi 
the bybtem. he may then compare the varioub optima with thib by considering 
that i i  the uncontrolled competitive town hab bay 800,000 people and no 
pollution control, then the. optimum town hab 1 x' people, oi whom 'p ' 
percent are. employed in cleaning up pollution and
50
the net level o£ pollution at the centre Is ' y1 percent loweJi .
11 w ill be apparent that some. o£ the parameter values considered here 
have t i t t le  empirical faundatlon. While this ti> regrettable and Implies 
that the model has t i t t le  quantitative use I t  does not render the exercite 
valueless, far a range o£ values axe considered and the model provide* 
some Interesting Insight Into the sensitivity o£ the results with respect to 
some o£ parameter values relative to others and Indeed the direction In which 
the optimum moves as some parameters change Is not intuitively obvious.
2.5.2 The Production Structure
We define the production o£ the consumption good by the £allowing relations:
y = n|k k>1 °$n,$N* (67)
■ y z Bnje-c l>e>o n,$N" (68)
B»c* positive constants.
£
By requiring continuity at - N * and di££ere>itiability at Kj- W , 
we obtain the fallowing expressions fax C and B :
e (differentiability) (69)
C * (N')k (continuity) (70)
Vifaexentiability at n-j -M Is assumed so as to ensure smoothness In the 
production £unction and prev 
that point.
We defat is the cleaning activity as producing an anti- pollutant, S , an amount, 
given by the relation,
ent^the results depending upon a 'kink' at
S ■= Dn^ o<6 ^ 1 n2> o (71)
and the net level o£ pollution, Z, Is given by, 
= y-S
D> positive constant
1 z >o (72)
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In order to choose V, we require that when the consumption good process Is
employing N* people, the pollution that they create can be cleaned completely 
ISby Ç.M.* people . Hence,
V = £ ~S. H* k~&
Finally the labour employed In both the activities adds up to the total 
quantity ci labour,
Hj + n2 = N [74 )
With such a production structure, the production constraint, y = F (Z),
¿or given W i  H*, may be concave. Concavity w ill be assured l i ,  
n.
k < 1 + U- 6) (75)
W- Hj*
where n^ is the solution to the equation,
njfe - (A/* - n,)6 = 0 (76)
However, as shown earlier, the production constraint V = F(2,SI) w ill not be
concave. Furthermore the condition required to ensure that the optimum 
town be smaller than the competitive town, (F^  0) cannot be
guaranteed ¿or any parameter values.
The production structure thus has the iollowlng undetermined parameter values, 
k, e, ô, Ç and N*.
2.5.3 The F>reference Structure and the Social Weljare Criterion.
The Individual preierences are given byj& ility  function,
8,7 _ „iY a > 0 8 > 0  y > 0
a + 8 + Y = 1
c.a (T - x) e (Zm - qj
T > x è 0, l > q z 09 m  ^ ,
c >0
(77)
log U - a log c q - l  , x - T* IV»9m in ]
q - (Z (1 - ^.x)) 7* r  
. I
r  > 0 (79)
0
x
Such a. u tility  futxction expresses u tility  as an increasing fuiiction of the.
consumption good, nearness to the centre (T-x) curd the absence
o£ pollution (eg. quieten the case of noise). The parameters T and l
rr.a.Lj then be interpreted as folloics; T is the maximum distance from the
centre of the tom that any household may be located, and 1 is them
maximuiY\ level of the pollution 2 that may be tolerated. I t  is natural 
to think cf a lim it such as T - one cannot spend more than the e-hole 
making day commuting or the whole of ones wages on travel. The lim it 
2 is a convenient translation of the measure of pollution from a 'bad' 
to a good. Its usefulness will appear again when we discuss the 
measurement of noise costs in Chapter 3. For the moment we may think 
of i t  as somehow related to the level of pollution produced at the centre 
in a competitive town. With noise pollution, (2 - q) would be
the level of quiet enjoyed by households at distance x from the centre. 2 
would be the maximum, endurable noise at the centre. Normalising the 
coefficients a 3 anty to add up to one, implies that the income elasticities
J
of demand for the aggregate consumption basket, for ’nearness' to the centre, 
and for freedom from pollution are all unity. Furthermore the coefficients 
would then represent the proportion of ones income that it  spent on each of 
these goods.
The distribution of pollution ever space has a very simple assumed form. I t  
is expected that the pollution w ill be the greatest at the centre and decline 
linearly until, at a distance of from the e c tre  we arrive at a pollution- 
free zone. This may be a poor approximation for aircraft no-ise, which 
appears to decline more exponentially than linearly. Jt is not dear how 
good an approximation i t  is for urban noise or air pollution. I t  does
however, have the advantage of allowing the social welfare criterion to be 
computed analytically for the chosen u tility  function. Furthermore the
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Implication oh cl iltua tlon  ujhc.no. potlLuU.cn l i  mono. ' i  pno.ad oat' can 
be ¿ladled In t lu i ilmple ¿ohm by companlng ¿1tuatlcni ¿uch ai A and 8, ' 
on. A cud C in  diagram 9. Thli cm be done by varying r and 2
The ¿octal me l  lane cU  teuton may be expneaed ai,
xo+N/2 U5~
J (. ,a) = 2- j- UC) dx
x 1- a
(80)
hen a 'long and nauuom' tomn. Ai a 1 i&0) l i  given by
V N/2
lim g(.,a) ~ 2 / log U(.) dx
a+1 x„
( 81 )
mhlch l i  the additive i eclat methane cAlteulon mlth a iepanable-utility
hunctlon and an Implied equal. comumpticn pen. head uied ai the methane
pnecedlng
cAlteul.cn hQfl mac>n ci the/cnalyili In th li chapten. dencehouth alien me ccmlden 
the additive ioctal methane cnlteJilo n me ¿hall ie t a -  1. Fon a clnculan to ion 
the iaine methane cnltenlcn alvei
x +R o
1im |(.ja) = / log U (')x dx (82)
xo .
where,
x +R +
N (83)
v = average density oh the population per square mile.
With the Raivlsian social welhare criterion we have 
*<■
l im £ (.,a) = UQ
0-++ co {S4 ]
Where Uq is a given level oh u tility , independent oh x. The consumption 
would then have to vary across x :
£c-ixVa P-VS = u0 (851
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The preherence structure and the social welhare criterion thus has the 
hollowing undetermined parameters, a, 3, T, Z , r, and v.
2.5.4. Computing the optimuin u tility  he*1 fixed population when 
(7) There. is an additive social wet hare criterion and 
(2) A_ Rawlsiau social welfare criterion 
(7) An additive social wel hare criterion 
[a] A long and narrow town
A necessary condition hot optimality as obtained hrom (8) in the 
separable case is that
y
C ' N {86)
at a ll x where the residential density Is positive. Since with the chosen 
u tility  hwnction the residential area is an interval oh the real line 
a ll we need to select is xQ, in order to obtain the set oh points where the 
residential density is positive. In doing this we recall that all 
households must be located within a distance oh T hAom di'ne ceivtre. Hence 
xq is given, ¿ox a long and narrow town as,
x0 min [  [T-HJZ), max (0, )  J (S7)
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uihefte x0* is the notation to
■0 log [T-xQ*-Uf2) + y log (Z ^ Z f f - A U ^ W / ^ )} =
3 log (T-x0*i * y log (Z^-Z(J-*x0)I (SS)
This i s  a. polynomial In x q* tohlch has to be solved numerically In 
general. When p V  , however, the ¿olution ¿6 given by
x *0 (T-W/2) lr (*9J
To compute the optimum u tility  {¡ox. a given N (¿ixed population), we 
¿can through the range ofi permissible values o& n^  and Hj and compute 
u t i l i t y  ficr each ¿et valuei oq and n ,^ given the optical location
oi households. Recall ¿ram [24) that nj + n^  r n. The restrictions 
on the valuet of n? and n2 atle given by,
1, i
max
/„ k \ ] L
4 4
V P /
¿or Hj 4 U* (90)
max o,
( En1 'c"Zm VS 8«j -c\i^ n„ <( ------- ) 5 ^o/l n. > U*l2 ^1 j  ,L1
K* l*  the- point at ivhllth marginal Increasing returns ¿top and demeaning 
marginal returns tet In.
The tight hand Inequalities In (90) and (9?) represent the restriction 
that the net level c$ pollution cannot be negative. The.lefit hand 
inequalities represent the restriction that the allocation o& labour 
i* bound below by zero on. that amount o¡J labour that will just prevent 
the net pollution ¿rom fusing above the maximum endurable - whichever lb 
the greateri. The value o$ the ¿octal welfare cfuterlon {¡ox the optimal
location o/j Individuals is given by
*NI
r <0 V
w iy, z) = z.
(9?)
+w/ o x +W>/ 2
°f “a^ccj^dx+p °f log (T-x)cfx+y ° f l°9 lZm~<l)dx
x.
(92)
Substituting in ¿ox q ^o m (79),
this exijfiesiicn may be integrated, term by term, to give
w u z ]
OX,
X + A7/_ r 0 Î
- a N log y + 23 (T-x)
N X0
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* Ì 2.2T
(T-x) log (T-x)
+ M  [
x .i L
X + N/„0 ' 2
V  Z +"Zxl ^3 (Zm-Z+/i2x) - (Z^-ZwiZx)
(93)
7
f'T
Z x
H I i  0, XQ+ N/2 < 1_
[ (V z+/,lZx1 £og (zffl-z+AZx) - (zM-z+^zx)l KB1
* a  [  ¡v u/t i - ,/J] ios 2 ]
¿ í Z ^ 0, x +W/ ^ J >  X0 2 -- 0
X
c-1,
* tf.W -£03 Z,B1 ¿ £ 2 = o  ox x à 7 0 —
ßy evaluating the ¿eelal icel¿axe cxiiexicn iox a ll difáexent pc¿¿ible 
ccm binotic nò ci n  ^and n^  ¿hat combination uiiieh maximize* the cxitexion 
may be obtained, and ¿Xcm l i  the coxxeiponding level* o£ Zand tj.
(fc) A cixculax taon
With a cixculax tcicn the additive *octal wel^axe cxitexicn may
be expxeued ca,
x + R 
(°
\ ( a teg [Y] + 3 leg (T-x) + log (Zm - q ) ) x dx
x h 'c •
x i*  given by,
0 I
ioli ci e
xc = mZn" { ( r " —  ) »
7T-V
) 1 max (0
- V ' }
and x * l i  obtained bo an expxe*¿ion analgou* to (SB) When 3 =% , 
0
thi& expxeiAicn becomes,
(94)
(95)
T/f W/fTTvf
Whexe T =
T - K «  -
(961
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Again to compute, the. optimum u tility , one ¿cans through the combinations
of n and satisfying (90) ok (91) whichev ex is xelevant, and integxatcng
expxession (94). This integxation yields a sexies of foams somewhat moxe
complex than (93), but similaxly obtainable. Again the combination of
n and n„ and the coaxes ponding values of y and z, that maximise the social 
1 ^
welfaxe cxitexion may be obtained.
2. A Ratclsian Social k’elfaxe Cxitexicn
Fxom equation (85) tee may expxess the Rawlsian Ct/elfaxe Caiteaion as
choosing a given level of u tility  U fox a ll individúalo, by vexying
consumption c(x) ovex x. ht is easy to see, fxom the necessaxy condition
that consumption at a ll exixeme points of the set of household locations
be equal] ^ that the choice of xQ undex such a welfaxe cxitexicn w ill be
the same as that undex the additive exitexion. Hence fox a long and
naxxew town x t i l l  be given by (87) and (88) and fox a cixeulax town o
i t  f i l l  be given by (95) and an expxession analogous to (88), which yields 
(96) when & = y.To compute the maximum value of available when 
n. and n„ axe given and the locations chosen we invext (85) to obtain:
< -e/a - Y/aC(x) = Uo a . (T - x] - i) a .. (97!
Integrating with xespect. to x and multiplying by two gives,-
x +U[
f
2
. x + H/f
i ) c (x) dx - y
xo
1 /O
= )  IT
" Y/ct
- x) “ IZm - ,| a dx
in )
This expxession holds fox a long and naxxow town. A similax one may be
ixculax 
x + H/,
obtained fox a e e town . We cUJ-i*'*
Ej £ 1 ,I 'X• f (T - x) “P/a (Zm q) ‘ dx. (99)
Then,
Uo
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( v / F  ) a
t Li )
{ 100 }
The integral E ? cannot be. evaluated analytically but I t  may be computed 
by using nmeAical methods and hence. Uo may be obtained. To find 
the combinations of n? and that maximise {¡on given n, tee 
scan through the various combinations, taking account 0f (74), (90) and 
(97) and compute ion. each combination.
2.5.5 Computing the optimum u tility  when the population is variable.
To obtain the evemail, optimum, including the optimum toien size, tee have
to scan through the Aange of toien sizes. Thefte is a natuAal maximum
to the toicn sizes, called N , u'heAe,max
n^ax = ^  b0K a £°nQ uv-d aoaacw town {101]
and U = tt.T v foA a ciAculaA torn {102}max
This policies fAom the definition of T and the foAiv of the u tility  
function (77).
Foa the cveAall optimum, at the chosen N, n^  and n^  should be such that, 
_TL. is maximised (a/i in equation (47)) tolieAe,
'  Z w'^ » Z* (103)
N
oi{V, Z) is the maximum value of the soci.al teelfcAe cAiteAicn foA given N. 
Since P is iAAelevant to the optimisation, maximising trx j amounts to
¿canning through H and, ion each W computingu [V, 2) 'as indicated in 
the, previous section. That value o{ N that maximises w[V, Z) 
i 6 ¿fie. desired overall optimum. ^
2.5.6. Investigating the Possibility o{ Multiple Equilibria {¡or a 
Fixed Tctm Size._____ ____________________________________
In section 2.3. J ice discussed the possibility o{ multiple solutions to the
necessary conditions that define the optimum to an additive social welfare
criterion {¡or a long and no-wow tom. I t  would be o{ some interest to
investigate whether such multiple solutions were likely {or plausible
parametric values. Such solutions would represent multiple tangency
points between the wel{are indi{{erence curves, and the production constraint,
In diagram 5 and their existence and positions would help throw some light
on how likely a competitive system is to go wrong in controlling pollution.
From equation ( 9) we know that a necessary condition {or an Interior 
optimum to the above problem is,
*0 " N/z
Uz dx
U
when a = I
Given[77) and [SI)/the L.H.So{ il04) may be written as Lj where
nun
Lj = 2. V  .V
a.N
t Xo + W/2’ 7 ^
_____ I - rx
zm - z v  - « }
dx {or x £ 1u 0 —
U04)
[105]
{or xq > 1_
This may be integrated to give,
max [V(x^ + W/g)» 01)
r
L 2 .y.y
a.t.hl.Z 1 vjx j
Zm
T
, (z - m  - 1log m + 1/ {or l  i  Q
[106)
[ionWhere l/Ut (I - -’¡xl
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from (67) to (72) the R.H.S. ol (104) may be vvuttcn as L^ , where,
Lo 1 lor < W* 
n2 > 0
L
1 * 8 V n2 6~‘ UC8)
L
„ K-1K n.
1 1 lor Wj > N* . 
n2 > 0
L
1 + 8.V n2 5 " 7 (109)
Thus by ¿canning through the permissible volute cl n^  and n2 a ll 
solutions ol equation (104} can be computed, and lurthehmcre the 
¿hope ol the wellare IndlUerence surlaces and the production 
com tool nt can be deduced.
2.5.7. Some Plausible Parameter Volute lor the System
Some Plausible Parameters cl the Production Structure.
Ix’e consider the parameters In the lollcwlng order,
Parameters of, the production structure.
k,e,M*: The parameters ol the production structure are chosen In such a way
that the city size which maximises average product with no pollution control '
w ill be one with around a million Inhabitants. This seems a typical city
be
size to consider, and, as Clark (1968) points out, I t  appears to/the emerging 
size In an Industrial country. Consequently, In order to obtain an
N** cl 1,000,000, M* is l-ixed at 500,000. N** may be expressed In terms ol
N*, c, and k by the lallowing expression
H** 1  . N’
fc (I - elj
• 61.
tilth the given value. of N*, we consider. values of k Hanging from 1,2 to 1.8 
and valuer of) c tanging from 0.6 to 0.9. Thii gives an N** tanging from 
about 3/^ miXLion to 1^ /4 million.
As a special. case toe consider the situation where e = 1.0. In this event 
average ptoduct is always tiding and the uncontrolled d ig  size i t  defined 
aA the maximum possible city size, for a monocenitic city given the geogra- 
plicaX and travelling limitati.ons.
6: The returns to a cole in the electing activity ate taken ovet the
Acme rouge as thewdecreasing returns to Acale for. the ptoduetton activity 
(0.6 to 0.9).
1: Unfortunately thete ate few eAtimates available of the reAource coAtA
of eliminating pollution in citieA, and i t  iA not cleat, that what eAtimateA
ate available have a ditect beating on the value oft, . A a fat at noise
pollution iA concetned no ovetaXX eAtimateA ate available. Utban noise hat
not been coAted. Regatding ait eta ft noise, Valters (1974) has recently
AuggeAted that an expenditute of $2 billion would be tequited to retro fit
tothe exiAting fleet U.S. ainXineA . UnfottunaieXy this te lls  ua notUng
of the effects on operating costs. (h'owevet this
substantial teduction in aitetaft noise would represent less than 7/2% of
CMP in the U.S.) A A far as ait pollution is concetned, some beiiet estim.ates
ate available, Accotding to a report. ftom the U.S. Environmental Vtoteciion
Agency (1972), the costs of implementing the clean ait acts amount to between
1 - 21 of G.M.P. These figutes ate tepotted by Becketman (1974), who points
cut that the stundatds requited by the new act teptesent very shatp reductions
in ait pollution. (e.g. an 861 teduction in the level of sulphut dioxide
telative to its  previous level). This woul.d suggest that, the teAour.ce cost
of bringing about a negligible level of air pollution would be somewhat above 
of G.M.T.
21/(with decreasing returns in the cleaning sectors the last feio units of 
pollution ate more costly in retources to clear).
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Overall then the costs oh reducing air and no¿6e pollution In cities to
negligible. proportions could be anything hrem about. 1% upwards. I t  Is
/\
dihhicult to know what the upper bound Is, and so values oh.p were tried 
hrem 0,05 up to a point where no abatement is undertaken at the optbnum. 
This point appears to be around 0,20, indicating how high the cleaning 
costs would have to be hor ike maximum pollution to be optimal. Roughly 
speaking, a value oh K c>h 0.05 represents a cost oh 2^ /2% oh OJi.V. to get 
hd oh o il pollution and pncponti.cnai.eiij hor higher values oh 
v: This variable represents the average density oh the town. Most
density studies oh urban areas suggest a density hnncti.cn that declines 
exponcnti.aliy with distance h,rom ike centre , although there is some 
evidence that some large cities in the U.S. are. tending towards a uni ho ran 
density pattern, with an average density oh about 10,000 inhabitants per 
square mile. The average density her cities in the U.K. as given by 
the H.M.S.O. Handbook oh Britain (1968) is about 18,000 per square mile.
(Ce take this density higure and recognise that the model w ill be biased in 
so h&r as a variation in density is an important adjustment hector in 
attaining the optimum. Thus hor example the model w ill exaggerate the 
consequences h°r the optimum oh & change in the rate oh dispersion oh 
pollution in the environment.
Parameters oh the Social Melhare Criterion.
&: This parameter represents the preherence hor nearness to the
city ceiitre, and, with this h°m u tility  hwnction, a u tility  maxiniseT'•> 
would be expected to spend the proportion 8 oh his income on being near to 
the centre. tilule no direct estimate is available hor this we take the 
expenditure on work transport as a proportion oh total personal expenditure 
as a proxy hor ikis. Regarding this we have some evidence hrom various 
surveys, including one. by the U.S. Bureau oh Labour, which is analysed by 
Oi and ShuldvYwr (1962). According to them households in cities oh around
.63.
■ a million ¿pend 12.6 percent o{ their Income on a ll travel. Thl¿ will 
overestin:ate ike expenditure on -travel. within the city. However, Oi and 
Shutdiner's Study indicates that a large proposition o{ travel 
expenditure Is intra-city. F urthermore there is ¿orne suggestion that this
number rises with real income and the U.S survey was conducted in 1950. 
Consequently a range o{ values o{ ranging {rom 0.1 to 0.15 were.tried In the 
simulations, these representing estimates o{ JO percent and 15 percent 
respectively.
y: This represents the households distaste {.or pollution. In chapter 5
we discuss some evidence regarding household expenditure on quiet {rom
house ¡oríce di{{erentials In noisy and quiet areas. These suggest an
average expenditure o{ beiceen 8 and 11 peJicent on quiet. Other studies o{
values o{ properties In zones a{{ected by air pollution suggest values In
22the same range, but slightly smaller. i'Je have taken values o{ y
ranging {rom 0.08 to 0.16 In our simulations. Given $ and y ,& is {ixed
as 1 - B-y, by the normalisation which allows us to interpret these
cce{{icients as proportions o{ expenditure on the various goods.
T, 2n: These two variables de{lne the origins o{ the u tility  {unctions: T
gives us the maximum distance {romthe town centre and the maxim;] level
o{ endurable pollution. T was set at 10 miles - a distance which implies a
width o{ 2.6 miles {or a long and narrow city and which allows cities o{
up to six million people, at the densities chosen, with a c ircu la r  land use
pattern. This seems reasonable. Z was chosen as that level o{ pollution
produced in a town o{ sixe U** (maximising average product}, with no resou/.ces
devoted to abatement. From some sensitivity runs it appears that while optimum
allocations o{ aesource to abatement are a{{ecte.l by changes in the value o{
2 , the relative numbers are l i t t l e  changed and the optimum size o{ the town m
is quite insensitive to small variations in an<^  the choice o{ the origin 
o{ nmsuAmsnt does nut appear to be crucial.
.¿4»
At As as noise nuisance is conccAncd, i t  appeoas ¿Aom Accent studies
that tAa^lc notie has an impoAtant. but AatheA localised e^ec l. Measures
ofi such tAa^ic, noise cJit now available ¿ca some motoAWays and uAban motoA
vehicle noise. In a Accent book Anthoap (1973) AepoAts on a study in
Tokyo which caliboAated median noise levels at dl^eJient points in time against
the tAa^ic density. This shows " a high ccAActation between tra g ic  density
23and measuAed noise levels" In vim  ol this evidence we shall take the tAa^ic
density as an appAcximatc measuAe o/ noise levels. Some wonk fias been done
on this by the TAa^ic Studies gAoup at UnivcAsity College/an^'^aughan et al,
( 7 972 ) halve shown that tAa^lc density, os meosuAcd by total distance travelled
pen unit anew on pajon no ads, is a negatively exponential function cA the
levels
distance {aom the town centne, Aeaching veny low/within 2.5-3.75
miles {¡oa towns such as Reading and Luton. These towns have ofi coutse 
consideAably less than a million inhabitants. in an unpublished papeA 
Hutchinson has continued this woAk, and shown that paAcuneteAS ofa the negative 
exponential depend on the city size, and with a city cl about a million 
decline to veAu low levels with 5-1C miles o/j the city centre. Consequently
A
we hiave taken/ns- between .o. I  and 0.1. As {¡oa as aiA pollution is concerned, 
we ate intexested in the dispeAsal Aate aAound a concentAaiion ol factories 
seAving a pcpulati.cn about a million. [We ignoAe here the {¡act that such 
souAces aiA pollution ate usually spAead aound the town AatheA tian concen- 
trxited). FAom a bniel examination cl the National SuAvey ol aiA pollution ’
(1972) i t  would not seem unreasonable tb take a dispersal Aate leading to a 
'base' level. Oq aiA pollution within the same distances foem the. pollution 
centAe. This is what we have done.
2.5.X NimeAicaJ. Results
The ejects on the optimum allocation cl a /ixed town size when,
(а) The social wt/aAt cxitcAion changes
(б) The, geography o/ the town changes lAom long and narAow to circulaA
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(a) Whether the criterion cf ¿octal welfare 1* an additive one, or a Raul*.ian 
cm make* l i t t le  difference to the. optimum proposition of the. population to
r i
be devoted to poitution abatement and consequently jotj the optimum level of
i  t
pollution. In a ll the cates considered the Rawlsian and additive criteria  
both gave optimum value* {¡or the above variables that were within eight pesieent 
of. each' other.. The difference* between the tivo criteria were greatest for 
low values of % with the Raivlsian criterion giving a lower allocation 
of resource* to abatement and consequently a higher level of pollution. With
.66
£ at 0.2 the ^¿¿erences were les<s than two percent. In the caie the 
additive weZ^ cuie function one chooses V and 1 to maxim,ise the log sum o& 
utilities  over households. One might think the Rawls¿an ¿unction ai 
choosing V and 2 to maximise the ¿urn ofi u tilities  [w.ith a = 0) and then 
choosing the ¿uncticnal c{x) to obtain equal u tilities  ¿on. alt individuali,.
Thai unite the additive wet ¿are ¿unction deci not do quite uhat the ¿ tu t pant 
o¿ the Rawls lan one wcuZd do, i t  does something ¿imitati. The numerical 
results iuggeit that the (¿¿¿¿erences one rather ¿malt.
(5) In table I we present the optimum pnoponticn the lab own. resources 
that ¿hould be allocated tc abatement in a long and narrow town and in a 
cincwtan town, ¿on. thn.ee (¿¿¿¿enent value.s c¿ E, and two valuei> c¿ n and two
combinations o¿ 3 and '{. I t  appe.au that a cinculan. town should go in ¿on. mone
cleanar.ee when the resource cost o¿ such clearance is low, but that i t  should 
■ go in ¿on. less clearance when the cost ol clearance is relatively high.
These a¿¿ects are accentuated when the pollution is mone concentrated aound 
the centre. There are two ¿cAces trading o¿¿ against each other here. On
the one hand a gAeateA level o¿ abatement allows mcAe pleasant living, especially
nearcA the centre, bat on the other hand i t  implies lower consumption. With 
a circular town the 'hermits' o¿ clearance are greater In that more people 
can take advantage <?3 the improved environment but on the other.hand the 
consequences c¿ not clearing up are less bad than in a long and narrow town 
because even with very l i t t l e  abatenent mere people can live in pleasant areas. 
This leads to a more extreme behaviour in the circular optimum town: either 
you go in ¿or a le t o¿ clearance, or you go in ¿or ve/cy t it t le .
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a=0.7, 8=0.15, y=0.15. a-0. 8, 8=0. 10, y =0. 10.
\ a
r 0.15 0.20 0.15 0.20
■ Long and Marrou 0.05 4.15 2.70 1.83 1.13
Circular 6.51* 6.5S* 4.42 0.05
Long and Narrow 0.10 2.91 l.U 1.13 0.65
Circular 1.12 0.05 0. 16 0.00
Long and Narrow 0.20 1.83 1.02 0.54 0.27
Circular 0.21 0.00 0.05 0.00■
Optimum percentage o<$ labour {orce to be devoted to abatement 
Table. 1 k = 1.3 6 = 0 . 7  e = 0 . 7  U** = 9 2 5 ,0 0 0
A ¿tar indicates that with that level. o{ re&curcet devoted to 
cle.ax.ancz a ll  pollution ¿6 cleared.
Thli> behaviour it> repeated ¡$04. the. whole range parameter valueò {¡ox. which 
the optimum behaviour o{ long and naAA.ow.and round townò wai computed, in 
diagram 10 we pretent a ¿cole repretentaticn o{ the land'-arcai available in the 
tec hindi o { towiu.
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Sensitivity cf\ the allocation of, labour to the two activities, when the town 
size -¿6 ¿ixed, with respect to
(a) Changer in r and Ç
(£>) Changer in k and e.
(0 Changes in $ and y
(a) Changer in r  and Ç
In graph 1 we present the optimal percentage. a{, the labour {¡once that is ' 
allocated to abatement In a tong and narrow tom with an additive soctal 
welhane criterion, ¿or di^^erent rates o& pollution dispersal ranging ¿rom 
0.10 to 0.25. Thii> suggests that at the pollution get,s more concentrated 
round the centre, the extent o£ abatement ¿alls at a declining rate, with 
a higher cost of pollution abutment leading to a ¿mailer allocation o&
' retcurcet to clearance and consequently to a higher level ofi optimal pollution.. 
The rate cq decline seems ¿airly constaivt ¿or ^.¿¿erent values o¿ These 
results hold quite widely across the parameter values, and are In accordance 
with what one would expect.
(b) Changer in k and e
Tn table 2 we give the percentage o¿ the labour ¿orce allocated to abatment 
¿or nine (^-¿¿crcnt combinations o¿ k and e and two combinations o¿ u tility  
' parainctcr valuer. I t  seems clear that as the level o¿ Increasing returns ¿or 
the In tla l pant o¿ the production ¿unction get greater the resources devoted 
to clearance ¿all. A higher value o¿ k represents greater productivity in the 
consumption good sector. Consequently the opportunity cost o¿ shi¿tlng 
resources to abatement Is greater .
/
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a = 0.7 B = 0.15 y = 0.15 a = 0. S B = O.lo y = O.lo
---- 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.2 1.2 1.5
0.1 5.57 4.16 2.70 2.69 1.S4 1.00
O.ê 5.12 4.20 3.20 2.32 1.75 1.15
1.0 5.20* 5.40* 4.45 2.75 2.50 1.45
TABLE 2 Ç = 0.05 n - o. 15
Optimum pcncentagc c{ population to be allocated to abatement {.on a town 
o{ {ixed size. (Long and Nannow tilth an additive ¿octal wel{oAe cnitenlcn). 
A ¿tan indicate that tilth that level o{ nesounces devoted to cleanance, 
a ll pollution Is cleaned.
With a log additive u tility  {unction, the manglnal u tility  o{ abatement In 
Independent o{ consumption and consequently not a^eeted by changes In 
the value o{ k. Hence a {a ll In the allocation o{ laboun nesounces to cleanance 
tilth a nine In the value o{ k is uhat one tiould expect. With a non-sepanable 
u tility  {¡unction ¿uch a nesult need not hold. As z increases {on given k thene 
Is no clean Indication as to how the optimal level o{ pollution goes.
(c) Changes In B and y
I t  would ¿cm that the optimal contact c{ pollution Is quite ¿ensitive to 
the actual values o{ g and y. The allocation o{ nesounces to abatement can 
vany by a {acton o{ 3 to 4 betceen the extneme combinations o{ B and y 
within the nathen ¿mall nange consldened {on these pcaamete/u. The dl{{eaences 
axe most accentuated when the value o{ K is high and alien pollution Is gneatiy
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dispersed over the environment. I t  would seem then that a satis factorty 
pollution contact policy would have to way great attention to the values ot 
parameters that represanted Individual preferences concerning pollution 
and nearness to ones work cent/ie.
I[gin Factors A Meeting the Optimum Size of, Towns
In table 3 we present ¿erne results regarding the optimum town when the town 
size is variable. A town constrained to a long and narrow geography and a 
town constrained-to a ■ circular geography are considered. We report, In 
each case the optimum town size, the optimum allocation of labour to abatement 
and the pollution level In the optimum town as a percentage of the pollution 
level In the uncontrolled town.
Long and Marrow Circular
5 0.0 5 0.10 0.20 0.05 0. 10 0.20
r s 0.15
Optimum town size 700,000 700,000 700,000 800,000 750,000 750,000
Optimum b!^ [?o) 1.21 0.50 0.14 3.5 0.47 0.07
(z/z„) m 45.08 59.7 4 ■ 65.20 25.94 64.17 71.77
r = 0.20
Optimum toivn size 700,000 700,000 700,000 850,000 800,000 800,000
Optimum Np (2) 0.64 0.29 0.07 0.0 0.0 0.0
Iz/zm ) m 53.07 62.16 65.94 82.47 82.47 82.47
= 1.3 0.7TABLE 3 K M** = 925,000 a = 0.8 0 = 0.1 Y = o.l
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. FcA these paramcteA valics .the town size In the case oh a long and naAAow 
tom  hi Aeduced btj about 2 4 peA cent and the cI acuI oa tom  btj between S pee 
cent and 19 peA cent, the loweA Aeductlons {¡oa the clAeulaA town being oh 
course what one would expect.. i t  h> InteAestlng to note that most oh the
hall In pollution at the optimum Is achieved by choosing a AmallcA town size, . 
and hence a loweA leve l oh pollution cAeated, AatheA than a laAge devotion 
oh AeAouAcei) to pollution Aemoval. Comparing the pollution leve l In the 
clheulan. and long and naAAow towns one obietvei, again, a moAe extAeme choice 
oh pollution In the ¿o/oneA than In the latteA.
A numbeA ch combination. 3 end y weAe tAled within the Aange ¿elected and I t  
was {,(■'end that the optimum c ity  ¿Ize and the optimum pollution leve l went 
down as y and 3 t oeAz Aalsed. The maximum dlhheAence In option icon c ity  ¿Ize 
due to the valueA oh these paAameteAA woa about 100,000, 
i t  I a Interesting to compare the Aesults obtained ho a values oh e which 
arc less than one, and In the Aeglon 0.7 to 0.9, with those obtained when 
e = 1. in the latteA case aveAage output In the pAoduetlcn seetoA Is 
always aI slng and the uncontrolled c ity  size Is dehlned by constraints cn 
the c ity  aAea Imposed by the value oh T. With a AectangulaA land aAea this 
Im.plles, In ouA case, a maximum population oh a m illion and In the clAculaA ‘ 
case one oh about 5^ /2 m illion .  We pAesent, In gAaphs 2 and 3, the value 
oh the social welhaAe cAlterlcn and the peAcentage oh pollution clcaAcd as 
a hmctlon oh the c ity  size hcfl a £°n9 an<^  naAAow town, and In gAaphs 4 and 
5 the same things hofl a elAeulaA town. GAaphs 2 and 4 have s = 0,7 and 
gAaphs 3 and 5 have c - 1.0. in a ll  the casts wheAe e = 1 veAij l i t t le  labouA 
Ia allocated to abatement, and almost a ll the. gains cac obtained by Acducing 
pollution tliAough sacAihieing consumption [Adducing aveAage o u - f jv t ') , ,  in the. 
ciAcula'i c ity  the ¿ rX C  in  the population Ac.quiA.eJ to obtain the. optimum size 
when £ = 1 Is spectacular - the cptimm size Aanging hr cm 1.9 m illion to 
2 .7  m illion depending on the parameter values.
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Multiple Equilibria (or a town o( (ixrd size with incheasing returns in 
Production.
In Se.cdu.cn 2.5,6 we pointed cat that -it was possible to obtain ¿ame idea 
c( ¿¡tape o( the production constraint and the weZ^ ar.e indi.((erence curves 
dram in diagram 5 by evaluating the le (t  and right hand sides o( equation 
(104], as given in equ.ati.ons (106] to (709). This was done (¡or a range c ( 
values o( k, e, y > end with 6 ~ 0.8. This last value -vr,plied that/pro­
duction constraint teas concave. Tor 48 scans that weie tried, 13 shaved 
two interior solutions to equation 104, From the numerical values c( the 
L.H.S. o( 104 the welfare indi((erence curves seem to take the shape given 
in diagram, 11 below. (The interior optimum giving the greater u tility  
always represents a lower level o( pollution]. Thus a pollution tax 
policy equating the. tax on pollution to zMRS could land up at either ej or 
e2* Tn some cas os the di((erences between Cj and e^  is quite large but
i t  can be as l i t t le  as e^  representing 3,4 per cent c( the labour (orce 
employed in. abatement and e^  representing 4.6 percent. Thus i t  is quite 
apparent that a market tax solution could easily lead to a local minimum, 
and , (urthermcre as the above (inures show, one that is not patently absurd.
Diagram 11
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.2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we have considered the problem o{¡ optlnum tcwnò In the 
pretence oI environmental pollution. The structure ol the town wai taken 
¿Imple/ ai one with production concentrated at the centre and residential, 
location organized In Its vicinity. In itia lly  we derived the necessary 
conditions defining the optimal locations and the optimal levels cl pollution 
ol a town cl lixed size, when the ¿octal wellare criterion was an additive 
one and when i t  was a Rant¿lan one. We observed that non-convexities 
had an Important rc.le to play, both ai lor as the production constraint was 
concerned and as lar as the social wellare criterion was concerned. This 
meant tirai the problem could not be posed Interestingly In a way which led 
to a unique Interior optimum being dellned by the llrs t order conditions. 
Consequently a police decentralisation Involved the possibility that equating 
the marginal product ol pollution to the sum ol the marginal rates ol 
substitution between the public bad and consumption could lead to a constrained 
minimtum position - a possibility that was lent some lurther credence when 
some numerical computations were done. In these circumstances I t  Is 
Important that not only shoul.d Inlormation'>regardhg TMRS be obtained but also 
some Inlormatlcn should be obtained regarding Its rate cl change.
We also examined certain lectures regarding the optimal location ol households 
and the distribution ol consumption across households. Here I t  turned out 
that l i t t l e  could be. scud regarding these lectors when general u tility  
lunctlons were sperilled. With an addltively separable u tility  lunaton,
however, consumption l i  Independent ol location and equal lor a ll Indivi­
duals, when an additive social wellare criterion Is used. With a Rcuvl s i an 
criterion comumptlon Is equal at a ll extreme points ol the set ol- locations 
{excluding the centre) curd move.4 In'an eppoilte direction to the locational 
utility  ai one traces Its behaviour over the residential locations.
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The ¿oc.afj.oM ore defined over an interval when the. ¿oc.af.ion u tility  
along a fioij ¿rom the centre ¿A ¿Lncfz peaked, Ion. any given ¿cveZ ofi con­
sumption, and the conditions o^n. this to be so ane stated. When the
residential ¿0cations one defined oven an tntenvaf, this tnteAvat dees not 
necessaniZy move etc set to the centne as the po ¿lotion ievef cut the centne 
declines. Whether i t  does so on not depends on how the note dispensed, 
is a^ected by changes in the ieved o$ pollution.
Zi the- size c& the town is not ¿ixed then thene ane tec choice variables, 
the size 0* the to an and the ¿evei. o$ pollution. The neceisany conditions 
ion optimcJUty ane given hene, and a comparison Is made with the uncontrolled 
competitive town. This town is deilned as one which maximises average 
product, and pays no attention to the externality. fan such a town size, to 
exist,, the increasing returns In production postulated hitherto have to be 
limited, and ¿ollmved by some durlnlsllng returns. Zi such diminishing 
returns do not exist then the uncontrolled city size is deiined by some other 
constraint, such as land area available. The uncontrolled town cannot 
generally be shown to be larger than the optimum town. When the unconfrolled, 
town size has seme locally diminishing returns in its neighbourhood, and 
when the optimality conditions define an optimum 'close1 to the uncontrolled 
town, then the conditions o{, the optimum town to be no larger than the 
uncontrolled town can be stated.
As with a fixed size town i t  is not generally possible to obtain the optimum 
by decentralisation. Z$ the optimum is defined at a locally concave position 
in the production set, then, subject to the provisos made earlier, the 
optimum may be decentralised by using a pollution tax. and an mployment tax, 
and having producers who are price take's and profit maximisers.
BO.
A poAmetAic AepAesetxtaticn c { the model discussed above, was made. Some 
mmeAlcal value* wcac taken { oa the paAamctens, in cA.dea to obtain explicit 
solutions {oA the optimum level o{ pollution, the optimum allocation o{  
labcuA. to abatement, and the op-tlmum 6Ize o{ toon; and In cAdeA to examine 
the sensitivity o{ these variables to vo.aLcus as swaptions. It  tuAned out 
that whet hex the social wel{a;ie cAltenlcn Is, additive ca R aiclslan made vcxy 
l i t t le  dl^enence to the cptlraum values. ' The Raicisian cAite’iion Implied 
slightly hlgheA optimal values {¡ca pollution vixen the abatement costs wcac 
I ce. The gecg-xaphy c{ the town on the ctheA hand matteAf AatheA a lo t and 
a ciAculoA geogAo.phy Implied mcAe extAeme choices o { pollution levels with 
dl{{exent puxajreteAS. Also Impc-Atant in detexrrlnlng the optimal contAol o{ 
pollution weAc the values o{ the pcAometcns tiepaesenting the pAc{eAcnces. 
Ton quite small changes In these poAamettAS, Aclativety laAge changes could 
be obtained In the cptbmn allocation c { acscuacps to abatement.
The optimum town size always wveAged as smallet than the uncontAolled town 
size {oA the paAomcteAS chosen. The dl{{eAenc.e was less with a clAculaA 
town than with a long and naAAcw town, except when aveAage pAoduct was always 
Alslng, In which case the cI acuI oa town Is much laAgeA In the uncontAolled 
state and Aeduces shuAply In the ccntActled state. When computing the 
optimum town with a town o{ a size {Ixed at the uncontAolled level but 
with optimal pollution ccntAol, I t  was obseAved that the {oAmeA Involved 
substantially less ¿.butement than the lattcA. It  appeals thexe{oAc that 
wheie both town size and pollution levels aAe variable, theAe Is a tendency 
{ oa the optimum position to Aely on Aeduclng town size than on Amoving 
pollution.
The above conclusions uxe obtained In the context o{ a model that excludes 
sevexal impoAtant aspects o{ an uAban aAca. Othex authoAS have examined 
some o{ the tnade-c{{s AcpAesented by { actoAS excluded hcAe and thelA con­
clusions cannot be dlxectly compaAcd to ouxs. Uowcvqa, I t  Is  { e.lt that.
.01.
white, the. actual ' nun: b ext' xepoxted hexe may be aJU.en.ed In a mone genexal 
model, the qualitative conditloni may ¡ ¡ t i l l  be ¿owe tmpoxtance.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 1
1. Sitting A equal to 5 implies that the u tility  {¡unction ¿6 only defined 
{¡on. kou>!>eholdi living up to five mile* from the centre o{ the town. We can 
think o{ tilts at> implying that a monocentnic town ts bounded by natural
considerations such as travel time.
2. Vizit: The Optimuin Factory Town (1973).
3. Cleanly we can always choose the units o{ measurement so that this is 
true. However, once we have done so the assumptions o{ concavity on. convexity 
that are made with regard to 'natural' units may no longer hold with regard
to these trans{onjned wilts. While we recognise this possibility we do not 
deal with i t .
4. This argument is taken {rom llirrlees (1972).
5. The set Is defined on E^  with the centre o{ the town being represented 
by the origin. The angiunent in this and the succeeding section relies on the
{act that we are considering a continuum of individuals. Thus is one individual 
occupies a unit length then a length dx w ill be occupied by 1dx’ o{ one 
individual.
6. The indices o{ aircraft noise pollution discussed in chapter 5 certainly 
display this quality, and, from a cursory look at the National. Survey o{ kir 
Pollution ( 1972) -it appears as i f  this is also the case {or air pollution.
7. We assume sufficient continuity in the deriviatives for the inverses to 
be differentiable.
8. nj* is the quality of labour devoted to pollution removal that gets rid 
of alt pollution when the total labour force is N.
.8%
9. The co sumption M e  cation mile then-give* an equal allocation oh consumption,
and the location oh individuals Is oven, an interval. We chop the multiple
2 which Indicated that the population Is allocated on both sides o{) the town.
In ¿act it. is oh no. analytic i>r,pentanee and only has to be bonne . in mind 
when the computations ate done.
10. This hootnote has be excluded ¿ncm the text.
H. 7^ [a] the u tility  ¿unction is concave and completely and additively 
seperable in a ll its  arguements, and, (6) the changes in the way that pollution, 
spreads itselh as the level oh pollution mises ate not such as to outwei.gh the 
tendancy to move the residential areas ¿wither cut with the increa.se in pollution, 
.then the ¿irst term w ill be positive. A gain assuming concavity c>h the
u tility  ¿unction, and that changes in pollution levels at distance X ¿rom the 
centre are in proportion to the changes at the centre, then the second terrii w ill 
be .negative.
12. This occurs because oh the constraint of equal u tility . The indihherence 
curves in the consumption - distance- ¿rom - the- centre space as shown in 
diagram 3 are not symmetric about the X axis and so higher levels oh output 
require a dihherent locational interval. This proposition is somewhat 
unintuitive.
13. The price ¿unction is being heated as differentiable, and again this 
assum.es considerable smoothness in the nelcvvit ¿unctions.
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14. fa Miming o{ counse, that i t  fa d i{{cientiable as stated eaAlloA. Thfa
k in d  o{ d e c e n tA o its a t l e t i  f a  n o i  an o th eA  e x am p le  o{ t h e  p A o p ^ it io n s  {o u n d
in geneial equillbiiwr theoAy, {¡da tee have a con t in  mi o{ eonsumehs and non-
Set
convexities in the consumption/ UndeA these conditions an optimum cannot in 
genetici be decentialised.
16. hie Acquine that A* and B* be ¿mali numbeis because the Aesults nequiAe 
that the pAoducticn {unction F (. • 1 be iocaiiy concave at the A and B at
ichicli the paAtials one evaluated. The pAoduction pAccess {¡on the consumption 
good fa iocaiiy concave {Aom M* owands and in {¡act on alt the computations done 
in optimum city size tee neve A got anyuhene as iote as N*. Thus cos long as 
F( * ) fa concave in 2, the above nesuits obtained one iikeiy to hold.
17. The {inm fa asswr.ed to maximise pio {-its subject to a given pollution tax 
and a paynoii tax dependant on the numben o{ individuals employed, i .e  .
the {inm has the objective:
MX U  -z F (hi, 2} - P(N) - Pr Z
The paynoit tax P(M) and the pollution tax Fj have to be chosen so that the
optimality conditions (63) and [64] one satfa{ied. Fnom this i t  {ollows
individual
that the pollution tax u 'ill equal the sum o{ the/mangimi nates-o{ substitution
between I and C when the population fa optimally located. Fncm the {fast
ondca pA.o{it maximising conditions and the equilibAium condition that the
numbeA o{ towns be such that zcao supcino-imal pAo{its aie made, we obtain :
xD + N/2
N U(fi] + 2 j R[x,z)dx -  hlRix^  + W/2>Z)
X
J V  w - P(W) --------------5-----------------------------------  +?z Z
Uc <"«>
The tvvm onthe night tuind side fa dcAived by Aeplaci.ng A* in (63) with the
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value derlvedln (56). The RHS will be positive i*  the. locational u tility  
is a. concave ¿uncti.on o$ distance ¿romthe centre - the Conditions {¡on which we 
¿toted on page 12. the RHS l i  positive, however, this in-plies that 
the &unction P{H) is convex and the poo {¡it ¿unction l i  a concave ¿unction 
c¿ U and 2. In that case the ¿ tu t o fid to condition ho de¿lne the maximum 
pfio¿It position, when the ¿unction F(• ) i¿ concave In H and 2. Hence, given, 
the'right ¿unction P(W) and the flight value Pj, poo ¿it maxiirls alien subject 
to given prices w ill result In the necessary optimum conditions being 
satis¿led when
la) The optin:um siz?-ol the laboufi ¿once allocated to production is 
greater than hi*.
[b) The pollution removal process has decreasing returns to labour.
[(a) and lb) imply that F(- ] is locally concave in M and Z).
[c) The u tility  ¿unction is adltlvely seperable.
[d) U tility is a concave ¿unction c¿ distance ¿ran the centre.
IS. We choose an t, by normalising around hi*. In retrospect this is not a
good choice since the number can be more easily interpreted when/ss de¿¿ncd 
* *with respect to hi’, the uncontrolled town size. Having chosen SI*, however, 
we estimated values c¿\  on the basis o¿ the proportion resources required 
to clear the pollution In a>n uncontrolled town and then worked back,via the 
production ¿unction to values ol% with respect to hi*.
19. See pages 13 - 15 ¿or details.
20. Walters ( 7974) page 152. The source o\5 this estimate is not given in 
the monograph but ¿or cur purposes we arejonly interested In orders o¿ magnitude
.06
2 7 .  Tkii oAÌi<£ bccauiz ofì tkc dioici noAmaJUiation $qa £  ^
22 . Ridimi and Hznning (7967] cbtaiiiid icmt intimata 0 j$ aiti pollution and
it i  id io t i  on AUidcntial koinè, valuti. In a dcvilopmcnt and Acfiinmcnt o f
th ii itudy Andeoicn and Codivi {1969} intimati tiiat at mcan Itve li oj aiti
poliutionj tkz marginai capitatiiid Io li Zi atout $300 -  $700.
"¡■'aiginai" lietii Ai^tAi to an additònal J0ms/w 3/  day o& nuipendid potutela
2
pini an additonal 0.1 mg So^ /100Cm / day o{. <sulphaticn. TatUng thè capitatiiid
Ic-ii at $500 thè total dzpAiciaticn icith toking thè uppeA bound o& aia pollution 
2
(80 mg/m / day and costiponding ¿ulphation levili  1 an zetio dzpAiciatZon in
$4000. Toa a houii valued a $ 2 5 ,000 and an incorni/houii pAict Aatio
0$ 3 thii implicò an ixpcndituAi ofi 4% o.nnual incorni to buy compiiti
iAtidom 5AonaiA pctlictton [ivi uit hiAz an annuitiiation nati o£ &*£,)
Thi houii pAia cl $25,000 Zi uiid ai Aolating to aveAagz U.S. incorni gAoupi
by II attiAi in compiling nomi illnitAativc digiuni /oa houiikald txpzndituAi
on noia ivaiion. Thi incorni -  houa paia Aatio ol 3 a m i typical /¡oa 
p
U.S . (See. cjpcnciix to ckaptzA 3 £oa detaili). CP.eaAly thiò fiiguAi
o£ 4% muit bc AigaAdid ai an uppiA bound iinez m.oit houiikoldi buy l u i  tkin
total {¡Aiidom £Acm aia pollution.
23. AntliAop (7973) pagi 60.
CHAPTER 3
87.
The Location of Noisy Centres - The Measurement of Noise Costs to Households 
Introduction
In the practical evaluation of the noise costs of establishing a noisy 
centre, the most significant component often turns out to be the costs 
to households.^ In this chapter we are concerned with the measurement 
of such costs. The economic issues that are involved relate to the
concept of a commodity called quiet and how an individuals demand for 
it can be measured from his behaviour. . Section one considers a classically 
economic treatment of such a commodity. Given that quiet is a smooth, 
continuously adjustable, freely variable commodity, the demand for it can 
be identified and from this the costs of the imposition of a certain level 
of noise can be assessed. Two issues arise, however, that could lead to 
a modification of this treatment for quiet. The first is that quiet is 
often consumed as a joint good along with a number of other goods, notably 
residential ones, and^therefore not freely variable. The second is that 
the supply constraints on quiet are not only the overall constraint on the 
total amount of 'quiet' available, but also on the number of transactions 
of a given level of quiet that are possible. This leads to certain
restrictions on the distributions of tastes and income under which a single 
equilibrium price for quiet will emerge.
Section two outlines the Reski]1 model of noise measurement. This 
contrasts with the more classical model in that the demand for quiet is 
treated as a discrete function and the concentration is on capturing the 
short run adjustment costs of the imposition of noise. A number of the 
underlying issues and assumptions of the model are investigated further.
The first relates to the use of a noise annoyance scale to measure the 
noise annoyance disbenefits of various noise levels to individuals of 
differing perturbability. Some of the basic underlying difficulties in 
the use of such a scale are discussed. The second question that is 
considered is the treatment of the noise costs of inmovers in the Roskill 
Model. It is felt that this can be improved. The reasons for thinking 
so are given and a more consistent method of costing is suggested. The 
third factor to be considered concerns the welfare implications of the 
noise costs that are obtainpd by using such a model. It has been argued
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that a particular welfare implication can be made from these costs, and, 
depending on onet distributional judgements, these may or may not be 
the costs required in a cost-benefit analysis. Section three analyses 
the relationship between the noise costs obtained by a model such as 
the Roskill model and other desirable measures of the costs of noise, 
and obtains a specific relationship between them using Cobb-Douglas 
and Stone Geary utility functions.
The fourth assumption of the model that is investigated further is 
the relationship between the noise costs and other adjustment costs 
postulated in the model. In this sub-section, the so-called 'median' 
assumption is shown to be valid under very restrictive conditions and 
an alternative more general relationship is suggested. Some numerical 
examples of the application of the relevant algorithm are given.
The fifth assumption that requires further investigation is the 
one of discrete adjustment to noise. This requires that individuals 
who adjust to quiet do so by moving to completely quiet areas. A 
method of testing this assumption is suggested in section five.
Finally, we consider some of the issues raised in the Roskill model 
regarding the treatment of costs over tine and of uncertainty.
Section three concludes the chapter by discussing the relative 
merits of the improved Roskill model and the classical model of 
measuring noise costs and how both these models can be utilised in a 
framework that incorporates fully both the short run and long run costs 
of the imposition of noise. Apart from the occasional reference, when 
necessary to support a theoretical point, the empirical work in this 
field is not discussed or reported here. Such work which is related 
to the theoretical issues raised here is reported in chapter 5.
1, A classical model of the evaluation of noise costs
1,1. The four consumer surpluses and their use in the case of externalities 
We begin this section by outlining the four interpretations that 
Hicks (1956) offered in his treatment of consumer surplus, and interpreting 
the various measures in the context of the imposition of an externality.
Let there be a commodity q that is of interest to us and let p be its 
price initially. We consider an individual with income M who chooses 
cjo units of commodity q and spends the remainder of his income Yq on other
09
goods . His position is represented by the point a. on diagram I.
Nov/ the imposition of an unfavourable externality would reduce the supply 
of q and consequently raise the price to p^  . If the externality 
v/ere imposed the individual would move to b and we are interested in 
a money measure of the ensuing utility loss U - Ub . Hicks proposed 
the following four measures:
(a) If the individual could bribe the agency^that,wa^ going 
to impose the externality and cause it /from so doing the 
maximum he would be willing to pay the authority would be
M M, . Hicks referred to this as the equivalent variation.
(b) If after the agency had imposed the externality, it was 
required to compensate the individual so that he could attain 
the utility level U that he enjoyed before, the minimum sucha
compensation would be H . This is known as the compensating 
variation.
(c) If the individual were to bribe the agency and if he knew that 
for some reason he could not change his consumption of q from 
q , then the maximum he would be willing to pay the agency
0 A
would be Y - YQ . This is known as the equivalent surplus
(d) Finally, if the agency had to compensate the individual after 
the externality had been imposed and he had moved to q^  , but 
could not now move from q^  , then the compensation required is 
Y.j - Yj This is referred to as the compensating surplus.
These concepts relate to the areas under the demand curves as follows:
Diagram 2 represents the 'Marshallian' demand curves corresponding to
diagram 1. D is the demand curve giving the relationship between price
and quantity demanded when utility is held constant at level U . Similarly,
Db is the demand curve giving the same relationship when utility is held
constant at level Ub. These are referred to as compensated demand curves.
Finally, D0 is the demand curve relating price to quantity demanded when
money income is held constant at level MQ . The relative positions of
D and D. reflect a positive income elasticity for q. a b '
2
AX DIAGRAM 2
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The compensating variation is given by the area P P^DB , which is 
the "area under" the compensated demand curveDa . The equivalent 
variation is given by the area P P-jAC , which is the area under the 
compensated demand curveD^» Finally the compensating and equivalent 
surpluses are given by areas PoP-|DB + AED and P P^AC - CBF, respectively. 
It should be noted that normally the area under the uncompensated 
demand curve will not correspond to any of these concepts. It will 
correspond to all of them, however, if the income elasticity of demand 
for q is zero. In that case demand curves Dg and coincide.
In the case of an externality the variational concepts of costs 
are more suitable when the individual can freely adjust the quantity of 
commodity q, i.e. when there are no significant adjustment costs and q 
is a continuous -commodity. Whether we choose to use the equivalent 
variation or the compensating variation depends on our distributional 
value judgements, and to whom we accord the 'right' to impose the 
externality. If it is to the agency then the 'bribe' or equivalent 
variation seems appropriate. If it is to the individual then the 
compensating variation is more appropriate.
The concepts of compensating and equivalent surplus turn out, with 
some modifications, to be useful in measuring the costs of an externality 
when adjustment to the externality is lumpy and costly. Their use in 
the evaluation of noise costs is discussed further in section I.IV.
1.II The treatment of quiet
The above variational treatment of costs may be applied to the 
evaluation cf noise costs through the demand for quiet. One important 
point needs to be made, however, regarding the commodity quiet. This 
is that the level of quiet can really only be interpreted' as the lack 
of noise, and since there is a limit to the level of feasible noise, 
there must be a maximum level of quiet. Such a commodity can be treated 
in the standard economic framework by requiring that the marginal utility 
of further units of 'quiet', beyond the maximum always have a zero marginal 
utility. In that case we need never be concerned with such units.
In diagram 3 we consider an individual living in a previously 
quiet area with income M, As a result of the i.ew noise centre somewhere 
in his vicinity he -finds himself transferrred from a to b, but he also 
finds that a new price for quiet, p* , has emerged,. The choice line now
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available to him is AF. . There are two effects to separate out here. 
First there is the relative price effect, indicating that quiet is now 
relatively more expensive than other goods, and secondly there is an 
income effect, indicating that the individual has acquired an exchangeable 
asset - viz the number of units of quiet that he now lives under. To 
obtain the variational costs from the area under the compensated demand 
curve, given the equilibrium price p*, we proceed as follows: Construct
a price line KD, parallel to AF. This gives the relative price effect 
when there is no income effect, and, under these circumstances the 
individual chooses the point c. The compensating variation now is MB.
We now define the compensation cost as the minimum cost of restoring 
the individual to utility level Ua , given the new price for quiet, and 
we define the willingness cost as the maximum amount that the individual 
would be willing to pay to stay at a* and not have the price of quiet 
change from zero to p*.
To obtain the compensation cost we subtract from the compensating 
variation the income effect of the price change. The latter is given 
in diagram 3 as MA. Thus we have,
Compensation cost = MB-MA = AB
In terms of diagram 4, MB is given by
MB = p*qg + area RqaqQ
and MA = p*qfa
AB = p* (qa - qb) + area R‘qa'qQ
Similarly the willingness cost is the equivalent variation less the 
income effect of the price change. The equivalent variation is given 
by c*a* in diagram 3, and the income effect is again MA. In diagram 4 
we have
c*a* = p*qc + area Q*qc-qc
and MA = p*qb
willingness cost = p* (qc - qb) + area Q*qc*qo
The two demand curves in diagram 4 are the compensated demand curves, 
holding utility or 'real income' constant at Ug and Uc. In principle 
it is possible to obtain approximations for compensated demand functions, 
given the demand function for the product. For a discussion of such an 
approximation, see Hicks ( 1996).
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To obtain an exact representation of compensated demand function, 
however, it is necessary to know the underlying utility function.
i.HI The compensated demand functions in the case of a modified 
Cohb-Douglas utility function 
The use of compensated demand functions for the measurement of 
noise coats has been stressed on account of the fact that the income 
elasticity for quiet is regarded to be substantially greater than zero 
and the size of income effect', consequent upon the price change is not 
negligible.^ In this sub-section we are concerned with obtaining 
specific compensated demand functions for an individual given a specific 
utility function. The utility function chosen is the Cobb-Douglas 
or log linear utility function, modified to take account of the 
special nature of the commodity of quiet. Such a utility function 
implies unit elasticities of price and income for quiet in the relevant 
range of variations of the commodity and may be empirically unsatisfactory.
In fact it is of interest for two reasons. First, in using these measures 
of consumer surplus we are assuming that cross price elasticities are 
zero or at least of negligible magnitude.5 One utility function which 
generates demand functions with qualitatively plausible properties and has 
zero cross price elasticities is the Cobb-Douglas utility function.
Second, it provides us with an exact representation of the compensated demand 
functions and an indication of the magnitude of error involved in the 
use of uncompensated demand functions. In section II we consider the 
implications of a Stone-Geary type utility function on the relation 
between the surpluses.
Let the tastes be represented by:
. YI_a Y$0, Osq<q0 (I)
. YI_a q*q0 y >o (2)
(2) indicates that qQ is the maximum level of quiet that is of interest. 
The uncompensated demand functions are given oy:
q = a . M
q = q f
for P ^
« M
ocr
for P S a M
qo
(3)
(4)
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After the introduction of the noise the equilibrium price is p* .
If p*-$ -&i! then the cost associated to the individual, with the adventq ■
of noise ?s given by the distance a*F in diagram 3:
a1* I7 = (q0 - P* (5)
which is the market valuation of the noise imposed. This cost will
measure both the compensation and willingness costs, as given in the previous
section
If p* > 2Llil then we may use the expression obtained in the previous 
section to dePive the compensation and willingness costs. First it is 
necessary to define the compensated demand curve corresponding to utility 
function (1). To obtain such a demand curve we consider the expenditure 
function corresponding to (1). This expenditure function, which gives 
the minimum expenditure required to attain a given level of utility, at 
given prices, is expressed as:
M = a”0, ( l - a f 1 pa .U (6)
Differentiating this with respect to p , we obtain the compensated 
demand function, with q as a function of p, and U:
8_ M = q ( « )0"à)
(1-a) jx-1 11• p • U(
Inverting this function we obtain:
1
n _ a  • (U) 
P “ T-Ó (q)
(7)
( 8 )
For the compensatihg variation we wish to measure the area given in 
diagram 4 as R*q„*q . This may now be expressed as:
'*o
Rqa*b
( n ) (Ua ) T ^  .
(T-a) (9 ) °*
(9)
Where (j = a a,M1- a Substituting this in (9) and rearranging gives:
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P%%
(
( ( « )  
((T^a)
• M • -a )
) fig
( 10)
which, integrated, yields:
RV o  ' " •qo
rt_ ( _ a _ a )
( ~ 1 ”"a 1 -a )
( qa - qo ) ( 11 )
qa may be obtained directly, from the compensated demand function (7)- Vhen 
v.e take into account that it may not exceed q , it may be written as,
qa mi n
O-ct)
(P*)
(a-1) a <1 -a
( 12 )
Similarly one may
constant at U .c
we recall that qc 
the expression:
obtain the equivalent variation, which holds utility 
This is given by the area q.qc.qQ in diagram 4. if 
= min (aM , q_). we may proceed as above, to obtain
(?* °i
Q*q • q = M • (1-a)
C 0
L U  ( 
(T=a) ( 
*(
1 -a
(13)
Given the areas Rq q„ , and Q*q • the compensation and willingness
3 0 C O
costs can be derived straightforwardly, as indicated in the previous 
section.
It is of interest to compare the compensation and willingness costs 
in the case of a typical kind of figure that is obtained in empirical 
work for p* , along with values of a that would appear to be plausible, 
given households calculated willingess to pay for quiet. The 
empirical data is discussed in greater detail in chapter 5, and the 
representative values used in the calculation; that follow, are given in 
an appendix to this chapter. In table 1 belcw, we list the compensation 
and willingness costs for a household with an annual income of £2,000, 
with a qiven preference for quiet indicated by the value of a . The 
level of quiet is measured in units for zero to 25, where 25 indicates
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the maximum quiet (no noise) and zero indicates the maximum level of 
noise. (For details of the scale see the appendix). The different 
values of qb that are considered for each o , indicate the different 
levels of noise imposed. Thus a value of q^ of 8 indicates that when 
the noise is introduced the household's level of quiet is reduced from 25 
to $.
We note that the divergence between the compensation costs and
willingness costs is greater when a is below the level at which the
individual continues to consume q units of quiet. Once a P %  ,
o —|r— •
then, of course the compensation and willingness costs are the same, and 
are given by equation (5).. The percentage divergence is also greater 
between the two costs, v/hen the level of noise imposed is small 
(ie qb is large)*. Thus it would appear that differences between 
the two kinds of costs could be quite large, when the values of a are 
relatively low - ie when we are concerned with individuals who do not 
express a relatively strong distaste for noise.
TABLE I
q b 5 10 15 20
a = 
0.03
Compensation Cost 175 130 85 40
Willingness Cost 153 108 63 19
Compensation-Wi11ingness
14.4 20.4 34.9 110.5Willingness X 100
a =
o . n
Compensation Cost 180 135 91 46
Willingness Cost 179 134 90 45
Compensation-Wi11i ngness
0.6 0.7 1.1 2.2Willingness X 100
Compensation and Willingness costs in £s per annum for a household an 
annual income of £2,000. For value ofa in excess of 0.1120 both 
costs are equal
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1 . IV Some extensions to the application of the classical model.
Adjustment costs
In the above analysis it has been assumed that there are no adjustment 
costs, there is perfect information, and the purchase of quiet is independent 
of other goods. Adjustment costs arise when the consumption of different 
levels of noise require some lump sum expenditures such as moving locations.
In this case some individuals who would have adjusted their consumption 
level will be deterred from so doing, while others, taking account of 
the adjustment costs, will change their level of q. The costs of those 
who do adjust their consumption level are given by the previous section, 
with the additional requirement that the adjustment costs be added to the 
costs already calculated. For those who do not adjust their consumption 
level, we need to invoke the Hicksian surplus concepts outlined in section 
1.I. Consider diagram 3. As a result of the noise the individual is 
placed atb. If he is not going to move as a result of the noise then 
the maximum bribe he would pay to the agency imposing the noise is a*b* , 
while the minimum compensation required to restore him to his original 
utility level is a*d*. These measures can be related to Hicks' compensating 
and equivalent surpluses as follows:
In diagram 4 the middle demand curve is the uncompensated demand 
curve, and the point p ^  on it represents the point e in diagram 3, 
lying on budget line KE. Now the compensating surplus, which is the 
distance de in diagram 3, is represented in diagram 4 by the expressions
p^  + area e v area wev
From"this must be subtracted the income effect corresponding to b.e, 
which is given in money terms by p^*q^
Hence the compensation cost for the non mover is given by
Compensation Cost = area ( V e q ^  ) + area (wev ) + p-j (q ^ - )
The points and are of course the points of tanger.cy of a budget .line 
with slope -pj with the indifference curves representing utility levels 
U and U respectively. (These lines are not drawn into diagram 3, so 
as to keep the diagram simple). Given the compensated and uncompensated 
demand curves, all these areas may be calculated straightforwardly.
The willingness cost for the non-mover, is given by c*a*-c*b*. C* a* 
is of cource the equivalent surplus and the equivalent variation, and 
can he measured in terms of the derand curves by the formula given in 
section l.II. c*b*, however, cannot be represented in terms of a straijitforward
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income effect. If the utility function underlying the demand function 
is known then an exact value for it can be obtained. The distance DF 
used in obtaining the willingness cost for movers will in general 'not ,
• equal - b*c*.^. It may be possible to obtain an estimate of
this measure, in terms of measureable variables, but we have not succeeded 
in doing so.
Joint Goods
Apart from the adjustment costs discussed above, a further related 
problem arises in this treatment of noise costs. It has been assumed 
so far that the purchase of quiet is independent of all other goods, and 
can be combined with them in any desired mixture. However, in many 
cases the purchases of quiet will necessitate the physical movement from
n
one location to another and a change of residence. A residential 
location is a collection of goods, the individual components of which 
may not be free to vary independently of each other. Thus ideally 
one should consider the joint demand for all these commodities. This is, 
however, impossible in practice. One has therefore to work on the 
assumption that in considering what level of quiet to enjoy, the individual 
will take account of the difference in value to him between his present 
location and the 'best' alternative location at each level of quiet.
For each level of quiet this figure may be referred to as the householder^ 
surplus. In our measurement of noise costs we may treat such a householder's 
surplus as an additional adjustment cost and again divide consumers into 
those who would move and those who would not. Those who move would now 
be accorded the compensation costs plus the adjustment costs plus the 
householder surplus. Those who did not move would have their compensation costs 
assessed exactly as before.
I.V Dynamic Considerations
There is perhaps a distinction to be drawn here between those who 
adjust to an increase in the noise level in the short run and those who 
do so in the long run; or more generally it is important to consider the 
time period of adjustment to the imposition of the noise. Those households 
that adjust in the short run immediately after the noise arrives are very 
likely to incur some householder surplus loss and may be regarded as having 
incurred the movement costs specifically with respect to the noise externality.
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Hence the treatment of their costs outlined above seems appropriate.
However, in the long run it may be that more combinations of goods that
individuals wish to consume will make themselves available through the
residential and commercial markets and through the provision of the
relevant public services. In that case, the long run mover may be
regarded as losing less householders surplus. Furthermore, it is
statistically observed that most of the population move locations in
the long run anyway, and so the movement costs incurred by them do not
9
apply to the noise externality . Thus the long run treatment of noise 
costs approaches more closely to the classical model outlined in Section I.II.
This distinction indicates that in a simple model the overall noise 
costs, N, would be assessed by taking a discounted sum of the annual 
costs as follows:
For short run movers
i=l
where T$ i T
VI
L U 1'
(Hr) 
and for
N = LUI1
S1 (l+r
+ (M + S) -i-Ul 
(Hr)
long run moves,
i=T+l
L I)1
(Hr
(14)
(15)
Where T$ is the number of years after which the short run mover moves out,
N . is the annual variational cost (compensation or willingness) and N .
VI IQ si
is the annual surplus cost (compensation or willingness) ; M is the 
movement cost, S the surplus, T the maximum length of time within which the 
short run mover moves out of the noisy location, and T^ the length of time . 
after which a long run mover leaves the location.
This issue is important only if T is small relative to T^. If T is 
a long period then the distinction between the short and long run movers 
is blurred.
I.VI Supply Constraints
The final problem discussed regarding this treatment of quiet is the 
one relating to supply constraints. With a normal good, there are no 
constraints regarding the number of transactions of any given size made 
and the equilibrium price is determined by equating agregate supply and
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and aggregate demand for the commodity. If »however, the purchase of
a given amount of quiet is related to the use of a specific location and 
there are a fixed number of such locations then the number of household 
transactions of a given level of quiet are also restricted.
In general this implies that there will not be a unique equilibrium 
price per unit of quiet, as there are as many constraints to be satisfied 
as there are levels of quiet. Under some restrictive conditions on 
the distributions of tastes, incomes and surpluses, there will be a 
unique price fcr quiet. What these conditions amount to, is requiring 
that in addition to the aggregate demand and supply being equal at a 
given price p, it should 'work out' that the number of transactions 
demanded for any given, level of quiet should not exceed the number of 
transactions possible at that level of quiet. Whether or not this is the 
case is ultimately an empirical question. However, it should be noted 
..that this problem is not one of the choice of units of measurement of 
quiet. ■ Indeed, in the absence of any restriction on transactions there 
will be ¿measure of quiet, such that, given the definition of an 
origin, only measures that are proportional to that, will yield an 
equilibrium constant price per unit of quiet. If such a measure is 
then transformed so as to yield a constant price per unit of quiet in the 
presence of restriction on transactions, then the transformed units of 
quiet will not normally be admissible in the calculation of individual 
welfare costs.
I.VII The Aggregation of Individual N'oise Costs
So far in this section we have considered how one might calculate 
the noise costs of an individual, given some information regarding 
his tastes for quiet through a utility function in quiet and anaggregate 
of other goods or directly through a demand function for quiet. However, 
in society there is a variation of incomes, tastes for quiet and householder 
surpluses, and it remains to consider the issues raised in the aggregation 
of their noise costs. Once the joint distribution of incomes, householder 
surplus, and a taste parameter is available, there is no real difficulty.
We calculate the noise cost for a mover and for a stayer, given specific 
values of these variables and given a certain level of imposed noise.
V.'e then take the lower of the two.costs and weight it by the proportion 
of the population in that noise zone that has these values of the variables.
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The weighted sum of the noise costs of all noise zones is the total noise 
cost.
To obtain such a distribution, we may proceed by survey methods to 
collect information regarding income and surplus (although there are some 
difficulties regarding the latter that are discussed in section II.Ill), 
but we cannot obtain information regarding tastes in this manner. The 
parametric representation of tastes could be with respect to the price 
and income elasticities of the demand function or it could be with 
respect to a parameter of the utility function (such as in the case of 
the Cobb-Douglas utility function used in. section I.III). In either 
case the estimation of such a distribution could proceed in one of two 
ways'. First it. could be done as an integral part of a study of the 
implicit market for quiet, which would have to be carried out to obtain 
an estimate of the demand function for quiet, and second it could be done 
by constructing an ordinal index of the strength of preferences regarding 
noise from a questionnaire, andising this in conjunction with the 
information on the price of quiet, and the other costs of adjustment, to 
infer a distribution of tastes for qufet. Neither approach has been 
fully attempted so far, although the second approach is very much in the 
spirit of the work of the Roskill Commission that is discussed in the 
next section. It seems appropriate, therefore, to consider that work, 
and to discuss the question of the appropriate method of measurement of 
the distribution of tastes when evaluating the relative merits of the 
two approaches. It is to the Roski11 approach to the measurement of 
noise costs that we now turn.
I.VIII The Welfare measurement of costs, when there is a change in the 
price of more than one related good.
In the preceding analysis we have been concerned with a change in the 
price of quiet, as a result of some government action, and we have analysed 
the consequences of such a change, independently of movements in any of the 
other prices. It, however, the same government action significantly 
effects the prices of any of the other commodities in that area, then the 
costs or benefits of such effects have to be considered in establishing a 
ranking alternative government actions.
Initially it might seem desirable to take the srum of the relevant vari 
ational or surplus costs to obtain the total cost of the project. Such
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variational or surplus costs are measured as the areas related to the com­
pensated demand curves and indicated on diagram 2. However, when there are 
changes in relative prices the compensation measures (variational and 
surplus) may not rank different alternatives according to their relative 
affects on utility. This point has been made by Foster and Neuberger (1974)
5
and can be demonstrated as shown in diagram . Originally the individual
is at a. In the case of project I, relative prices are so changed that 
his budget line moves from AE to CD, and in the case of project 2, relative 
prices are so changed that his budget line moves from AB to EF. The gain 
in utility measured by a compensating variation CV^in case 1 is given by
• CV1 ‘ h  Px2(I)
where is the price of x2 in case I. Similarly in case 2
But
and, as drawn, 
therefore CV-| >
p (2) > p (0)
x2 X2
A1 > A 2
( 2)
> P  (!) 
X2
CV2
However, the respecti 
u2 > U
ve utility positions obtained indicate that 
1
If the line EF were tilted towards E we could have the same relative 
values for the CVs but the U„ <  U,. Thus it follows that the compensating
measure need not be monotonically related to changes in utility when there 
is more than one price change. However, the same is not true of the 
equivalent measure if the individual is unsatiated. This can be seen 
simply as follows:’
Originally the price vector for commodities is P and income is M. In 
case I the price vector is changed to P* and in case 2 the price vector is 
changed to P**
To find the equivalent variation EV, we wish to find an M* and an M**:
U (P*, M) = U (Pi M*), and
U (P**, M) = U (P, M**)
if M** - M > M* - M, then EV] > EV2
and U (P, H**) > U (P, M*)
therefore U (P*, M) > U (P**, M).
Thus it would appear that whereas EV is m^notonically related to utility, 
CV need not be. While this point is important, it is also important to 
bear in mind that in ranking alternatives, it is not sufficient to rank the 
utilities of individuals. This is because almost all problems involve
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the effects on the utilities of several people, as well as some direct 
production costs. Thus the particular cardinalisation chosen to represent 
utilities will be of great importance. In section I. I we have given some/ 
interpretation to the various measures of a utility change brought about 
by a disbenefit causing the price of one good to rise. These interpretations 
relate to the accordance of pollution rights and the distributional judgements 
inherent therein. If therefore we can obtain the same ranking of alternatives 
using only the equivalent measures as we can using the combination of com­
pensating and equivalent measures that cur distributional judgements would 
like, then the cardinalisation represented by the latter is surely preferable 
and these costs should be used. In the probably unlikely event of the 
equivalent measures producing a different ranking from the desired measures, 
we are compelled to use the equivalent measures.
II.I The Roskill Approach to the Measurement of Noise Costs
In this section we consider the measurement of noise costs pioneered 
in the Commission on the Third London Airport (1970), volume 7, parts 1 and 
2. The method of measuring r.oise costs used by the Commission differs 
from the classical treatment outlined in the previous section because it 
does not use the concept of the demand for quiet as such. When noise is 
imposed on individuals they either adjust to it by moving out of the 
noisy area and into a completely quiet area, or they suffer the 
consequences of a higher noise level. The.action that they choose depends 
on which is the less costly of the two alternatives. Thus in the
individual's decision making, noise is treated as an attribute - either 
you suffer it or you do not.
The Roskill model started by using a measure of noise called the 
noise and number index (NNI). When aircraft noise was imposed on a 
previously quiet area, this lead to a depreciation in the value of 
household property, that was related to the NNI level imposed in that 
area. This depreciation occurred as some residents moved out of the 
area on account of the noise, and ethers moved in. The noise costs to 
households were then assigned as follows:
(i) Households that moved out on account of the noise were assigned 
a cost equal to R + S + D where R was the movement cost, S the 
householder's surplus and D the depreciation in the property on 
account of the noise.
(ii) Households tnat stayed in the area were allocated a noise 
cost N, where N was a measure of the "noise annoyance 
disbenefit".
(iii) Households that moved into the noisy area were assigned-a 
noise cost of N which was exactly equal to their gain in 
depreciation D. Thus they were assumed to have no noise 
cost.
(iv) Households that moved out of the area for reasons other than 
noise were assigned a cost of D.
The model was applied to noise zones of 35 NNI and above only. The 
values of R and D were obtained empirically, as was the distribution of 
S in the population involved. The distribution of N in each noise zone 
was obtained as follows: households in each noise zone were asked a number 
of objective and subjective questions regarding various aspects of aircraft 
noise and according to their responses, they were rated on a five point 
noise annoyance scale, with a higher rating representing greater 
annoyance. The median value, on the noise annoyance distribution thus 
constructed, was then accorded a noise annoyance disbenefit equal to the 
depreciation in that noise zone. This was done for each noise zone 
and as the distributions of noise annoyance and the levels of depreciation 
were different in the different noise zones this gave a number of 
different money \alues for the different points on the noise annoyance 
scale. By interpolating linearly in between points the noise annoyance
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scale was converted into a money measure and the distribution of N 
obtained for each noise zone. The justification given for equating 
the median of the noise annoyance scale with the house price 
depreciation was that the equilibrium fall in house prices is determined 
by households whose noise annoyance is greater than the depreciation 
moving out of the area, and households whose noise annoyance is less 
than the depreciation moving into the area. At the ma.gin the inmovers 
gain, D, is equal to his noise annoyance cost, N, while the outmovers 
loss, also D, is equal to his 'saving' in noise annoyance cost, N.
As there are as many outmovers as there are inmovers, it is alleged 
that this implies that the cost associated with the median noise . 
annoyance is equal to the depreciation. All the costs, S, D,R, and
i
N were calculated on an annual basis and S, D, and R were assumed to 
grow over time, to reflect an increasing valuation of quiet in the 
case of D and an increasing valuation of commodities with a high 
service content in the case of R. Heuristically the logic of the 
model can best be seen by considering diagram 5 below which represents 
the density distribution of N in the population. For a given house­
holder surplus S 11, the right hand tail will represent the initial
outmovers (N > R + S+ D), while the left hano tail will represent the
12
initial inmovers (N > D-R) . The central section represents those 
who stay. Over time the distribution of N will .tend to shift to the
tc t V * . ««kit
left as the right hand tail disappears and^as the median value of N, 
which equals D, grows as D grows. Thus a new group of outmovers and 
inmovers will appear annually, and their costs will be assessed in the 
same way as the initial years costs were assessed. Those who do not 
move out or in on account of the noise,suffer a noise annoyance disbenefit 
N according to their position in the distribution for some period of 
time and then they are assumed to move out for reasons unconnected with 
noise, and suffer a loss of depreciation D. Thus we have the basis of 
dynamic model for costing noise in a situation where adjustment costs 
are important. The sum of the annual noise costs, appropriately 
discounted, is equal to the total noise cost of the imposition of noise.
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II.II Criticisms and Comments on the Roskill Model
The method described in the previous section played a central role
in the evaluation of noise costs by the Roskill Commission. The work of
the Commission in general, and the costing of noise in particular has
drawn a range of comments and criticisms. A summary of the various
positions taken is given in a paper by John Adams (1971). At the
extreme there are the comments by P. Self (1970) in New Society
where he describes the work of the Commission as, "nonsense on stilts",
"lunatic logic" and "a porridge of bogus accountancy". Mr Adams himself
takes a rather similar line. Thus elsewhere he states, "(the measurement
of noise costs) is clearly not a question amenable to quantification. (Roskill)
created a cost-benefit fantasy world in which things .....  of real
importance, such as friends, neighbours and human lives were treated in
a derisory manner". Adams (1972). The comments are given, not so that
they may be argued here, but because they co indicate that individuals
who are concerned about these things do believe that the measurement of
noise costs by any means whatsoever, is not a feasible exercise. Lhless
there are some metaphysical reasons for rejecting measurement however, the
rational procedure seems to be to judge the measurement of noise costs
, which
on the theoretical and empircal grounds by / they were derived. • This 
indeed is the position adopted by most of the people that have considered 
the question. After having examined the noise estimates in more detail,
no
suggested improvements where possible, and considered alternative methods 
of measurement , we may evaluate whether the problem has been satisfactorily 
tackled. This is what we hope to do at the end of this chapter.
The following is a'Tist of the important aspects of the Roskill noise 
methodology that have drawn criticism and further comment:
(a) The measurement of noise, by the noise and number index.
(b) The data on which the house price depreciation estimates are based.
(c) The use of a noise annoyance scale.
(d) The treatment of inmovers.
(e) The 'Welfare implications of the noise costs measured by N.
(f) The use of the median assumption in calculating N.
(g) The use of noise as an attribute in the decision-making process.
(h) The treatment of time and uncertainty.
Items (a) and (b) are essentially empirical questions and these are 
discussed along with the other empirical issues in chapter 5.. In
the remainder of section II, we consider in detail items (c)-(h).
II.H I  The the of a Noise Annoyance Scale
The noise annoyance scale was used initially in the construction 
of the NNI (’IcKennell 1S63>). Households, were asked a number of 
questions. They were first asked, 'Does the noise of aircraft bother you, • 
very much, moderately, a little, or not at all?1 If they were at least 
a little annoyed they were then asked, 'Does the noise of aircraft, (a) ever 
wake you up, (b) interfere with listening to TV or radio, (c) make the house 
vibrate or shake, (d) interfere with conversation (e) interfere with or 
disturb any other activity, or bother,annoy or disturb you in any other 
way?' From their responses, households v/ere rated on a five point scale 
where /a^ratYng^oV6 2 corresponds approximately to being a little annoyed, 
a rating of 3 to being moderately annoyed, and so on'.
Thus the noise annoyance scale provides an ordinal rating of the strength 
of feeling about noise. It was first used to construct a noise index.
Given the noise index, this tells us the distribution of noise annoyance 
in a given noise zone. There are three economic points to be made regarding 
such a scale. First, the population in a given noise zone may already 
be self selected. If the noise has persisted for some time then the 
distribution of noise annoyance will be biased in favour of the less 
annoyed and this will underestimate the noise costs of introducing noise 
in a new area. McKenell's survey of noise was conducted in 1961, about 
two years after/introduction of jet noise around Heathrow Airport, London,
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and so one may assume some adjustment. This was not allowed for, and
it is not clear how it can be allowed for. It appears, in general, not
possible to obtain satisfactory answers to 'as if' questions in areas
where there is no noise, thus excluding the possibility of surveying
*» 1
the distribution of annoyance in an area where there is no noise .
Second, there is the well known Public Good problem regarding the 
revalation of preferences in situations where individuals may believe 
that they have something to gain or lo^se by giving a particular answer.
It is plausible, for example, that an airport worker will understate 
his noise annoyance in the belief that if too many people 'complain', the 
airport may be moved, while someone else who has nothing to lose by the 
airport being moved may will exaggerate his annoyance (but perhaps not 
overdo it, lest the questionnaire is thrown out! )14. The resultant 
distribution from the interaction of these forces may be far removed from 
the object of initial interest in conducting the survey. To be sure, 
a well designed survey does not make its object transparent, and has questions 
that check against each other. However, it is difficult to believe that 
the object does not become clear to the respondent, and that his response 
is determined by his self interest. Third, it is important to remember 
that the noise annoyance scale is only an ordinal scale of annoyance.
In converting it into a money measure of the noise annoyance disbenefit, 
the median assumption is used to obtain the money value of levels of annoyance 
that lie, in general, between the integer ratings 0-4. Thus to obtain 
the noise annoyance disbenefit of a rating of 1, 2, 3, or 4, it will be . 
necessary to interpolate betv/een the values obtained. In the absence 
of any other basis for interpolating, this is done linearly. Thus 
there is a strong presumption towards cardinality in associating money 
values with points on the noise annoyance index. Given the strongly 
ordinal assumptions behind its construction this is a matter of some concern.
While these issues have been raised , it remains unfortunately true that 
they cannot be satisfactorily resolved, and furthermore, the magnitude 
of the erros caused by the presence of these problems remains undetermined. 
Overall, the use of a noise annoyance scale to establish the noise annoyance 
disbenefit remains, in our view the mos-i- ouuwpt-ible- part of the Roskill 
methodology most susceptible to criticism.
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11.1V The Treatment of Inmovers
The Roskill model assigns no noise costs to inmovers. Their noise
annoyance d'sbenefit N, is assumed to equal the depreciation in property
values that they obtain. This is difficult to justify. If a household
moves into a noisy area, on account of the noise it's net gain is D - R - N
where R is the annuitised movement cost. These gains can be straight"
forwardly calculated, given the distribution of N, as shown in diagram
5, by reading off the left hand tail. The reason why the commission's
study ignores these gains is because a large number of inmovers are
regarded as ignorant of the true noise annoyance, and only discover it
after having moved in. The evidence given for this is that recent
annoyance
inmovers in noisy areas often have high noise/ratings. However, if this 
is the case, then their net costs should be taken into account and there 
are no reasons for believing that the costs of this group exactly or 
even approximately outweigh the gains of the informed inmovers. In 
section II.VilI we consider some subsequent work that has been done to treat 
the costs of uninformed inmovers systematically. If such a procedure is 
adopted then the gains of the informed inmovers should be taken into 
account and this can ce done, as indicated, quite straightforwardly.
II. V The Welfare Implications of the Noise Costs Measured by N
In section I of this chapter, we observed that there are four 
concepts of the costs of externalities: two variational concepts and 
two surplus concepts. It turned out that for the noise problem the 
variational concepts were relevant when we are concerned with movers 
and the surplus concepts are relevant when we are concerned with non-movers. 
There are two variation! and two surplus concepts because in each case 
we can consider either the maximum amount that the individual would be 
willing to pay so that he is no worse off than he would be j_f the noise 
were imposed, or the minimum compensation that he would require to restore 
him to his original level of satisfaction once the noise is imposed.
Which of these we use depends on our allocation of pollution rights and 
therefore on distributional judgements. If we grant the pollution 
rights to the households in the area where the noise is imposed, then 
the compensating measure is appropriate. If we grant the pollution 
rights to the government agency that decides on the flying regulations and
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plans the airports, then the willingness-to-pay measure is more appropriate. 
Thus it appears that there are two questions to ask regarding the noise 
costs measured by N, First, does it measure the variational costs for 
movers and surplus costs for ncn-movers; and second does it measure the 
willingness-to-pay or compensation cost in each case? Having considered 
these questions we then examine whether within the framework of the Foskill 
model it is possible to derive information on costs other than those 
obtained, by the use of suitable utility functions.
The distribution of noise costs N is obtained by equating the
depreciation in house prices in a given noise zone to the median noise
rating in that zone, and by assuming that the movers out of noise zones
move into completely quiet ones. The heuristic explanation that was
given for the median assumption, was that the equilibrium depreciation
was a market phenomenon, in which the marginal buyer and seller have
no net gains. We consider the position of a marginal seller in diagram 7 ,
which considers the same variables as diagram 3. Originally he is at a*
enjoying the maximum quiet. When noise is introduced he finds himself at
b. Should he wish to move,the choices available to him are given by
AF, which does not go through b, because there is a lump sum moving cost.
If he is a marginal seller, he will be indifferent between, staying at
b and moving to F, and this is shown in the diagram. The quantity a*F
is equal to D + R. If we equate this to N, for the appropriate noise
annoyance rating, then we are measuring the will ingness-to-pay cost,
which happens to be both the variational and surplus concept, as the
16individual is moving to complete quiet. Now the Roskill model equates 
D to the median of the noise annoyance scale, and the most favourable 
interpretation that v/e can place on this act is to say that, D + R equalling 
some point on the noise annoyance scale implies D equalling the median 
point on that scale. We will return to the median assumption in the 
next section. At this stage the best that can be done is to suggest that 
if individuals do adjust completely to noise, then the noise annoyance dis- 
benefit obtained by the Roskill model is the willingness-to-pay cost, which 
is both the variational and surplus concept. Thus the willingness to pay 
costs for movers and non-movers are the same. The compensation costs, 
however, will net be the same. Again if we can assume complete adjustment, 
then the compensation cost for the mover is equal to R + S+ D, where this 
is the sum of costs incurred in moving to complete quiet. For the non-mover
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the compensating surplus, which is the relevant cost is given by bd 
in the above diagram.
It would appear, therefore, that the Roskill assumption of all 
households moving out of noisy areas, moving into completely quiet ones 
does considerably simplify the problem of identifying the noise costs.
We will consider some ways of testing this assumption in section II. VI.
There has been some criticism of the Roskill noise costs on the 
grounds that they claim to measure the compensating costs, whereas in 
fact they do not. from our analysis this criticism appears to be valid
as far as the costs of•non-movers are concerned. In this case it seems 
reasonable to ask whether some information on the compensating surplus 
for non-movers can be obtained, given the equivalent surplus represented 
by N. This can be dene in specificcases when preferences of the household 
can be represented by analytical'utility functions. Tor illustrative 
purposes we consider the Cobb-Douglas utility function that was described
. l i t ) .
fully in section I.III.
a  „ l -  a
U = K-q • Y 1 (16)
where
K>o o<a<l 
q = amount of quiet
Y = expenditure on other goods (annual)
If we consider the original income as M , and define the original level of 
quiet as , and the new level of noise suffered as ^  , then we are 
interested in the value of bd, given the value a*F. We observe the 
following relationship:
bd = MFT iTFT
This can be seen as follows:
bd
( Uj ) T O
( ~ ~ )
(Kq^)
i l
1
(Kq1Ct) ^
(¡7)
08)
a*F
1 1
( ( u, ) T'
(Kq0& ) ({Kq ) “ )
bd
a*F
(d0 ) 
( ~ )  
(^1)
a
- a
1 1
(IS)
(2 0 )
and since , V " a qQa O-a^ ) 1'0
(21)
(%)
(c T )
(q1)
a
M = bd
TFFF FT (2?)
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The relationship between bd. and a*F would suggest the following things:
(i) The compensation cost is never less than the willingness to pay cost. 
The two, however, only differ substantially if the willingness to 
pay cost is a substantial part of household income. A willingness 
to pay of about 8% of income is about average which would suggest
that the compensation cost be about 8.7% greater than the willinness
. + 17to pay cost.
(ii) In the utility function tastes are represented by the parameter a .
For a given value of a , and a given level of quiet q^  , the value 
of N is proportional to income. Thus for given tastes, and a 
given level of noise imposed, the percentage difference between 
the compensation and willingness costs is independent of income.
The Cobb-Douglas utility function is used here to illustrate the relationship 
betv/een the two kinds of costs. It is valid only if the price and income 
elasticities for quiet are unity. Empirically this is known to be 
unsatisfactory, especially as regards the income elasticity. A more 
realistic relationship between the costs can be obtained if we consider 
that there is a minimum level of expenditure on other commodities than 
quiet, such that for any household at a lave! of income equal to or below 
that, the household would purchase no quiet at all, in the event of an 
airport being placed near him. This has the advantage of not assuming 
that the demand for quiet falls only proportionately with income. We 
may modify the Cobb-Douglas utility function to take account of such 
a factor as follows:
U= Kqa (Y-t)1'0
where is the minimum level of expenditure on other goods.^ The 
demand function for quiet implied by this is
q . (l-o) <V-&) 
Pq
where is the price of quiet.
q<q,
p> cxf-1 -F-) 
q ~
(23)
(2 ¡i)
This given an income elasticity for quiet that is always greater than one, 
and decreasing as income decreases. This implies the following relationship 
between a*F and bd.
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bd = M-E 
a* F M -E'-a*F
(25)
In this case we note the following:
(i) For a given money value of expressed willingness to pay the compensation 
required will be higher for a person with low income than if £ were set 
equal to zero.
(ii) For an expressed willingness to pay that is a given proportion of an
individual's income the percentage difference between the compensation
cost and the willingness to pay cost will now increase as M gets
smaller relative to E. As a comparison with the figures obtained in the
Cobb-Douglas case we note the following
If N = 0.08-1 then w
Compensation cost = 1,087 willingness cost if no account is taken of t
Compensation cost = 1 .667 willingness cost if M = 1.25E.
Compensation cost = 1.190 willingness cost if M = 2 t
Compensation cost = 1.119 willingness cost if M -- 4 C
(iii) For a given set of preferences for quiet, (i.e, a given a) the
percentage divergence between the compensation cost and willingness cost ’s 
independent of income for a given level of imposed noise, for all levels 
of income greater than the minimum level of consumption. This result 
holds in the case of the straightforward Cobb-Douglas utility function as 
well.(when E. may be regarded as zero ).
Overall, these comparisons serve to show that it is possible to obtain information 
on compensation costs regarding non-movers within the Roskill methodology, if 
it is possible to represent the tastes by a satisfactory set of preferences.
If this cannot be done, but some knowledge is available about the price and 
income elasticities for quiet, then we may proceed to obtain direct estimates 
of the compensation costs by using the demands methods given in section I of 
this chapter.
11.V The Use of the Median Assumption in Calculating N
In section II. I we explained the rationale given for equating the 
house price depreciation in a certain noise zone with the median noise annoyance 
level in the noise annoyance distribution for that zone. The three basic
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assumptions underlying this view are that when the residential market adjusts as 
a result of the noise, >
(a) The number of inmovers is equal to the number of outmovers.
(b) The depreciation is so determined that the marginal Inmover and the 
marginal outmover gain nothing by moving.
(c) The inmovers' net gain is D-N and the outmovers' net gain is N-D.
Given these assumptions it is clear that D will equal the median of the 
distribution of noise annoyance among the inmovers and outmovers. This may 
or may not imply that D is equal to the median of the noise annoyance 
distribution for the population. Furthermore, whereas assumptions (a) and 
(b) are acceptable, it is not possible to accept assumption (c). The net 
gains of the inmovers and those of outmovers must include losses of 
movement costs and of householder surplus. When both these factors are 
brought into consideration, the validity of the original argument for the median 
assumption breaks down, and one is left with an assumption which is very 
important and which cannot be satisfactorily justified.
What is really involved here is an attempt to derive a noise annoyance cost 
function which associates with each noise annoyance level x, a cost c(x).19 
We first consider cases where the cost function obtained by the use of the 
median assumption is valid. The conditions required for its validity turn out 
to be rather restrictive. We then go on to consider an alternative approach 
for obtaining c(x) which involved the use of data on inmevers and outmovers as 
a proportion of the population in an area, and an algorithm for dealing with 
the difficulties raised by the existence of a distribution of householder 
surpluses. Finally we conclude this subsection by making some general 
observations on the applicability of such an alternaitve procedure.
Let the noise annoyance scale x be defined over a range /jO,T7 and
let there exist a cost function c(x), defined over this noise annoyance scale, such 
that c(o) = 0. Then we may state the following lemmas:
Lemma 1
If (a) The depreciation is so determined that the marginal inmover 
and outmover have zero net gains;
(b) the density distribution of the population over the noise annoyance 
scale x is symmetrical ar.d unimodal;
(c) c(x) is a linear function;
(d) all inmovers and outmovers have the same surplus $ ;
then the mean and median of the distribution of noise annoyance T , 
has a cost D associated with it.
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Since the number of inmovers is equal to the number of outmovers 
as a result of the noise, and the marginal inmover and outmover 
gain nothing, there exists a X on the noise annoyance scale:
c(X) - D-R-S
c(T-X) : D+R+S
By linearity of the noise scale, and since C(o) - o
V/i th a linear cost function we may write c (x) a.x , a > o
(26)
(27)
(28)
Lemma 2
If assumption's (a) to (c) of lemma 1 hold and there is a distribution 
(d*) of householder surplus S over the population such that the distribution 
is defined over a range [°»smax] * where
S £ min f D-R , aT-D-R J (29)
max L ’
(e) The distributions of householder surplus and noise annoyance are 
independent of each other, then the mean and median of the noise 
annoyance distribution, ^  has a cost D associated with it.
Proof
Let F(x) be the cumulative distribution corresponding to the density 
distribution f(x). Then for each surplus level S, the proportion who 
move in are given by F(O-R-S), and the proportion who move out are given 
by 1-F(D+R+S). Let g(s) be the density distribution of the population. 
Since g(s) and f(x) are independent, the equality of the number o f  inmovers 
to the number of outmovers gives:
niin (Smax, D_P)
S - mln( aT-D-R , S ) - * max
[l- F(D+R+S)} g (S)dS
(30)
F(D-R-S) g (S)dS
^ o  S ^ 'o
Given assumption(d ), and rearranging terms,
max „ n
J' [ f (D-R-S) + F (D+R+S) J g (S) dS - 1
SrO
(3D
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Now by assumption (b) we know that if F(D)< 0.5, then F(D-R-S) + F(D+R+S)<1 
and the above equation cannot be satisfied. (Recall that g($) = 1 and 
Jg(S)dS = 1). If, however, F(D)>0.5, then F(D-R-S) + F(D+R+S)>1, and 
again the above equation cannot be satisfied. Therefore it can only be 
satisfied when F(D+R+S) + F(D-R-S) = 1 and that occurs when F(D) = 0.5, 
indicating that = D.
These two lemmas indicate that only under restrictive conditions can 
the median assumption be shown to be valid.2® From lemma 1 it follows that 
if all the inmovers and outmovers have a fixed surplus then linearity of the 
cost function and unimodal symmetry of the annoyance distribution will do.
One naturally thinks of noise movers as having a small or even zero surplus 
although this need not be the case. It-is more difficult, however, to accept 
the linearity assumption which implies a cardinal interpretation to what is 
essentially an Grdinal scale. If, the movers have considerably variable 
surpluses, then from lemma 2, the further requirement (d) is that the range 
of such a surplus be small - so small that no inmover is excluded from moving 
in on account of his surplus, and no outmover is excluded from moving out on 
account of his surplus, given the value of D and R. Again this condition 
seems unlikely to be satisfied.
An alternative procedure for obtaining the cost function c(x) is 
one that attempts to infer such a function from information regarding
turnover rates in residential property in various noisy zones. For each
. . 99noise zone z, we have a noise annoyance density distribution f(x,z) . From
these distributions we wish to obtain a cost function c(x). If this noise
cost function is strictly monotonic and differentiable then there exists a
derived distribution g(c,z) where
g(c,z) = f((x(c),x). jj£ (31)
and x(c) is the inverted cost function.
g(c,z) is the density distribution, giving the proportion of the population 
that has a noise nuisance cost of between c and c+dc in zone z as g(c,z)dc.
Let us assume initially that there is no distribution of surplus among the 
population and that everyone has a surplus S. We will relax this assumption 
later. Then, if noise is introduced into a previously quiet area, making it 
into a noise zone of level z, all outmovers will suffer a loss of D+R+S. Since 
at the margin there is no net gain for the outmover of the inmover, we have that: 
G(c*,z) = l-t(z) (3 2)
G(c**,z) = t(z) (33)
c* = D+R+S, c*'-' = D-R-S, and t is proportion of the residents that move
out of the area as a consequence of the noise zone being created,
G(c,z) is the cumulative distribution corresponding to the derived 
distribution g(c,z).
Nov/ for each noise zone z there will be values of t(z) from which 
the function c(x) can be constructed, as shown below in diagram 7. We 
plot the cumulative distribution F(x,z) in the southwest quadrant, In 
the north east quadrant ws plot the combinations of c* and G(c*), and 
c** and G(c**) as given in the expressions above. By tracing through 
diagram we can thus obtain two points relating c to x, Repeating the 
exercise for different noise zones, we get further pairs of points in 
the c-x space. By interpolating between these points we have an 
approximation to the c(x) function.
Thus for the case where there is no distribution of surplus and 
where the function c(x) is strictly monotonic, there is a procedure 
for deriving this function by a consideration of the turnover rates 
in the various ncise zones. In most applications, however, the distribution 
of the surplus S is an important factor, and it is to the implications of 
such a distribution on thecferivation of the function c(x) that we now turn.
Let us assume that there is a density distribution of surplus, 
given by h(s), and that the distrubiton of surplus is independent of the 
distributions f(x,z), for all z. We proceed by ignoring the distribution 
h(s), and by choosing, for each z, two values of S, viz., S^z) and $u(z). 
Given these values the cost function c(x) is constructed, as outlined 
in the previous section with the knowledge of the turnover rates in each 
of the noise zones. Now given the cost function, the cumulative 
distribution of noise annoyance costs, G(c,z) can be obtained by a 
summation over c of the terms given in equation (32). W'i th this 
cumulative distribution, the predicted turnover rate in zone z is expressed 
as E [t (z)J , where^
E[t(z)] :
s
A r D(z) + R
We are concerned with the choise of the values S. (z) and S (z),I- u
such that the cost function obtained predicts, as 'well' as possible, the 
observed turnover rates. Thus one possible way would be to try all 
possible combinations of S^(z) and S^fZ) but that would be extremely
C g (A+S;z)h(S)
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DIAGRAM 8
laborious.
If E[t(z)] >■ t*(z)
where t*(z) is the observed turnover rate in zone z, then we wish to
lower the predicted turnover rate. From equation (35) it is clear that
the cumulative function G(c,z) must shift upwards as shown in diagram 8.
For this to happeni the cost associated with a given turnover rate must
fall. For a turnover rate of t(z) we associate a cost of D-R-SL(z)
with t*(z) and a cost of D+M+Su (z) with J-t*(z). Tbus, if t h e s e  c o s t s
a r e to fall S^(z) must be raised and S^z) lowered.
Therefore, if we observe that the predicted turnover rate exceeds
the observed turnover rate we should lower Su(z), and raise S ^ ( z ) , and
vice versa. There are, however, some natural restrictions on the value
that S (z) and $. (z) can take: u L
(a) D(z)-R-Sl (z) j o  for all z
(b) The thoice of the relative values of S^iz) and S (z) for all z 
is such that the cost function obtained is non decreasing in x.
Condition (a) is necessary to ensure that the costs associated with 
given values of x are not negative. Condition (b) seems to be a 
natural restriction to place on a noise annoyance scale that measures 
increasing levels of annoyance
The following algorithm seems to suggest i tse l f:
DIAGRAM Q
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!n any practical application of a procedure such as that outlined 
above, it wi11 not be possible to obtain predicted movement rates that 
are exactly equal to the observed movement rates. This is because 
the data on the functions f(x,z) and h(S), and on the turnover rates 
is obtained by statistical methods that are liable to sampling error, 
and because the construction of the c(x) function will involve a 
considerable amount of interpolation. It will be necessary therefore 
to have some criteron of 'goodness - of fit'. One such criterion could 
be, for example, to minimise:
This penalises one large deviation more than two small ones, and 
therefore emphasises a uniform closeness to the observed rates.
In chapter 5 we discuss some of the evidence on turnover rates
in areas inflicted by noise. There are several difficulties of
measurement and interpretation, but one of the tentative conclusions
is that about six to nine per cent of the residents of a region inflicted
with noise might move, in regions where the noise level is 27.5n.e.f.
and ever (This is approximately equivalent to noise zones of n.n.i.
and over). Taking three noise zones for which the Roskill Commission
had collected data on the f(x,z) functions, we proceeded to apply the
above algorithm, when the observed turnover rates in each of the zones
was eight per cent. The details of the data used, and the assumptions
regarding movment costs and depreciation levels Is given in an appendix
to this chapter. We summarise here the iterations in Table 2 and
graphs A and B. In Table 2 we observe that the sum of squares of
deviations falls between each step. In graph 1 we show-the changes
the function c(x) as the iterations are carried out. Graph 1 corresponds
to step I in the table, graph 2 corresponds to step II in the-table
and graph 6 corresponds to step 111 in the table. Graphs 3 to 5 are
not tabulated, but all show a uniform fall in the sum of squares of 
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deviations. In graph B we plot the best estimated cost functions 
using turnover rates of eight per cent, and the cost function obtained
graph B are:
(i) The median assumption probably seriously underestimates the noise
costs at the t o D  end of the' scale. Tnis will imply that the Roskill *i ■ ■ - ... - -..... ... - .. - - ----------- - i ,i ,-- | | -—
* The costs presented here, as well as the value of (z) and S^(z), pre all 
annuitised costs in income units. Thus for example a value of c of 0.10 
implies that the annual noise nuisance cost is I0£ of annual income.
z.
by the use of the median assumption. The main points to note in
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TABLE 2
I I I
z(NEF) SL (z) sv (z) E t(z) t*(z) E T(z) -t(z) 2
37.5 0.0032 0.08 0.123 C.080 0.0018
33.5 0.0032 0.08 0.131 0.080 0.0026
27.5 0.0032 0.08 0.204 0 . 0 8 0 0.015*1
0.0198
37.5 0.0032 0.07 0.061 0.080 0.0004
33.5 0.0032 0.06 0.077 0.080 0.0000
27.5 0.0032 0.05 0.163 0.080 0.0069
0.0073]
37.5 0.0496 0.07 0.55 0.080 0.0006
33.5 0.0317 0.06 0.066 0.080 0.0002
27.5 0.0048 0.05 0.100 0.080 0.0004
0.0012 i
Restrictions on values of SL(z) and Sv(z):
Condi t ion (a) implies
SL(27.5) « 0.0048
Sl (33.5) <■N 0.0317
Sl (37.5) <N 0.0496
Cond i t ion (b) implies that
Sl (37.5) >, S L ( 3 3 • 5 ) ^
All values of S are expressed in annual income units, e.g. S x 0.08 
implies that the annuitised value of the householder surplus is 8 % of 
annual income.
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noise model will generate much lower movement rates and lower r.oise costs 
for the higher noise nuisance ratings, especially in very noisy zones. In 
fact if we consider the movement rates predicted by noise cost function as
p r
estimated by the median assumption, we obtain the following movement rates :
TABLE 3
NEF Movement rates predicted by noise model using median assumption %
.20-25 14.9
25-30 12.i
30-35 5.9
35-40 0.0
The figures for the 30-35 nef and 35-40 nef appear to be at variance 
with what statistical data is available on movement rates*
(ii) If the observed movement rate is around 8", then the middle section 
of the noise cost function (x=2 to x=4) is probably not too bad as 
estimated by the median assumption.
(iii) Again with observed movement rate of around 8%, it is probably safe
* to ignore the gains to inmovers, as the best estimate of the cost
function appears to be c(x)=0 for x o$rx.<1.
However, it is by no means established that the movement rate is 8%. A 
closer examination of the statistical evidence on these is necessary, and such 
evidence could lead to the costs established .by the median assumption as being 
even more unsatisfactory.
11.VI The Use of Noise as an Attribute in the Decision-Making Process
In the noise model used by the Roskill Commission households were assumed 
to choose between the option of staying and suffering the noise, or moving 
to a completely quiet zone. In reality of course, households have a whole 
range of intermediate options involving moving to different noise zones.
The very low turnover rates in the 30 nef and above zones are predicted 
because the distributions of noise nuisance are rather closely bunched together 
at the top end for al^ noise zones and the higher depreciation levels in the 
very noisy zones lead/median calculated values of N tomovc^ore slowly than de­
preciation rates.
The choices available are represented in diagram 9. Originally the 
household is at F., enjoying the maximum quiet. He then finds himself at 
N, as a result of the imposed noise in the environment. The choices 
available to him are to stay at N, or to choose a point on the line 
CE. This 1 ir.e is below N, because there are movement cost losses of 
surplus involved in any move. Such fixed costs of moving are 
represented by NK. The household will evaluate the maximum uti1ity 
attainable by moving (call it U ) and compare it with the utility of 
staying (call it Us) If the former is greater than the latter he will 
move, otherwise he will stay.
The question involved here is whether, for an outmover, it is
valid to assume that passes through E. If it does then the
relevant comparison is between FE and FO, where 0 is the point of
intersection of the indifference curve through N, representing utility Us ,
with the maximum quiet line. If FO is greater than FE the householder
moves; otherwise he stays. Intuitively one might regard the fixed cost
of moving as implying a declining unit cost to the purchase of quiet, and
the greater the fixed cost relative to the price of quiet the more likely
it is that a household that finds it beneficial to move will only find it
so when purchasing a lot of quiet. In practice the fixed costs are
always quite substantia 1 .Even in the absence of any householder surplus,
Pf)the movement costs are about nine per cent of the houseprice. These compare 
with a depreciation of about fourteen per cent of the house price in 
moving from a 30 n.e.f. noise level (quite noisy) to a quiet zone. Thus 
one might expect the assumption that noise can be treated as an attribute 
to be reasonably satisfactory in the context in which it is used.
Whether this is the case or not, however, can only be established by
further specifying the underlying utility function for the household. For
example, if we take the Cobb-Douglas utility function, modified to take
account of a maximum level of quiet, as presented in section l.ill, then
we may present the choice as follows:
If the household was enjoying units of quiet, where q is the maximum
amount of quiet possible, and now finds itself at x units of quiet then it
will move i f
„ j-ot a 1-ot 
q Y ] - x M > o
where qj and Y represent the utility maximising choices along the budget 
line
M+p'x - p.q - L - o
where p is the price of a unit of quiet and L is the fixed cost (movement 
cost plus loss of household surplus) of moving locations. The utility
DIAGRAM IQ
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maximisation gives'
q j  -  min |^ a ( M-t d x - L ) ,  q
* p °J
Y, s max [ 0-a)(H+px-L), H*p(q -x)-L ]
The min andmax terms indicate that no individual can consume more than 
units of quiet, no matter what hisct.
For illustrative purposes we consider a household with an annual 
income of £3000. L is set equal to R, the movement costs alone, and 
the data on R and p are taken as given in the appendix.
In graph C we plot ot, the parameter indicating the preference for 
quiet on the horizontal axis and the level of quiet that the household 
chooses to live under as the vertical axis, The maximum level of noise 
for residential purposes is taken as h S n.e.f. This implies that all 
households wi th a> o will move from a ¿¡5 n.e.f. noise level. 20 n.e.f. 
is taken as the no noise level. This means that there are 25 units of 
quiet. Households are considered at the 25, 30,35 and *t0 n.e.f. zones, 
and the stayers are represented by the horizontal part of the graph for 
each zone. Those households with very low alphas move into even more 
noisy areas, whereas those with high alphas (a strong liking for quiet) 
move into quieter areas. It will be observed that, for the 
25-30 n.e.f. zones all households that move into quieter areas, move to 
the maximum quiet, whereas in the ¿¡0 and 35 n.e.f, zone there are some 
outmovers that move into less than the completely quiet zone. Such 
households could be substantial, depending on the distribution of a  in 
the population especially in the very noisy zone { h O n.e.f.) Overall, 
however, it does appear that, except for the noisest zone the assumption 
that the decision to move to quiet areas can be made with noise regarded 
as an attribute is reasonably valid.
Although these results have been presented for a given income level, 
they are in fact very insensitive to changes in the level of income.
Also, increasing the level of L to include householder surplus only acts 
to reinforce the conclusions reached here.
While the choice of utility function used in the above illustration 
has its already spelt out limitations, it is difficult to believe that an 
alternative utility function v/ould radically alter the conclusion that, given 
the kinds of values taken bv the relevant variables, the treatment of noise 
as an attibute in this context is satisfactory all except the noisiest zones.
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II.VII The Problems of Time and Uncertainty 
Uncerta i nty
The model outlined so far, and commented upon, attempts to measure
the costs cf noise from a household decision making model which is based
on the assumptions that the household chooses that course of action which
is most beneficial to itself, and it does so with complete information
regarding the relevant costs and prices, and regarding its own tastes«
The assumption of complete information, however, is rather unsatisfactory
in this context. The development of serious aircraft noise is a
comparatively new phenomenon, and careful marginal judgements with
resepet to it may be difficult, especially for those with little or no
experience of noise. It is for this reason that the Roskill Commission
did not measure the noise costs or benefits of inrr.overs. However, it
remains true that if there is some depreciation in house price due to
noise, then there must be some households that choose to move in on
account,of their subjective evaluation of the noise costs. Furthermore
the social costs of noise will depend on the relationship between the
subjective evaluation and the realised noise costs. Such a relationship
may be a completely ’random' one, or it tray be that the1 subject 1 ve'
evaluation of noise costs, consists of a probability distribution of such
costs, and the probabilities reflect the long run frequencies of the
realised noise costs. In the case of the subjective noise costs and
the realised noise costs being randomly related, we may proceed as before,
including in the calculation of the .furict ion c(x). When the noise costs
of inmovers are to be assessed, however, the treatment is as follows:
uni form
A/random relationship implies that, irrespective of one's subjective noise 
cost, the actual noise cost, N could take any of the values in the range 
of N. That is to say, each value of N has the same probability of occurring 
Let the rangeof values of N be from zero to T. Then the expected noise 
costs are given by:
Expected Noise Costs= - ^"(D-R-N) ~ + £(D+2P)'y
N <tiin(T,D+R) h> min(T,D+R)
The first term indicates the expected gain, when the individual noise cost 
Is less than D+R, and he stays in the noisy zone. The second term is the 
expected loss if N exceeds D+R and the individual leaves the noisy zone, to 
return to the quiet zone. (This being his least costly course.of action).
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Assuming no risk aversion, the individual will move into the noisy area 
only if his expected noise cost is non positive. Thus if we add all 
the negative expected noise costs we obtain the long run or expected 
noise costs of inmovers.
Such a procedure is based on the assumption of a uniform random 
relationship between the subjective noise cost and the realised noise 
cost. If, however, the 'subjective' noise cost does bear some other 
relation to the possible outcomes, then the problem is more complex 
for the probability distribution of possible noise costs has to be 
ascertained. In our present state of-knowledge it would not appear 
to be possible to construct the subjective probability distributions 
of individuals views' of their noise costs. However, taking a 
uniform random relationship, which may be interpreted as a case of 
equal ignorance of all possible states, gives some idea of the expected 
noise costs in a situation of considerable uncertainty.
The presence of risk aversion in individual behaviour would further 
complicate the problem, and would require the specification of a Von- 
fieuriann-Morgernstern type utility function with a risk parameter, for 
the solution of the problem. However, in the absence of any reasonable 
basis for making such a specification, it should be noted that the 
actual noise costs incurred by a risk averse population will be lower than 
those incurred by a risk neutral population. This is because, being 
risk averse they will tend to stay where they are more frequently, and 
this action has a zero cost or benefit associated with it. Similarly 
the gains obtained will be smaller too, thus giving an overall distribution 
of actual gains and losses that is more closely bunched around zero than 
with risk neutral behaviour.
Time
The annual noise costs are discounted to a given year and added 
together to obtain the total noise costs. The Roskill Commission 
truncated the noise costs in the year 2005. Also, to allow for growth 
of real incomes, and a change in relative prices they allowed for a 
growth in the values D, R and S overtime. The choice of the year 
truncation raises an
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interesting economic problem. It v/ould bo'des i rabl e property of the 
truncation point if the discounted sum of net benefits of the whole project 
for any discount rate should not change sign for truncation points greater 
than the one chosen. If it did change sign then it would imply that the 
costs and benefits that are ignored could have a decisive effect on the 
project depending on the discount rate. In this connection Sen(l973) 
has shovm, in an unpublished paper, that if certain regularity conditions 
are satisfied and in addition the discounted sum of the net benefits 
after the point of truncation are posi tivc then that point satisfies the 
above property. In practice, however, it is extremely difficult to 
establish the last condition,and apoint of truncation is chosen when 
it is.felt that values of the relevant variables beyond that point are 
too uncertain to be held with any credibility. This does mean of course 
that different views of the future beyond the point of truncation could 
reasonably be the source of differences regarding the desirability of the 
whole project.
It is certainly important to take account of changes in real income 
and relative prices over time. As real income grows over time, the 
positive income elasticity for quiet implies an increase in the demand 
for quiet. Given limitations in the supply sidt this would lead to an 
increase in the price of quiet, although in measuring this it is important 
to take into consideration changes in the levels of noise produced by 
aircraft of different designand different volume in the future. Similarly, 
an increase in the relative price of services would lead to an increase in 
the costs of moving. Householder surplus is usually related to the 
expenditure on housing. Whether this increases over time or net, depends 
on the relative values of the income and price elasticities of housing.
If we define $ as the percentage change in real expenditure on housing, 
then <P r n.g + 0+e) if>
where e- price elasticity of demand for housing
i|; ~rate of increase of house prices in real terms 
rii income elasticity of demand for housing 
gyrate of growth of real income
Since 'p is oftr-n considered to be positive, whether 6 is positive or not 
depends on the relative values of the variables. It is by no means clear 
that It should equal q, as assumed by the Roskil! Commission.
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III. Conclusions
In this chapter we have considered, in some detail, two alternative 
methods of measuring noise costs to households. The first method begins 
by treating quiet as a typically economic good, and then makes allowances 
for factors which are special to quiet, such as adjustment costs. The 
second method starts out by taking account of the special features of 
noise in constructing a noise model. When considered more closely, this 
model can be regarded as a special case of the first method - a case where 
noise can be treated as an attribute rather than as a continijoustyvariable 
commodity in the households decision as to whether it should move or not.
We have considered the validity of this simplifying assumption, an.d conclude 
that it is probably valid for low and medium levels of imposed noise, but 
may not be valid- for high levels of imposed noise.
If noise is treated as an attribute, the measurement of noise costs 
can proceed without any specific demand function for quiet. The approach 
that is taken consists of deriving a noise annoyance disbenefit distribution 
from an ordinal scale of noise annoyance, along with data on house price 
depreciation, movement costs, and householders surplus. We have discussed 
this approach and considered a number of problems. By far the most awkward 
problem is the one of constructing a suitable noise annoyance scale from 
questionnaires on issues related to noise, carried cut in noisy zones.
It is difficult enough to state the direction of any biases caused by 
using such a scale, let alone quantify them. Yet there are reasons for 
thinking that such biases might net be insubstantial. Hov/ever, if the 
noise annoyance scale can be relied upon, then it should be possible to 
obtain reasonable estimates for the noise costs, providing that some inform­
ation can bo obtained on turnover rates in zones where the noise is 
introduced, and providing that the data on depreciation, movement cost 
and surplus is satisfactory. Such estimated costs will consist of movers 
costs and stayers costs. The movers costs are both the compensation and 
willingness costs as defined earlier, but the stayers costs are the willing­
ness costs only. From these, some idea of the compensation costs can be 
obtained, given an underlying utility function between quiet and other 
commodities. Such a function would imply, however, a demand function for
quiet, and some values for the price and income elasticities for quiet, which 
this approach aimed to do without.
The more classically economic method of costinq noise does away with 
a noise annoyance scale, and the consequent estimation of the noise annoyance
iy¡
disbenefit, but requires an estimated demand function (or functions) for 
quiet. This estimation is not an easy task, but the data is available, 
and it should be possible. Indeed in some hitherto unpublished work,
V,'alters (1S73) has already derived some preliminary estimates for the price 
and income elasticities for quiet. The measurement of noise costs based on 
these has a number of advantages:
(a) An estimated demand function for quiet would give some confidence 
interval for the estimated parameters. With these it should be 
possible to obtain confidence intervals on the derived noise costs. 
This is not possible with the Roski11 or modified RoskiT1 models.
(b) There will be no need to assume that noise is an attribute - an
assumption that could be misleading in some cases. -
(c) It will be possible to provide a fuller treatment of the compensation 
and willingness costs of noise. Such a treatment is not possible 
with the Roskill model, without specifying the utility function, 
which amounts to having some idea of the demand function.
(d) The step by which the noise annoyance scale is converted into money 
values will be avoided. This means that the dubious median 
assumption, or the difficult alternative of measuring turnover 
rates will not be necessary.
1J8
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3
In calculating the cost functions the following data was used:
(I) The functions f(x,z) were taken from the McKennel Survey 
(McKennel 1963). This gave the distribution annoyance
at various nni levels. The nni values were converted to nef 
values by using conversion factors constructed by Abrahams.
(Abrahams, 1973).
(II) The distribution of surplus h(s) was taken from the Roskill Report,
Vo 1.7, Table 20.1. This gave the consumer surplus as a percentage 
excess of the market price of a house and listed the percentage
of a sample of householders who stated that surplus.
(III) House price depreciation was set at 1.4 per cent of the house 
price with the noise, per nef. Details of this estimate are 
given in chapter 5.
(IV) Movement costs were fixed at 9 per cent of the house price. Again 
this estimate is explained in more detail in chapter 5.
(V) To measure everything in income units a ratio of 4 was assumed
between annual income and house value. The constancy, or other 
wise, of the proportion of income spent on housing has long been a 
matter of debate. The current evidence on this question is 
summarised in a survey by de Leeuw (1*771), where he argues that the 
income elasticity of demand for housing is about unity with respect 
to permenant income, implying a constant proportion of income being 
spent on housing services. The ratio of expenditure on housing
service to house value however, appears to be a marginally declining 
as house value increases. , a s
one/ with the fitted equations relating the log of housing
expenditure to the log of permenant income,it is possible to estimate
the proportion of income spent on housing from the constant term
of the equations when the income elasticity is about unity.
Unfortunately this does not yield sensible values when applied
to those results quoted by de Leeuw. (In the case of equations
relating house value to income they imply the ratio of income to
house value as being greater considerably than one i) In a
footnote in the same paper, de Leeuw states that this ratio is
probably between 2 and 3 in the United States. This range seems
rather low to us for British data, where the ratio is probably closer
to 4 - a value that was considered to be about right for Australian data in
the course of the Sydney Airport Study.
(VI) To annuitise the costs a discount rate of eight per cent vas 
used.
Finally, the functions f(x,z) were only used for those zones where 
D(z)-R/o, since if D(z)-RvO then there will be no inmovers and hence the 
level of depreciation must be a hypothetical figure. This excludes the 
possibility of uninformed behaviour,but this analysis only makes sense 
if such behaviour is excluded.
In calculating the willingness and compensation costs in section 1, 
the price of a unit of quiet, p*, was set at 1.4% of the house price per 
unit of quiet.- To relate this to income, assumption (v) above was made. 
All costs were annuitised using a discount rate of 8%. The units of 
quiet are measured from 0 to 25. 25 units of quiet may be taken
to correspond to 20 n.e.f., the cut off point in the noise scale used by 
the Roskill Commission. 0 units of quiet would then correspond to 45 
nef,and, given the utility function assumed, this would imply that at that 
noise level all households with any positive degree of perturbility would 
move out.
.140
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 3
1. In an evaluation of the costs of aircraft noise the Roskill Commission 
calculated that iesidential noise costs were the easily biggest single 
component of the total noise costs and ranged, for a prospective third London 
airport, from about £10 million for an airport at Foulness to about £12 million 
for an airport at FUhampstead. See Roskill (1570) for details.
2. Expressing an indifference curve between quiet and expenditure in other 
goods, the indifference map will depend on the prices of all other goods.
We assume that such prices are held constant in this analysis.
3. It is entirely possible of course, that os a result of the noise the house­
hold would be better off than with no noise. Fcr if his indifference
curves were very 'flat', then some points on the new price line 
could lie above and moving to a 1ower level of quiet represented by 
one of these the household would be at a higher level of welfare than that 
represented by Lir.
4. In chapter 5 we cite some of the evidence suggesting that the income 
elasticity of demand for quiet is about 2. This kind of elasticity, along 
with the 'large' price change being considered are the classic ingredients 
of important income effects,.
5. Where cross price elasticities are not negligible it would be necessary
to take account of the effects on other prices, and the shifts they would cause 
to the demand curves for other commodities. Since such effects are rarely 
considered it is implicitly being assumed that cross price elasticities are 
negligible.
6. If households are sufficiently sensitive to move to a completely quiet area 
then their willingness and compensation costs are indistinguishable. Later 
when adjustment factors are considered this statement will have to be qualified.
7. With Ccbb-Douglas or Stone-Geary type utility functions, implying
a constant unit income elasticity and a greater than unity income elasticity, 
declining with income, respectively, it can be shown that OF being greater than 
the distance between Uc and measured in expenditure terms at qfa, is 
consequently larger than c* b* (see section T F T  for details). For other 
forms of utility function we cannot say how DF and c* b* will be related.
8. In considering any serious adjustment to noise we assume that moving 
residence is necessary. This is in accordance with the general belief
that adjustments to noise through sound proofing fail to offer extensive protection 
against noise. The adjustment costs associated with moving
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locations that is referred to as householders surplus may itself be 
measured in compensation terms - the extra money above the sale price of the 
house required to compensate you for moving locations, or in willingness 
to pay terms - the amount you would be willing to pay above the purchase 
price tc buy the particular house you live in. We discuss these differences 
more fully in Chapter 5, section four. In summary, the willingness concept 
is the relevant ore for decisions regarding moving or staying; once a house­
holder decides not to move the concept is irrelevant, end if the householder 
moves his costs will be measured as before except that to obtain an overall 
compensation cost a compensation householder surplus is added end 
to obtain an overall willingness cost a willirgness-to-pay householder surplus 
is added. For some interesting theoretical and empirical observations on 
this question the reader is referred to Starkie and Johnson (1973).
9. From data given by the General Householder Survey (1973) we observe 
that about 40 percent of the population neve in a period of five years 
anyway. See General Household Survey fable 5.5.2.
10. The variational cost is used for short run movers because we consider 
then as adjusting their level of quiet in the short run in response to the 
externality. We use the surplus cost for the long run movers while they 
can be regarded as non-adjusters - i.e. until that period of time is past 
after which wc- nay regarded all householders as adjusting. Then
we regard them as free to adjust and use a variational cost.
11. W'e consider a fixed householder surplus for diacramatic simplicity. 
Otherwise we would have to do the analysis for every level of householder 
surplus.
12. We ignore here the surplus for imovers. In practice it turns out to 
be unimportant since only households with no noise annoyance and no surplus 
would move into ncisy zones in the short run.
13. This was considered in conjunction with the Sydney Airport Study and 
after further enquiry it was decided that surveying annoyance even in areas 
where there hac been noise some years back was net feasible.
14. The author actually experienced an interview during which the husband 
refused to let his wife talk, and claimed that he did not suffer any noise 
annoyance, although one could r.ct hear him when a plane flew ever head erd the 
house visibly shock. It turned out that he was employed at the airport
and there was some possibility of his airline cutting back staff!
15. Again fer the same reason, we ignore householder surplus among inmovers
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16. This marginal condition cf N=D+R will or.ly measure a*F if of 
course the household does move to complete Quiet. We return to this point 
later.
17. We remark here that these differences are quite small, and non movers 
costs being the major component cf the noise, compensation and vnllingress 
costs, at least as measured by unit elasticities are well within the 
margins of error cf such an analysis.
18. Such a concept as E should be quite measureable. Cne interpretation 
might be the poverty lire as defined in Social Welfare Programmes. This 
allows fer local factors and brings in the size cf the family which would 
appear a desirable thing to do.
IS. Ir c o n s tru c t in g  such a function a r.cise cost cf c for a noise annoyance 
rating of x is assured to hold in all noise zones.
20. It should be stressed here that tie above conditions for the median 
assumption tc te valid are sufficient but ret recessery. Thus it may te 
possible for the assumption tc be valid when these conditions are ret 
satisfied. however, what we have shown is that, in examining the conditions 
under which, the median assumption is valid, we have not teen able tc provide a 
theoretical rationalisation for its use. In the absence of any such 
rationalise tier, therefore, we must remain sceptical cf the validity of this 
assumption.
21. This footnote has been excluded from the text.
22. We use this nctaticn to refer tc the proportion cf households with
a noise annoyance rating cf X in a r.cise zone Z. It is obtained by sample 
survey methods.
23. The predicted turnover rate is constructed by assuming that all households 
with noise costs greater than depreciation plus adjustment costs move cut of 
the noise zone.
24. From this analysis it dees appear that the algorithm would work better 
if the noise arrcyance rating scale was contir.uise-d in some appropriate 
fashion. Failing that a closer approximation to the observed rates
would be obtained if the interpolation fcc-tweeen points cn Graph A was dene 
ccr.vexly rather than by straight lines.
25. Details cf these estimates are giver in Chapter 5 section 5.5 
Effectively fray are derived from a Pcski11 type noise cost model with a con­
stant level of noise imposed and with the price cf quiet rising relative
tc all ether variables. These movements are the ones that occur in the short
term (first eight years). After that., sirce gradually tut inexorably
the valuation cf quiet is assumed to rise there will be further adjustments.
However, for the purposes cf estimating initial noise costs i 
the short tern: movements that vc are interested in.
26. This estimate is taker, from, the Sydney Airport Study. 
Roskill Commission used similar figures.
t is
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Chapter 4.
Control of the Level of Noise
4.1. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we discuss the economic aspects of the control of the level 
of noise. In doing this we draw from the large and growing literature on 
the control of externalities and Public Bads, and, in the light of the specific 
nature of the noise problem, evaluate the various forms of control which 
are used and which have been proposed to deal with this problem. This is 
done in this section. In the next section the most suitable method of 
charging for noise is examined more fully within the context of e formal 
general equilibrium model incorporating the relevant variables, and some 
of the problems and difficulties that may be encountered in its implementation 
are discussed. Such a scheme would require considerable further work and 
may or may not be operational. In the meantime the urgency of the noise 
problem has resulted in a series of measures to control noise. These have 
a varying degree of appeal to social or economic criteria and in section 
three we evaluate such direct controls as already exist. Most of the 
discussion in this chapter is in the context of aircraft noise, and certainly • 
sections two and three deal with aspects of the noise problem that have 
little relevance to the questions raised by the existence of urban noise. 
Section four says what little can be said about the economic aspects of the 
control of urban noise.
, A general discussion of noise as an externality and as a Public Bad
An externality is said to exist when an activity pursued by one agent in the 
economy has a direct effect on the utility or the profits of some other agent 
in the economy, and when no market exists which directly takes account of 
such an effect^. It is clear how noise complies with this definition.
The noise generated by motor vehicles, aeroplanes, and individuals affects 
the utility of other individuals, and although che markets for related 
commodities may reflect such influences, there is no direct market for 
quiet, or freedom from noise. When the activity of some agent has a direct and
.145.
deleterious effect on the utility of all households, and the above conditions 
apply, then we may refer to that aspect of the activity in question that 
produces this undesirable effect as a Public Bad. Whether or not noise is 
a Public Bad is not so clear. Many kinds of noise, such as motorway 
noise have a rather localised effect and cannot be said to directly influence 
the utility of many households. Other kinds of noise are rather broader 
in their impact, and can be said to influence a large part of the population.
A household may be influenced by the existence of noise, even when it does 
not appear to suffer the consequences of this noise. This is because it 
may have taken some approriate action, at some cost to itself, to avoid this 
noise. On the other hand some household may be seen to be suffering seme 
noise, but might be better off than if the noise did not exist. This is 
because its preferences for quiet may be small, relative to the implicit price 
for quiet which emerges through the markets of complementary commodities.
As we saw in chapter 3 this can easily lead to a higher level of welfare 
for some household, relative to the no noise position, in which case it is 
perhaps inappropriate to refer to noise as'a Public Bad. it is widely 
recognised, however, that a pure public good, or bad, hardly ever exists.
The concept, nevertheless, is useful in deriving the conditions defining the 
optimum level of seme commodities, and on considering the attainment of such 
optima. The validity of the concept depends on whether a large, and 
approximately identifiable, group of households is influenced by a particular 
activity2. This would appear to be the case with aircraft noise, but not 
with some other kinds of noise. Hence their analysis and treatment would 
differ.
4.1.2. Various methods of controlling externalities and Public Bads.
In order to keep ideas concrete, and to concentrate on the matter at hard, 
we will discuss the control of externalities in the context of aircraft 
noise. We have in mind an airport surrounded by residential dwellings. 
Households can select the level-of noise they suffer, but at a cost. for 
simplicity we may think of any changes in the noise level at the centre 
as giving an equal change in the noise level at any point . How can we 
obtain the optimal level of noise pollution?
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fa) A Pseudo-Market
The public bad exists because, for legal and/or technical reasons there 
is no market in noise pollution. Given the possiblity of the measurement 
of noise, the Government may set up a framework within which the rights 
to pollute may be bought and sold between the airport authority and the 
residents in the neighbourhood. If the environmental rights are accorded 
to the residents then they could sell them to the airport authority either 
individually or as a group, with a marginal increase in noise being 
sanctioned if all households receive their marginal costs of evading the 
extra noise. The airport authority4 would be required by the Government 
to act as a marginal cost pricing industry - i.e. not to exploit its monopoly 
power as a buyer of pollution rights - in deciding how much to buy of them.
It would then choose to buy that quantity where the marginal gain from 
creating more noise just equalled the price. The equilibrium level of 
production of the externality is given where the sum of the marginal 
costs of residential noise evasion equal the marginal gains to the airport 
authority of noise creation.
If the environmental rights were given to the airport authority, the
households would each pay a charge equal to the marginal noise evasion cost
to the airport, and the equilibrium would be defined by the equating of the
marginal noise evasion cost to the sum of the marginal benefits to all
households of a reduction in the noise level. In this case the measure of
noise evasion has to be relative to some level of noise. One naturally
thinks of this as being that level which would prevail in the absence of
any controls on noise, although other 'origins' of measurement may be used.
When the marginal conditions determine a unique equilibrium the outcome
is the same either way/* 5R!V0n]JlaS iff irE ? iS § t E eing that in the former case
the households are better off than in the latter case, with the opposite
being true for the airport authority. The usual caveat to the above statement
is that neither of the parties ‘shuts down' operations, as the rights are
transferred from one group to another. Households cannot 'shut down' in any
real sense. They may vary the level of quiet that they choose, according to
whether they have the rights or not. and hence the'margi'nal benefits of
noise evasion schedule' may differ from the'marginal costs of noise evasion
schedule'. Such a difference will be closely related to the difference
between the equivalent and compensating costs discussed in the previous chapter, 
with the marginal benefits being measured by the willingness to pay for extra * 
units of quiet and the marginal costs being measured by the compensation required 
for taking away an extra unit of quiet.
Given that the income effects of the onwership of pollution rights are 
small, such cost differences will also be small, and consequently the levels 
of quiet chosen under the two alternative schemes will not be far apart. T 
airport authority, however, can shut down if the noise charges are too high. 
In a recent and as yet unpublished paper Starrett and Zeckhauser (1971) 
have shown that such a shut down is only possible when the production 
possibilities for the airport authority are non-convex. However, such 
non-convexity is quite plausible and is illustrated in diagram 1 below.
The horizontal axis measures quiet from left to right and noise from right to 
left. The airport authorities demand schedule shows that they will pirchasc 
all pollution rights until the price rises above OA and will then pirchase 
progressively fewc-r rights until the price reaches OB. At that point it is 
no longer possible for them to operate ar airport in their regulated
capacity, and so they shut down operations5. Hence there are two equilibria, 
one at e> and one at 0 . Which one is superior depends on the relative 
sizes of the areas (I + II) (the benefits of the airport staying open), and 
areas (I +III) (the benefit of the airport closing down). The kind of 
schedules indicated below are by no means implausible. What their presence 
points to is that while a pseudo-market determined charge for pollution rights 
is possible in principle, such a charge, and the equilibrium associated with 
it, has to be compared with the other possibility of shutting down the airport. 
Converaly the decision to locate an airport cannot be solved by discovering 
whether an equilibrium tax rate exists. Such a solution may be dominated 
by one where there is no airport.
The kind of comparison of equilibria that is suggested here involves the 
measurement of surpluses and consequently would be conducted within the 
framework of a benefit cost analysis.
Apart from this consideration, there are several problems with the implement­
ation of an pseudo-market approach to controlling noise. The airport authority 
is a single buyer or seller of pollution rights and consequently government 
regulation would be required to avoid the use of monopoly power, where the 
authority is a private concern. Where the authority is a public concern the 
demand for pollution rights or the supply of an improved environment will be 
influenced by any financial control on the authorities operations and any 
pricing controls on the authorities other activities. The households on the 
ether hand are in a classical public good type situation. When they have 
the pollution rights they will be inclined to overstate their marginal 
noise evasion costs and when the authority has the rights the reverse will 
be the case5. The difficulties raised by such issues are very serious.
We can, under certain conditions, get information regarding household 
costs schedules from their market behaviour and do not have to resort to 
questionnaires to obtain subjective information. The circumstances under 
which this can be done are analysed in the next section. Where such informatio 
is gathered by a third party, however, the principle of a market between 
two groups of agents no longer exists and the information efficiencies 
that are one of the important advantages of the market type approach 
disappear.
.149.
(b) Taxes
With a government agency being able to assess the noise costs of households 
with reference to market data and being frequently involved in the operations 
of the airport authority, it would seem easier for a taxation scheme to be 
used to correct the externality. In such a scheme the government obtains 
information regarding the supply price of pollution rights at the given 
level of noise and places a tax on the airport authority. This leads to a 
reduction in the noise level and to a recalculation of the supply'price, 
the procedure resulting in an equilibrium position if it is a stable procedure. 
Given that the demand and supply schedules for pollution rights are as 
shown in diagram l (with a downward sloping demand curve for pollution rights 
and an unward sloping supply curve for them), then we will end up by such 
a procedure at either equilibrium E or 01. The difficulty is that the one 
that we end up at need not be the optimal one. However, given that the 
system is stable around equilibrium E, and we have independently decided 
which of the equilibria E or 01 we prefer, a taxation procedure would overcome 
the difficulties associated with direct public involvement in the pseudo- 
market approach. At the equilibrium the government imposes a tax of OD 
per unit of quiet that the airport authorities take away, leading them to 
reduce quiet by O'F units. Alternatively the government could pay the
authority an amount equal to CD per unit of noise that it reduced below the 
maximum. The authority would then be willing to reduce noise by OF units 
again leading to the optimum position. The tax revenue raised, or the 
bribe spent would be assumed to come from the overall government budget 
and the usual rules relating to government taxation (in the case of a bribe) 
or expenditure (in the case of a noise charge) would apply7.
Such a scheme does not involve cither raising money from households or 
paying money out to households, although there is no reason why this should 
not be done, if it were thought desirable on political grounds. In the 
light of the political lobbying that results whenever decisions regarding 
aircraft noise are concerned, it is important to consider the possibility 
that households be compensated for noise nuisance, and the role that such 
compensation might play in enabling an optimum level of pollution to be 
achieved. Such difficulties as may arise in providing a compensation scheme 
are discussed when .we consider below the direct controls on aircraft noise.
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At this stage we may note that such compensation is not an integral part
o.f a tax scheme for attaining the optimum level of noise control, 
in practical terms a taxation scheme has a number of advantages over a 
market scheme as far as the noise problem is concerned. Administratively 
it would be much easier to operate. The problem of stability, while 
theoretically relevant is unlikely to crop up for the demand schedule for 
pollution rights is probably inelastic enough to ensure stability.
The main difficulties that a tax scheme would encounter would be with reoard 
to the airport authorities' ability to calculate its demand curve for 
pollution rights and for the government to calculate the marginal noise evasion 
costs to households. Regarding the former as vie mentioned earlier that 
an airport authority is being considered as a government regulated industry 
applying the appropriate welfare pricing policy to its services and 
calculating its demands for factors and pollution rights on that basis.
At present we are still a long way from applying fully the principles of 
regulated industries to the business of airports. In fact many aspects 
of airport pricing policy show so little regard for considerations of cost 
and allocative efficiency that it sometimes seems heroic to assume that the 
kind of calculations underlying the demand schedule for pollution rights 
indicated in diagram 1 will ever be undertaken, and the regulatory procedures 
applied to the airport authorities so that they act as price takers and cost 
minimisers and pursue the desired pricing policies10. This does not, 
however, invalidate the consideration of charge schemes at a theoretical 
level, for such consideration must inevitably precede, and indeed has often 
preceded the implementation of new pricing policies in other spheres11. In 
the meantime, however, it is necessary to recognise that.such schemes are 
a long way off and that something has to be done to control noise levels. 
Regarding the latter, there are also substantial difficulties in obtaining 
the relevant information - difficulties that may be insurmountable.' h’e 
consider these more fully in the next section.
(c) The use of direct controls
Over the last decade ar.d a half a number of controls over aircraft noise have 
emerged. These constitute
151
(i) Controls on the location of airports
(ii) Controls on the noise levels of aircraft
(iii) Controls on flying hours
(iv) Controls on flight paths
(v) Zoning
As far as item (i) is concerned, we have observed above that the controls 
on airport location may be necessary even when a market or tax scheme is in 
operation: Decisions regarding airport location have been formalised so that 
the economic costs and benefits can be enumerated within one framework, and 
the costs of noise within this framework have been examined in chapter 3.
As far as controls on items (ii) to (v) are concerned, we must recognise 
that, while they are in part ad hoc, and the levels of control not fully 
justifiable, it may be essential to retain some of them along with a charges 
scheme, albeit in a form modified from the present one. This is because 
certain aspects of noise nuisance cannot be properly measured or may be too 
costly to measure and hence cannot be part of a tax adjustment procedure. 
Nevertheless one can appeal to economic principles to assess these controls 
in a qua!itative fashion. We attempt to do this in section three of this 
chapter, recognising that while these controls were conceived as measures 
arising from a growing but unsystematic concern for the nuisance of noisy 
aircraft, they may still have a role in an optimal control of such noise.
(d) Internalising the externality
One solution that has been posed to deal with the control of aircraft 
noise has been the idea of the 'expanded firm'. In an article investigating 
the legal aspects of noise, Baxter and Altree (1972) consider the possiblity 
that the airport authority should own all the land in the vicinity of the 
airport that is affected by noise. Given the object of maximising profits 
subject to given prices, such an authority would have to trade-off the 
profitability of further flying activities against the reduced rental income 
from the residential dwellings that are now inflicted by further noise. Su:h 
a procedure could, in principle, emerge at the equilibrium E. (Again the 
shut down or set-up decision cannot be solved by this procedure). However, 
as Baxter and Altree recognise, and os Walters has pointed out, the size of 
such an expanded firm would be gigantic, incorporating in the case of
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London's Heathrow airport for example, the ownership of about 80,000 
households** by the airport authority! The efficient management of regulated 
industries of the size envisaged raises many problems, more perhaps than such, 
an expanded firm solves. When the airport is not located close to large 
populations, then the possibility of an expanded firm may be more realistic.
In such circumstances the purchase of the noise affected land may be considered 
The appropriate price for such a transfer would be the price that prevailed 
before the airport was considered, thus excluding all externalities associated 
with the airport.
(e) Compensation
In the discussion of noise nuisance the idea has been considered that parties 
affected by a sudden increase in aircraft noise should be compensated for 
such an increase. In fact there is a legal history of such' compensation 
being claimed in the U.S. There are-recorded cases of the claims being 
denied and being upheld depending on individual circumstances, and a good 
summary of this development is contained in an article by Baxter and Altree. 
The current situation seems to be that increased aircraft noise nuisance is 
compensable, providing that some depreciation to the property affected can be 
shown to have occurred on account of the noise nuisance. The very presence 
of aircraft noise as measured by one of the recognised noise measures, does 
not. however, constitute evidence of such depreciation, and indeed there 
does appear to be scepticism of the validity of these measures. The com­
pensation where it is provided, is related to the extent of the depreciation 
established.
Such compensation as we have discussed above does not correspond to an 
economic concept of compensation. In chapter 3, where we considered the 
costs of noise nuisance in seme detail, we distinguished the compensation 
costs for moves and the compensation costs for stayers, and that there is 
perhaps a useful distinction to be drawn between the long term movers' costs 
and the short term movers’ costs. For movers such costs consist of the 
depreciation in property values, relative to the noise level in their new 
location, movement costs and seme element of lost Householder surplus. If 
we wish to consider the refinement of distinguishing between short and long 
term movers, then movement costs are to be ignored in the long term, and the 
surplus element considerably diminished. For stayers the compensation costs 
are related to the households preference for quiet. Such a model of com-
1
I
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pensatlon costs, is, however, of little use in practice. This is because 
compensation is paid to each household and, while a model can calculate 
total noise nuisance costs on the basis of the model outlined above, by 
deriving some knowledge of the distribution of preferences from market data 
and econometric estimation, such a model cannot then assign individual costs 
to individual households.
Thus the construction of a suitable scheme for compensation based on 
market data is not possible.. This brings us to the question of developing 
such a compensation scheme by obtaining 'individual household information, 
and as we have pointed out this line of approach is fraught with the. 
difficulties associated with asking people questions when they know they 
stand to benefit according to the answer they give.' It would appear then 
that a satisfactory compensation scheme is not feasible. Furthermore it is 
not sufficient in our view to say that a scheme based on the payment of the 
estimated depreciation to all residents is an adequate approximation to an 
'ideal scheme'. The notion of economic compensation is a sum of money required 
to restore the individual to his original level of satisfaction and the 
difference between such a sum and the estimated depreciation could be. 
arbitrarily large.
This does not mean, however, that some form of compensation cannot be 
justified on political grounds, and a rule of thumb based on depreciation, 
would, if acceptable, be as good as any. The argument one might suggest 
here is^a^slrong opposition to decisions regarding airport noise in general 
and airport location in particular, because a large identifiable group of 
people are adversely affected. Making the optimal economic decision may 
require for example maximising the discounted sum of benefits less costs.
This, however, cuts little ice with the action groups formed to preserve 
their share of the national distribution of welfare. If some payments were 
made to this group of people, in such a way that some gained a little relative 
to the no noise situation and some lost, then the solidarity would be 
fragmented. We may then consider the payment of compensation as an instrument 
for permitting decision based on a benefit cost principle to operate. 
Alternatively we may regard compensation as the best available means of re­
dressing any undesirable changes in the distribution of welfare caused by the 
imposition of noise in a particular area. Although, as we point out, compensa­
tion would not provide an accurate guide to correcting such changes, it would 
work in the right direction and might be the best guideline available.
4.2. Measures Relating to the Use of Charges in Controlling Aircraft
Noi se
In defining the optimum charges in the previous section we relied on a 
marginal argument and a partial equilibrium approach. This is a useful tool 
of analysis, based essentially on a consideration of consumer and producer 
surpluses, but it masks a number of difficulties in defining'the equilibrium 
and discovering the conditions under which a multiplicity of equilibria can 
be ruled out. As we have already seen in a rather restricted context, if 
there is more than one equilibrium a charge scheme may choose the wrong one 
from an optimality viewpoint. In the context that we discussed,we could 
rule out either one of the equilibria by a benefit-cost type of analysis. 
However, it may be that the demand schedule for pollution rights and the 
supply schedule are not 'nicely1 sloped as shown but cross over at a number 
of points. In that case a charge system may end up at either a local or 
a global maximum or minimum, and knowing that is not very helpful. The 
questions we are concerned wi th asking in this section are, what assumptions 
have to be made about the technology and about the factors determining 
household utilities to ensure that a unique interior optimum exists, and 
are these assumptions reasonable ones to make? These questions are better 
considered within the context of a simple general equilibrium model.
4.2.1. The Scarcity of Quiet
A supply curve of pollution rights by households will only exist if there is
a scarcity of the supply of quiet. But what is the cause of this scarcity?
After all, there is plenty of land which is quiet and where one can live
without suffering any aircraft noise. Indeed if one could combine quiet,
and all the other goods that one wished to consume in any manner that pleased
one, then there would be a negligible demand for noise affected land and
8
hence quiet could not be a scarce commodity , The scarcity of quiet arises 
because the choice of a certain level of quiet generally entails seme 
sacrifice - the convenience of being near to ones place of work for example, 
or near ones friends. When one considers the purchase of quiet immediately 
after the arrival of some aircraft noise, such factors will weigh more 
heavily than if one has to make these decisions over a long period, where
the set of choices is more flexible. In the assessment of the costs of 
noise to households we captured such considerations by using the concept 
of householders1 surplus. Here, however, we argue that the existence of 
some such surplus is essential to the existence of a scarcity of quiet.
Perhaps the best way to capture this aspect of quiet is to use the concept 
of locational inconvenience. This is the minimum inconvenience, suitably 
measured, that is involved in consuming any given level of quiet. . There 
may be several dimensions to this and from the analytical point of view 
there is no reason why there should not be. However, to keep the 
exposition simple, it will be assumed that such inconvenience is uni-dimens­
ional. (It is easy to think of many aspects to such inconvenience.
However many inconveniences of consuming a different level of quiet are 
purely short term and disappear once the move is made. In discussing a 
concept of inconveniences that is relevant for a scheme for noise charges 
the relevant inconveniences, however, are only the long term ones. One 
example of these is the distance involved in travelling to work. )
We will not assume that locational inconvenience either increases or decreases 
with the amount of quiet chosen. There is no a priori reason to assume that 
either is the case, and even when locational inconvenience is measured in 
terms of the distance from oneb work place to ones residence, the above 
relationship will not be monotonic unless the noise centre and the work centre 
are coincident for all individuals - an unlikely state of affairs in 
practice. An important assumption regarding the relationship between 
locational inconvenience and the level of quiet chosen that is made, however, 
is that locational inconvenience is a convex function of the level of quiet. 
This assumption is necessary to ensure a unique equilibrium for a given 
distribution of income. It implies that as you move away from some 'desired* 
location which exists at some level of quiet, your chosen location involves 
you in progressively more inconvenience as you choose increasingly higher or 
lower levels of quiet. An illustration is given in diagram 2 below. This 
household's desired location is at a level of quiet q. If. it wishes to 
consume any other level of quiet, it is forced to suffer some locational 
inconvenience, and this inconvenience increases marginally as the level of 
quiet differs f^om q.
On a priori grounds one can argue.for and against this assumption.
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The noise level falls at a declining rate as the distance from the noise
source increases. Given an ideal location at seme position relative to the
noise source, the distance that one would have to move from this location 
a
to acquire/lower level of noise will increase at an increasing rate, 
whereas the distance moved to acquire higher levels of noise will decrease 
at an increasing rate. Thus if locational inconvenience were defined only 
with respect to the distance from some ideal location, it would be convex for 
lower levels of noise and concave for higher levels of noise than that at the 
ideal position. However all choices regarding housing and social amenities 
at higher levels of noise tend to get progressively more limited, and the 
inconveniences represented by these factors could counterbalance the concavity 
obtained by distance considerations. Conversely, however, the expanded choice 
at lower levels of noise should ease the locational inconvenience and weaken 
the convexity argument there. Hence it is not clear whether convexity is „ 
a justified assumption and some empirical evidence cn this question would be 
welcome. If, however, this assumption seriously breaks down then there may 
well be multiple equilibria to any charge scheme such as that discussed above.
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In diagram 2 we implicitly assume that the level of noise at the source and 
its distribution is constant. This implies that the noise contours are 
fixed, which in turn implies that the numbers of each type of aircraft 
taking off and landing and their timing and flight paths are fixed. In 
this analysis we shall assume that the timing of aircraft movements and 
their flight paths are fixed in advance. Later we shall discuss why the 
former are probably best determined by direct control, while the latter are 
chosen so as to minimise the noise costs, given the flight routes. This 
leaves us with the effect of changes in the noise at the source on the 
relationship between quiet consumed and locational inconvenience. . If any 
increase in noise at the centre implies an equal increase in the noise at any 
point, then it i-s clear that locational inconvenience may be defined as a 
function of the difference between the level of noise at the source at the 
level of noise at any point. If we consider the technical factors regarding 
the measurement of noise it appears that such an assumption is justifiable, 
as long as any adjustments to reduce the level of noise by limiting flights 
are such as to limit movements on all paths approximately equally, and as 
long as changes in the noise levels of aircraft are obtained primarily by 
measures such as retrofitting the engines and not by developments in the 
rate of climb or descent of aircraft . In our analysis we shall make these 
simplifying assumptions. A more complex approach to the problem is possible 
but it results in expressions which can only be interpreted with a great 
deal more technical information.
Having considered the nature of the commodity quiet in some detail, we may 
proceed to construct a simple general equilibrium model incorporating these, 
features, along with some overall production constraints.
4.2.2. A Formal Model to Derive the Optimum Conditions
A.l. The community has a number of households, H, and an overall social 
welfare function
W = W( u1, u2, . . . uh, . . . UH ) (1)
This function is defined over the whole.utility space, is twice 
differentiable, strictly quasi-concave, and of the Pareto family 
(i.e. monotonically increasing with respect to all its arguments).
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The utility function of any one household, h, is given by,
Uh = Uh(c\ l \  nh) (2)
This function is defined over the household's consumption set, 
is twice differentiable, and strictly quasi-concave in its 
arguments. The variables are defined as follows, 
c. This stands for the quantity of commodity c that is 
consumed by household h. It represents those goods not dealti. m
with directly in the model, c '^lr^o
l*1: This is the long run locational inconvenience suffered by household 
h. In accordance with the discussion in previous section we may 
write this as,
lh * lh(Z-nh) l^o.U^o (3)
This function is strictly convex.
We define the noise level at the noise centre as Z, and the noise level 
at the position occupied by the household h as n \
2>jo, nSo. llj o^
Given the other factors of production, which are assumed to be fixed 
in supply and fully employed, the efficient production possibilities 
in the economy are defined by the values of Y,Z and L, where
T(Y,Z,L) = o (4)
Y = £ch L = n h ...
h h (5)
T(.) is assumed to be a strictly concave function. This assumption 
of concavity implies that the production set defined by T(Y,Z,L)^ o 
is convex. This limits the extent to which there may be increasing 
returns in any of these activities. The way in which Y and Z would 
be traded off, for given L, and the conditions under which the 
frontier in Y and Z would be concave were discussed in seme detail in 
Chapter 2. Similar considerations would apply to the assumption of 
concavity with respect to L.
The optimum is defined as the maximum welfare attainable, subject to 
the production constraint and the non-negativity constraint's. The
problem is one in quasi-concave programming, in which, subject to some 
regularity conditions, we may define an interior optimum (i.e. one where 
c^>o, lh>o for all b and Z>o), as a point where^:
Uh Uh l h
r, + 1 (Z-n)
“F ~ T
(Z-n)
Y
Condition (6) is a marginal condition which may be reasoned as follows: 
if we increase the level of noise at the centre by one unit, then all 
households need to buy another unit of quiet to keep them at the same net 
level of noise. This involves them in some locational inconvenience, the 
marginal opportunity cost of which, in terms of the consumption good, is the 
LHS of expression (6).
The increase in the level of noise, however, permits some further output of 
the consumption good (as less resources are spent on abatement). Part
of this further output has to be sacrificed in order to be able to produce 
the extra goods and services required to make the locational adjustment.
The condition requires that the net increase in the output of the consumption 
good be equal to the sum of the marginal opportunity costs to all households. 
Condition (7) states that if any household decides to enjoy an extra unit of 
quiet then the sacrifice of its consumption good that it is willing to make 
in order to do this should equal the marginal fall in the production of Y 
required to make the extra goods and services that the locational adjustment 
involves, available. From this it is clear that at the optimum, the marginal 
locational inconvenience cannot be negative; fov" if it were then a further 
reduction in the level of noise under which a household lives would be desirabl 
- as it would provide a utility gain and no resource cost. Hence at the 
optimum, lh(Z_n) >,o. Given our assumptions of the quasi-concavity of (1) 
and (2), the convexity of 3 and the concavity of (4), conditions (6) .and (7)
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are also sufficient for an optimum
4.2.3. On Attaining the Optimum - Prices, Charges and the Government's
In considering the attainment of the optimum we will assume that the 
consumption good is competitively produced and that the householders are 
utility maximisers and price takers. The production of the goods 
associated with locational adjustment (here one thinks mainly of transport 
services) and of the activities that produce the noise are subject to 
government regulation.
Given the set-up outlined above, it is fairly clear that in a society 
which allocates scarce resources by market forces, a premium will emerge 
for quiet areas that have a locational advantage for a lot of people. For 
while there is no scarcity of quiet as such, prime locations that are 
quiet will earn an economic rent by virtue of their position. The extent 
to which this will happen will depend on the relative distributions of 
locational inconvenience for various households and the distribution of 
quidt.
We will assume that this premium takes the form of a price for quiet. As
mentioned earlier, there is some empirical evidence for this. Given such
a price for quiet, households will face the following maximisation:
..h. h ,h,7 „h\ „h\ max U (c ,1 (Z-n ),n )
s.t. ch + PLlh + PQ(Z-nh) - mh = o
Where P^  and Pq are the consumer prices of goods L and Q respectively, 
expressed in units of the price of the consumption good, and is the 
income level of household h. The necessary condition for a maximum is
ui d7 , uh
. (z - p) + " 
u ?  I Fc c
- P 1 
v  (Z-n)
equating the marginal rate of substitution between noise and consumption 
(including the effect via 1) to the marginal cost to the consumer.
If the regulated agencies that are involved in the production of L and Z 
are obliged to follow a marginal cost pricing policy, then we can see 
from condition (S) that the charge on the production of noise, Z, at the 
source should be P^.» v'hprp»
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PZ =
*
T.
h (Z-n)
+
I
Uh
1 .
~TT
(Z-n) ( 11)
PL is the marginal cost price for the producer which, as we shall see will 
differ from the consumer price. We may substitute for the second expression 
on the right hand side of (11} by summing (10) over h and rearranging to 
give,
PZ ( P , - P L ) I  1L L h
h
(Z-n) ( 1 2 )
(12) equates the optimum charge on Z to the sum of the marginal locational 
inconveniences, valued at the difference between the consumer price of L,(P. ) and 
the marginal opportunity cost of L in production (PL) plus the sum of 
the differences between the price of quiet and the marginal rate of 
substitution between quiet and the consumption good^.
We cannot evaluate such a charge on noise in terms of market data alone.
We require to know the marginal long run locational inconveiences of 
choosing a different noise level. While it may not be possible to 
capture these fully, some of the main components may be obtained by 
considering, for example, the total amount of extra travel involved to the 
household in living under a marginally different noise level. We also 
need to know, however, the marginal rate of substitution between quiet and 
consumption and such information can only be obtained by subjective question­
naires. which have, as we already indicated, a large number of difficulties 
associated with them.
There is a possibility, however, that the noise charge may be expressed 
independently of this marginal rate of substitution. The reason for this 
is that locational inconvenience, certainly as measured by the extra 
travel incurred over that at some ideal location, may well be dependent 
on a number of other factors, such as the area required, the levels of 
other forms of environmental pollution and so on. If some of these 
factors are not directly priced and the household chooses the level of 
to maximise utility given the overall budget constraint, then it will 
equate the marginal rate of substitution between rv and c to the price of 
In that case it follows from (11) that the charge p i s  given by
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PZ cp, - ft) i i
h
h
(Z-n) (13)
relating Pz to the sum of the marginal locational costs valued at 
the difference between the producer and consumer prices. It is 
the relationship between these, therefore, that we have to consider.
When the producer price for L is a marginal cost price, then it follows 
from condition (7) that the marginal resource cost to household h of 
choosing a marginally different level of quiet is, P*lz . However, 
the actual marginal cost to household h is, by equation (10), P ^  +p 
From this we can see that these two marginal ccsts cannot generally be 
the same for alj_ households. Since, in general the marginal inconveniences 
will differ for different households and since there is only one value 
for P^ > this value of will have to be chosen as a compromise over 
various households. We consider one criteria for choosing guch a price 
below.
One case, however, where no compromise is required in choosing P^ is 
where all households have equal marginal inconveniences of adjusting 
their level of quiet. In that case, is given by,
PL
Pq .H
£
h (Z-n)
(14).
where H/ ,h is the reciprocal of the average of the marginal
1 (Z-n)
inconveniences (being equal to marginal in this case for all households). 
From (14) it follows straightforwardly that the RHS of (13) may be rewritten 
as,-H.Pq. Hence we have the simple result,
PZ = ~ HPQ (15)
which states the noise charge merely as the sum of the marginal noise 
evasion costs where such costs are measured only by the price of quiet. 
From (14) it may be reasonable to use a noise charge given by (15) when 
marginal locational inconveniences have a very small variance arpund 
a given mean.
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If the distribution of these inconveniences cannot be satisfactorily 
approximated by a mean then we have to choose PL by some suitable 
criterion. One such criterion which has some appeal is to minimise 
the sum of the deadweight losses of surplus for all households. Consider 
diagram 3. Vie measure the level of quiet from left to right, and we 
plot the marginal benefit of noise reduction which in the neighbourhood 
of the equilibrium we know will be sloped as shown, as well as the
private and social marginal costs of noise reduction, which in the 
neighbourhood of the equilibrium will be upward sloping. For the 
household shown the deadweight loss of the divergence between the two 
costs is the shaded area. Given the choice of a number of such areas 
will appear for different households. If we minimise the sum of such areas
mwe are choosing a surplus- Ices minimising criterion, which was made famous 
in another context by Hotelling ( 1933 ) and has been used recently in
the welfare pricing literature.
For small areas such as the one shaded, we may approximate it by the area 
of a triangle. Simple manipulations yield the deadweight loss for 
household h as d , where
1
2
^ PL - PL)lh(Z-n)+PQ)2 M * ^
{V  PL ^(Z-n) + PQ + PL lh(Z-n)}
(15)
Where i is the price elasticity of demand for quiet, (measured positively),
v the elasticity of the marginal inconvenience with respect to quiet, and
n*1* the chosen level of noise suffered by the household. While the
expression looks somewhat complex, there is nothing in it that is not in
principle 'knowable'. P, is what we wish to choose given P. . To do this
we minimise Ed , with respect to P, , recalling that nn will be a function 
h L
of PL . The expression derived to define the minimum is somewhat cumbersome 
but involves the expressions already listed, as well as the price elasticity 
of demand for quiet with respect to the price of L. Again, given the 
information for suitably defined groups of households, it should be 
possible, by numerical methods to calculate the opti»v\ic£. consumer price for
L.
In concluding this section we note that once we start to examine the marginal 
analysis of diagram 1 more closely we discover a structure that is not 
easy to analyse and tb 3 t  does not readily make available a method of calculating, 
the supply price of pollution rights. If the convexity assumptions of 
economic analysis are to carry over to this problem, then we have to assume that 
lh(.) is convex with respect to its argument. We do not know if this 
is a valid assumption. Once we devise the optimum conditions these can be 
easily interpreted. However, to attain them by a system of prices and 
charges would most probably require the validity of the assumption that allows 
us to express the charge in terms of equation (13) rather than equation (12).
When this assumption is valid, a charge system may be feasible - if the required 
information regarding marginal inconvenience is available. Furthermore, 
from such information we will be able to see how widely distributed the
marginal values are over households, and whether the simple formula of 
(15) is acceptable or not. If it is not acceptable, a more complex 
approach, along the lines suggested will be required. Overall this 
discussion places a considerable emphasis on direct controls until further 
empirical work establishes the possibility or otherwise of noise charges.
4.3 ' Measures Relating to the Direct Control of Aircraft Noise '
In section one we listed the items by which direct control of aircraft noise 
nuisance was achieved at an operating airport, as controls on the noise levels 
of aircraft, on the flight paths of aircraft, on flying hours, and on the 
zoning of land for non residential use.
(a) Aircraft Noise Levels
The systematic control on aircraft noise levels starts! with a system of noise 
certification for new types of sub-sonic jet aircraft. This was agreed to 
by the International Civil Aviation Organisation in 1969, and, according to 
the Noise Advisory Council, will ensure that new aircraft will be half as 
'noisy', weight for weight, as current types. In choosing these levels of 
cstification no analysis was done of the costs of implementing these proposals, 
relative to the benefits of noise reduction. Furthermore these noise levels 
apply to new aircraft, and not to existing aircraft, although the matter of 
adapting existing engines to reduce their noise levels is being given some 
consideration. Given any permissible noise level for existing aircraft, how­
ever, economic factors regarding the relative cost of quietening existing 
aircraft and buying quieter new ones will determine the chosen rate of 
obsolescence of the existing aircraft fleet by the airline operators. Even 
ignoring the external benefits of quieter aircraft, it is difficult to see 
how the levels of controls on new and old aircraft can be decided upon with,out 
some idea of overall desired noise levels in the future and some knowledge 
of the sensitivity of the rate of obsolescence to the relative costs mentioned. 
So far as one ran gather such factors have not been systematically considered.
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(b) Aircraft Flight Paths
The matter of the choice of flight paths has received more attention with 
regard to the economics of the question. The issue here is, what paths 
should departing aircraft take to their respective air corridors, and 
what approaches should arriving aircraft use? In answering this question 
there are.a number of costs to consider. The noise costs imposed on 
households, the airline operating costs, and the costs to the control 
authorities. All these will vary with the flight paths that are chosen.
The chosen strategy should be such that, for a given scale of operations, 
the overall costs of all groups are minimised.subject to whatever technical 
constraints exist*. The component of these costs that represent the noise 
nuisance should value the falling away of a unit of quiet at the long run 
marginal noise nuisance costs of all the households, and, as we saw in the 
previous section, these will depend in general upon both the price of 
quiet to households and the long run locational inconveniences of adjusting 
tc a marginally different noise level.
In the simple cose where the value of a unit of quiet is just the price of 
quiet times the number of households affected (see equation 15) there is a 
case for concentrating aircraft flight paths over a few households rather 
than dispersing them. The argument for this is that most noise measures 
appear to have the cardinal property that households are willing to pay the 
same amount for each unit of quiet as measured by them. However, the 
marginal increase in the noise level at any point is a declining function 
of the number of aircraft along a particular flight path^6 . Thus if there 
were two flight paths over identical concentrations of population, it would 
be hptter. ceteris paribus, to concentrate all flights on one flight path, 
for this would minimise the noise nuisance costs given the aircraft and 
their operations. Indeed a similar argument may be applied to the choice 
of the number of airports - fewer airports over a uniform population density 
represent lower noise nuisance costs. However it is difficult to see how 
this conclusion can be carried over to the case where the marginal valuation 
of a unit of quiet cannot be adequately represented in terms of equation (15). 
In that event the long run marginal locational inconveniences will have an 
important role to play and these might have different implications for the 
pattern of flight paths.
(c) Flying Hours.
Most airports regulate the arrival and departure of aircraft during the 
night hours. This seems an appropriate matter for regulation, the 
argument being that if a charge was imposed for night flying it would be so 
high as to eliminate all use of airport facilities during the night. In 
these circumstances it seems administratively more convenient to ban night 
flying altogether.
(d) Zoning
Some municipal authorities ban, or severely restrict the building of resid­
ential dwellings in the noisiest zones. There is considerable scope for 
zoning in optimal land use patterns, and indeed with long term considerations 
of the optimal location of industry it may be best to concentrate industrial 
activity near the airport. However, one argument commonly used to restrict 
residential building near the airport in an otherwise residential area is 
unpersuasive. This is that uninformed households will suffer as a consequence 
of buying houses in very noisy areas. If lack of information is a serious 
problem then of course the answer is better information and not zoning.
Whether zoning land near an airport for industrial purposes is desirable from 
the viewpoint of the optimal location of industry is a question that involves 
a whole host of issues that are beyond the scope of this study. It is clear, 
however, that any policy dealing with long run noise control, would be incom­
plete without a consideration of optimal land use patterns'.
4.4. Urban Noise
The discussion in this chapter has been concerned with the control of aircraft 
noise. This is not, however, the only important source of noise nuisance.
To many people traffic noise and neighbourhood noise are a more immediate 
source of annoyance than aircraft noise. A recent report of the Noise 
Advisory council » stated that at least a fifth of the urban population are 
exposed in their homes to 'undesirable'levels of traffic noise and that
I6fs
"traffic noise is by far the most widespread source of noise nuisance and
18the most urgent target for abatement action" . This finding is in 
keeping with the surveys done in other countries. The O.E.C.D. (1971) 
report on urban noise lists surveys in many urban areas, even with large 
airports, finding that surface traffic noise is the most predominant and 
widespread source of noise nuisance.
While many of the analytical tools developed to deal with costing aircraft
noise can be extended to traffic noise, and indeed some urban motorway
19studies have evaluated the environmental costs of such schemes, the same 
is not true of the control of urban noise levels. In any real urban 
environment it is no longer possible to think of the noise as emanating 
from one source and spreading out in the vicinity of that source. Thus 
it is not appropriate to treat traffic noise as a Public Bad in the way 
that we did in section 2 above. In these circumstances it is natural to 
resort to a system of standards for the engine noise for vehicles, 
employed in conjunction with a suitable policing system. The levels at 
which these standards should be set, is not however, an easy question to 
answer. In chapter 2 we explored some of the broad conceptual problems 
that arose with the existence of environmental externalities such as noise, 
in a highly simplified urban setting. The general picture that emerged 
there, was that optimal controls are extremely difficult to implement even 
in a very simple setting, but given some information regarding tastes and 
technology, it should be possible' to obtain rough orders of magnitude of 
the proportion of resources that should be devoted to such things as 
noise abatement, and to obtain some idea of how much control should be 
exercised on city size, in varying circumstances.
The policy thinking on the issue of urban noise has followed very much a 
quantity control approach. In its recommendations on urban noise the 
O.E.C.D. urged that governments should adopt more effective enforcement 
procedures for the maximum permissible noise emissions, they should 
control heavy night traffic in seme residential zones, improve methods of 
traffic flow control to avoid disturbance from noisy acceleration, and 
encourage the use of noise screens arid other artificial noise attenuating 
barriers20. They also recommended that the government should support 
detailed studies on the costs of noise abatement by these methods. Such 
studies have still to be carried out with regard to many aspects of urban 
noise control.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 4
1. Every economist has his pet definition but this broadly includes the 
main features-no explicit market and the influence of activities other 
than those under ones control on utilities and profits.
2. We make the point that to be influenced by a particular activity, 
one does not have to be observed to suffer it, for evasive action may be 
the form that the influence takes.
3. This approximation is effectively assuming that the noise function, 
which may be written in general as N = N(Z, fx]} (where Z is the noise 
level at the centre, [xj is the coordinate position of a given location 
relative to the noise source and N is the noise level at this location) 
may be expressed in a seperable form as N = A(Z) + B( [x] ) . This greatly 
simplifies the analysis, and as an approximation for a range of noise 
levels generated along given flight paths by conventional aircraft, it 
proves to be reasonably satisfactory.
4. We assume that the airport authority is the agency that is taxed or 
charged, rather than the individual airlines whose behaviour the noise 
controls will finally influence. This would probably be necessary for 
administrative convenience, as well as for the resolution of conflicts 
of interest that would arise between airlines when noise charges are 
imposed. On this latter point see, for example, Section 4.3.(b).
often In order to keep the airport
5. In practice of course this would notAiappen./ the government would /0,
allow the authority to deviate from its regulating behaviour and sub­
sidise it to keep it from passing on the noise charges to the airlines.
However the diagram indicates the demand for pollution rights schedule 
that is relevant for a calculation cf surpluses.
6. When households have the pollution rights any individual household 
will recognise that the demand for these rights will be negligibly 
affected by his supply price whereas if the authority has the rights
we have the classic free-rider case. The effects of under and over­
reporting on the equilibrium achieved is more fully discussed in 
Mai invaud (1971).
7. i.e. government taxes and spending does not influence marginal 
conditions elsewhere in the economy. The issues raised by second best 
considerations when there are commodity and profits taxes do not 
illuminate this type of partial analysis.
8. The creation of noise reduces the total amount of quiet land 
available but this effect is very small indeed. The main effect of 
noise is to reduce the amount of quiet land available in locations that 
have great desirability because of the convenience of living there.
9. For a discussion of some of the more obvious misallocative aspects 
of airport charges the reader is referred to Walters (1973)
10. The broader questions of airport pricing policies are being
investigated by Unhoff and some preliminary results are given in 
Lenhoff (1973). Clearly much more is involved than airline charges,
with the airport providing extensive freight and passenger services, and 
the pricing policies of all these items have to be considered together.
11. The story of how welfare principles were applied to the public 
utilities, especially electricity, in France is fascinatingly told by 
Allais, Eoiteux and Masse in Nelson (ed.) (1964).
12. We may safely consider an interior optimum here. It is inccr.cei vatic
that at the optimum there will be no noise pollution or that any household 
will consume nothing, and it is very likely that all households will 
suffer some locational inconvenience.
13. For example we may obtain the price for quiet explicitly in terms of 
distributions, when all locational inconvenience is measured as the 
shortest distance to the centre of the town, and the proportion of a 
'ring' of land at distance r from the centre that is affected by a noise 
level N is known. The mathematical derivation, however, is of little 
economic value.
uh
14. _J2 is the marginal rate of substitution between noise and the 
Uc
consumption good and is therefore equal to minus the MRS between quiet 
and the consumption good.
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15. There may of course be more than one value of P^ - an example 
would be when there are different commuter subsidies to different parts 
of the town. However, we may assume that there could not in general be 
as many consumer prices for L as there are different marginal inconve­
niences, hence the need for some principle to choose the values of P^.
15. The noise level at any point is, broadly speaking, linearly related 
to the log of the number of aircraft going over that point. Hence the 
marginally declining rate of increase.
17. Noise Advisory Council 1972 (b)
18. Unfortunately the Noise Advisory Council nowhere state what they 
mean by undesirable. We presume that this figure is derived from the 
Wilson Reports which cites, that for exposure levels higher than 55dB(A) 
mean energy value the number of individuals considerably disturbed 
often exceeds 20%.
19. For a review of some of these studies the reader is referred to 
Urban Motorways Study (1973).
20. O.E.C.D. (1971)
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Chapter 5
Empirical Evidence
5.1. INTRODUCTION
So far in this thesis, we have considered various aspects of the economics 
of noise, assuming that noise could be satisfactorily measured, that 
an implicit price for quiet could be ascertained, and that as far as 
the measurement of noise costs was concerned, reasonably adequate 
measurement could be made with regard to the household surplus and turn­
over rates. Being able to make these assumptions, and being able to 
take some rough orders of magnitude for these variables, made it possible 
to analyse the question of noise pollution in an economic framework, 
and to give some idea of the relative importance for some issues 
relative to others. Thus it is clear that empirical work in this field 
has been of paramount importance in development of noise economics.
In this chapter we present a brief review and assessment of seme of 
the current empirical evidence on the issuc-s listed above. In section 
two we discuss the various measures of noise nuisance. Their 'validity' 
must be intrinsically tied up with the implicit market valuation of 
units of this measure, and we consider the evidence cn the price of 
quiet that has so far been obtained by studies of house price 
depreciation in noisy areas around airports, in section three. Section 
four reviews some of the evidence collected regarding householder 
surplus and section five examines the evidence on turnover rates in 
noisy zones, which may be of some importance in evaluating noise costs 
using a Roskill type method. The evidence regarding the measurement of 
noise and the price of quiet has been well summarised by Walters in 
his recent but as yet unpublished monograph on the economics of noise.
We add little to this, except some differences in interpretation, and 
seme f>vmcYC< rtKJdi.
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5.2. The Measurement of Noise
There are now several measures of aircraft noise and at least two 
measures of traffic noise that have been designed to capture the noise 
annoyance caused by these sources.1 The construction of these 
measures has proceeded in much the same way, and the principles involved 
can be indicated by considering the Noise and Number Index that was 
developed by KcKenren  (1963) as part 0f a study of aircraft noise 
annoyance around London (Heathrow) Airport. From a social survey 
of households in noise affected areas around the airport, every 
household was given a noise annoyance rating on a noise annoyance scale, 
as outlined in chapter 3, section 11,111. At the same time measures 
of the noise level around the household, as given by the average loudness 
of aircraft flying overhead, the median loudness^the duration of aircraft 
noise, the number of aircraft, and other indicators, were tabulated.
The noise annoyance ratings were then regressed against combinations 
of the above variables, and the combination giving the best fit in 
terms of minimising the unexplained sums of squares, was then selected as 
a measure of the noise nuisance. For the noise and number index the 
best fit was obtained by:
NNI = Rid B+ 15 Log N - 80 (1)
NNI = noise and number index,
Where PNdB is the average peak loudness of aircraft, and N is 
the number of aircraft heard on a summer's day around Heathrow. 
Regressing the noise annoyance rating against NNI gave an R2 0f q .46 
which is significant at the 10" level of confidence.
There are a number of difficulties with the noise and number index. The 
predetermined variables are strongly correlated and this leads to large 
standard errors on the coefficients when estimated by ordinary least 
squares. Furthermore there was hardly any difference in terms of R2 
between choosing N and Log N in equation (1), although the implications 
for policy of the two may be substantially different.2 This 
suggests that the sensitivity of any results to minor changes .in the 
estimation of the noise index is quite large, Finally, the NNI
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does not differentiate between night and day flights, and so relates to 
the actual division between night and day flights at Heathrow, when 
the index was constructed. At that time approximately a quarter of 
the flights were night flights.3 This means that if a different 
combination of night and day flights were to exist then the NNI would 
be invalid if night flights had a different noise annoyance effect 
from day flights - which is very likely to be the case. A more 
sophisticated and more recent measure of noise nuisance is the noise 
exposure forecast (NEF). This replaces the PNdB measure of the 
noise loudness of aircraft by a means called the effective perceived 
noise level, EPjcB, where the latter takes account of the duration of 
loudness, as well as a technical correction for the presence of pure 
tones in the noise. The total noise exposure at a given point is 
viewed as being composed of noise produced by different aircraft flight 
paths. For a specific class of aircraft, i, on flight path j, the 
NEF.. is given by:
1J r- -r
KEF
(ij) EF’id3 (ij) + 10 Log
N(ij)(Day) + N(ij)(Might)
-C (2)
Where N^.jj(day) and N^.j^(night) are the numbers of the aircraft of 
type i, on flight path j, during the day (07. CO - 22.00 hours) and 
during.the night (22.00 - 07.00 hours) respectively. The choice of 
Kq and Kf^, both constants, is so made as to imply that a single night 
time flight contributes as much to NEF as approximately 17 day time 
flights. The constant C is chosen so that the NEF numbers lie in a 
range where they are not likely to be confused with other noise ratings. 
The total NEF at a given ground position is determined by the 
summation of all individual NEF^.jj values on an energy basis:
NEF = 10 Log £  £  antilog NEF^.j ^
This is a much more sophisticated measure than NNI. However its relation
t
to annoyance ratings has not been fully investigated, although it has 
been succesfully used to analyse complaints about noise around some
airports and to predict their patterns around others.^
Other noise indices constructed in much the same spirit but differing in detail 
are che Indice I.-opsophique in France and the Storindcx in Germany.
Regarding traffic noise, both the Traffic Noise Index and the Kean energy 
level have been shown separately to correlate well with nuisance,
and it is understood that the relative merits of these have now been tested in 
rranee in a separate Social Survey. Various measures of noise, whether 
traffic or airport are evidently closely related. For a given type of noise, 
it is not possible to obtain a unique relationship between them. For the kind 
Oi variations in aircraft numbers and their breakdown between day and night, 
in duration and loudness of aircraft and other factors, approximate relationships 
can be derived. The Roskill Report showed this relationship between the NNI, the 
Isopsophique and/ sforindex. In graph 1 we present a similar relationship 
between the NNI and the NEF, as calculated by S. Abhrdiams of the Civil 
Aviation Authority. The line fitted by the least squares suggests that- 
approximately 1 NEF = 1.35 NNI. As they stand, all these measures of annoyance 
have no obvious and relevant cardinalisation. That is to say the measures.do 
not have the property of two units representing twice as much 'annoyance' as one, 
or twice as much 'damage' to an individuals psyche as one. The coordination 
that an economist would naturally choose for measuring a ccraiodity is that 
each unit should have the same market price. Therefore the line of investigation 
that one should pursue in assqising the suitability of these measures, is to see 
whether they, or any monotonic transform of them,has the same unit value 
in an implicit market where quiet is traded. We turn to this in the next 
section. Before we do so, however, it does seem worth considering a 
criticism of the use of noise and number index. Mrs. Paul (1971) states 
that the index was derived in a situation where there were few cases of 
moderate loudness and many flights or of few flights and extremely loud noise, 
and that it was unjustifiably used to predict noise levels and costs in 
circumstances where both were true. In other words, the index does not hold 
outside the narrow range within which it was constructed. The validity of 
such an index cannot depend, however, on the correlation coefficient 
quoted earlier between noise annoyance ratings and the roise index.
It is quite conceivable that a smaller coefficient could
176
6 rp»p h  :c
177
result in a perfectly satisfactory index. The test of this must 
rest on whether a normalisation can be found of the given measure such 
that it produces a given unit price for quiet, under varying noise and 
number combinations .
5.3. The Price of Quiet
5.3.1. Techniques p_f Investigation in Statistics of the Price of Quiet
Empirical studies on the price for quiet are concerned with establishing 
a house price differential for similar houses in different noise zones.
By similar, we mean houses with a given level ofaccor^ od?tion§ access, * 
and amenities. Matched samples are constructed, at different noise 
levels and the average prices compared in a cross-section study, 
which is the main form of investigation undertaken, although there 
are some studies that compare the average rates of appreciation in 
matched samples at different noise levels ever time. The construction 
of matched samples is not an easy task, as the number of features that 
define a residential dwelling are many in number, and in some cases it 
is not possible to define them in comparable terms. This was 
found to be partly the case in the Roskill study, and led there to an 
inquiry of estate agents in the vicinity of Londons two airports.
Inis was designed to get their assssTient of house price differentials 
due to noise, for subjectively matched houses in different noise 
zones. Although this work was conducted with some care, it is un­
doubtedly preferable to have a statistical study based on actual data 
for house prices. This involves less subjective judgement and 
permits a calculation of standard errors of house price differentials.
In addition to the above problem of matching samples, a further 
difficulty arises in these investigations that attempts to calibrate 
actual house price differentials. This is that data on the prices at 
which houses are sold is not always obtainable. We find this 
problem especially in the U.K., and it implies that we have to rely 
on self-as sc en ts of house values, which are not really satisfactory, 
cr on valuations for tax purposes, which tend to underestimate house *
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values. Any interpretation of the data has therefore, to bear in mind 
the data source used for house prices.
5.3.2. Main Results of Studies on House Price Differentials
About a dozen studies have now been done regarding the effects of
aircraft noise on house prices. Most of these have been undertaken.
in America (U.S. and Canada) although some of the pioneering work
was done in Britain as part of the Roski11 Report, and a study was
recently done in Australia as part of the Sydney Airport study
scheme. Walters has recently attempted to bring together the
conclusions of the British and the American Studies and present them
in a comparable fashion. His basic conclusions are that aircraft noise
nuisance, as measured by any of the indices used in these countries,
does have some effect on house prices, and as a rough guide one
may say that a house valued at around £10,000 $ (U.S.) 25,000 in the
late sixties would depreciate between 0.4 and 0.7 percent per
unit increase in the NNI in the U.S. and between 1.0 and 1.4 percent
per unit increased in the NNI in the U.K. These results are obtained 
\
by measurements in noise zones of between 40 and 55 NNI, and if 
we may linearly extrapolate the actual depreciation levels per NNI 
in this range to lower NNI levels, we find a zero differential at 
between 28 and 30 NNI. The Australian study conducted in the Sydney 
region suggests a value of about 1.0 per cent per NNI. . While each 
of the studies does not by itself provide overwhelming evidence on 
the quantitative effects of noise on house prices, together they 
certainly do offer a range within which the price of quiet probably lies 
Given the approximate translations between the noise indices, these 
results also give some idea of the price of quiet as measured by 
these indices.
g.3.3. Comment on the Cardinality of the Noise Measure.
An issue of some importance to the measurement of noise and to the 
price of quiet is how the depreciation per unit change.in the noise 
index varies with the level of noise. As we mentioned earlier, if
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this depreciation is constant over a wide range of noise levels then 
that measure of noise can be treated as an economic measure as it stands. 
If the depreciation is.not constant over the experienced noise range, 
then it would be necessary to look for a transform of the noise measure 
that would produce a constant depreciation, and this transformed measure 
would then be an economic measure of noise.
The evidence on the constancy of this depreciation over the noise range is 
somewhat ambiguous. Only -Kvo studies have any real bearing on this 
question. They are the Roskill Study,¿a study by Emer$cr,(lS65) on 
aircraft noise levels and depreciation in the Minneapolis area*
We briefly summarise the relevant sections of 
these investigations below:
The Roskill Study
The date collected around Heathrow airport during the Roskill Study 
provides us with average rates of depreciation over 10 HNI range 
zones for 3 house price groups. Graph two below plots the percentage 
depreciation compared with houses below 35 NNI, against the mid point 
of the NNI range.
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Although the evidence is scant, it does suggest an approximately linear 
relationship between noise levels and depreciations, at least for the 
medium and low price houses, and this would appear to be reasonably 
consistent with the assumption of a constant depreciation rate per NNI 
for a given house price group. For different house price groups the price 
of quiet and the zero point of the noise scale are predicted to be different, 
however, and this would make a unique index of noise that applied to all 
income groups impossible.
Emerson ’ '
Emerson's study, a Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Minnesota, is 
extensively reported in Walters' monograph, where it is described as the 
most sophisticated and comprehensive study so far carried out in the 
United States. It analysed a cross-section of 222 sales of single 
family houses in 1967, using 26 independent variables including the level 
of aircraft noise as measured in steps of 5 CNR noise units (a unit 
change in CNR being approximately 1| NNI units).
A summary of the noise depreciation results of this study were:-
CNR
..... . • ..... . . . n
Percentage depreciation
due to noise
95 to 119 2.7
120 to 124 4.6
125 and over 9.6.
This suggests that there is a substantially increasing rate of depreciation 
per unit of CNR as the level of CNR increases. However, as Walters points 
out, the method of estimation was constrained to a non-linear relationship 
between the depreciation rate and the level of noise. Thus we do not 
know how well a linear relationship would have fitted, had it been tried.
LIBRA
RY
H
SIilti:
IMAGING SERVICES NORTH
Boston Spa, W etherby  
W est Yorkshire, LS23 7BQ
w w w .b l.uk
MISSING PAGE/PAGES 
HAVE NO CONTENT
.183.
In conclusion on this question one must say that the issue is not at 
all clearly resolved. There is some evidence from the Roskill data 
that is not inconsistent with the linearity hypothesis, and some 
evidence from Emerson's study that is suggestive of a marginally : 
increasing depreciation rate. However, we must await further evidence 
on this question. There are a number of difficulties in the comparative 
analysis that we have done so far which it would be desirable to tackle, 
and until more firm evidence is forthcoming an hypothesis of a constant 
depreciation cannot be said to have been disproved.
5.3.4. The Price and Income Elasticities of the Demand for Quiet
From the Roskill data we obtain a relationship between the house price 
and the percentage depreciation that the house suffers. If one may 
assume that the price of the house is proportional to the permanent 
income of the household, and there is some evidence for this, then the 
implied income elasticity of demand for quiet is about 2. This 
conclusion is derived from cross section data and to date there is no 
time series evidence on the demand for quiet. Furthermore, there is 
no real evidence on the price of elasticity of demand for quiet. Walters 
states that "the data are broadly consistent with a unit elasticity of 
demand - but converseley one cannot claim that such a hypothesis has 
been critically tested with such figures." ^
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5.4. Householder Surplus and Movement Costs
Householder Surplus
Householder surplus is intended to'capture the locational advantages of
a particular house, over the best available alternative. One can think
of this household consuming many goods, the unit price of which to him
depends on his location. If he moves to a different area he has to pay
a higher unit price for these goods and services and the householder
surplus is a measure of the utility difference implied by the two price
co.nfuguraticns"' . As we discussed in Chapter three, such a utility
difference can be measured in money terms,in four different ways: two
relating to the money cost of ensuring the pre-moving utility level at
the new prices and two relating to the reduction in money income that
would ensure post moving utility at the old price.
The relevance of this distinction for the calculation of noise costs
as outlined in Chapter three is clear. In order to decide whether a
household would move or stay, the concept that is relevant is the
willingness-to-pay one (relating the pre-moving utility level to the new
prices). Oncsthis decision is established the non-movers costs are
assesed as outlined before - the matter of surplus no longer being
relevant -.and the movers costs are now assesed as either willingness cost
or compensation costs. In order'to do this we obtain one component from 
for 1?
the demand curve/quiet, and add to it the adjustment costs. If we now
want the overall movers costs as willingness costs then we must add a
willingness-to-pay hoseholder surplus and if we want the movers costs as
compensation costs then we must add a compensation householder surplus.
While these distinctions may be important they have not been examined 
comprehensively and the empirical work on this question has mainly taken 
the form of questionnaires on a sample of houseowners and renters in order 
to ascertain what price they would take to move, net of any taxes or 
removal costs. The surveys of this type that have been conducted by the 
Roskill Commission^ and by the Urban Motorway "***" Study group have proved 
to be fairly satisfactory as far as the consistency of the sample results 
was concerned, and broadly in keeping with some other knowledge in the 
distribution of these surpluses . Given the general success of these 
surveys it should prove worthwhile to attempt to derive willingness-to-pay 
and compensation surplus distributions, separately.
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Movement Costs
The costs of moving house include the removal expenses, conveyancing
itenis* It has been estimated that these amount
to / 8 - 1 6 per cent of sale price depending on the country considered
The lower figure relates to Australian data, while the Roskill Commission 
estimated the costs around Heathrow to be 16 per cent.
5.5. Turnover Rates
Most people doing empirical work in the field of noise economics have 
recognised that in a noisy area, the proportion of the population moving 
out will be larger than in a quiet area for some time after the noise 
has been imposed. These extra movements are generated by a dynamic 
adjustment process in which households decide to move or to stay as 
they evaluate their dislike for noise relative to the costs of moving 
out. Inevitably suchfprocess is spread out over time as it takes a 
while to appreciate the consequences of noise, and there is a natural 
inertia in making any adjustments.
Some estimates have been made of the relative movement rates at a point 
in time, in noisy and quiet area that have similar residential dwellings 
with similar facilities. For details of these estimates, the reader is
I
referred ;to Walters, who concludes by saying that "when properly inter­
preted ... the orders of magnitude of the movements that are attributable 
to noise are approximately the same in both studies - say between 20 and 
30 per cent more movers than there would be under normal non-noisy con­
ditions. There is no evidence of dramatic sustained increases in 
movement rates - although in certain shock years the movement rates 
may be as much as 50 per cent above normal".'*
While these estimates are of some interest, they are noticeably incomplete 
for our purposes. First, they do not distinguish between movement rates 
at different noise levels, and secondly they do not tell us anything of 
the total ini till population that would move cut following the introduction 
of noise in a given area. Both these issues are of some importance in 
assesg'ng the validity of a Roskill type noise model, as well as in con­
structing a noise model not dependent on the unsatisfactory median 
assumption.
As far as we are aware there are only two sources of evidence on these
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q u e s t i o n s .  T h e  f i r s t  a r i s e s  fro m  t h e  M c K e n n e ll  Study"*® i n  W h ic h  an  
a s s e s s m e n t  o f  a h o u s e h o l d ' s  d e s i r e  t o  move was made fro m  a s e r i e s  o f  
q u e s t i o n s  a s k e d  o f  i t .  T h e s e  y i e l d e d  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  r e s u l t  i n  c o lu m n s  
I  a n d  I I  : -
I I I
P e r c e n t a g e  o f  p e o p l e  who f e e l  l i k e
NNI
m o v in g  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  n o i s e
3 5 - 4 5  ( 3 0  N EF) 3 . 1
4 5 - 5 5  ( 3 7  N E F ) 8 . 0
5 5 + n . o
S o u r c e  W a l t e r s :  p a g e  1 2 5  T a b l e  6 . 1 1
I t  i s  n o t  c l e a r ,  h o w e v e r ,  how t h i s  d a t a  i s  r e l a t e d  t o  a c t u a l  movement  
r a t e s .  T h e r e  i s  no known way o f  d o in g  t h i s  an d  s o / c l n  o n l y  t a k e  t h e s e  
a s  some i n d i c a t o r s  o f  m o v in g  i n t e n t i o n s  i n  d i f f e r e n t  n o i s e  z o n e s .  T h e  
s e c o n d  s o u r c e  o f  e v i d e n c e  on t h i s  q u e s t i o n  w as c o l l e c t e d  and a n a l y z e d  
d u r i n g  t h e  S y d n e y  A i r p o r t  s t u d y .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  we a r e  n o t  a b l e  t o  
q u o t e  t h e  d a t a  c o l l e c t e d  t h e r e ,  b u t  t h e  m ethod i s  o f  some i n t e r e s t .
A l l  h o u s e  s a l e s  b y  homeowners a n d  a l l  m oves b y  r e n t e r s  w ere r e c o r d e d  on
\
an  a n n u a l  b a s i s  o v e r  a p e r i o d  w h ic h  b eg a n  b e f o r e  a i r c r a f t  n o i s e  was a 
s e r i o u s  p r o b le m  and c o n t i n u e d  u n t i l  w e l l  a f t e r  t h e  i n i t i a l  s h o c k  o f  t h e  
n o i s e  was f e l t .  F o r  homeowners and r e n t e r s ,  t h e  h o u s e s  v a c a t e d  a s  a 
p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e  s t o c k  o f  s u c h  h o u s e s  w e re  l i s t e d  f o r  a q u i e t  z o n e  and  
f o r  z o n e s ,  a t  v a r i o u s  n o i s e  l e v e l s ,  w h ic h  w e re  o t h e r w i s e  c o m p a r a b l e  w i t h  
t h e  q u i e t  z o n e .  T h u s  t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  t u r n o v e r  r a t e s  f o r  z o n e s  o f  v a r i o u s  
n o i s e  l e v e l s  c a n  be o b t a i n e d  and co m p a red  w i t h  t u r n o v e r  r a t e s  i n  t h e  
~ q u i e t  z o n e .  Now t h e s e  f i g u r e s  w i l l  i n c l u d e  h o u s e s  w h ic h  h a v e  b een  s o l d  
o n c e ,  h o u s e s  w h ic h  h a v e  been  s o l d  t w i c e ,  t h r e e  t i m e s  and so  o n .  We w i s h  
t o  i s o l a t e  fro m  t h e s e ,  t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  h o u s e s  i n  e a c h  z o n e  t h a t  h a v e  
b e e n  s o l d  o n c e , a s  t h a t  f i g u r e  w o u ld  be an e s t i m a t e  f o r  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  
o f  t h e  o r i g i n a l  p o p u l a t i o n  t h a t  moved o u t  on a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  n o i s e .  W h i l e  
we c a n n o t  do t h i s  p r e c i s e l y  i t  d o e s  a p p e a r  t h a t  a l o w e r  e s t i m a t e  o f  o n c e
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v a c a t e d  h o u s e s  i s  g i v e n  by a s s u m i n g  t h a t  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  c h a n g e s  
i n  o c c u p a n c y  f o l l o w s  a P o i s s o n  d i s t r i b u t i o n ^ .  On t h e  o t h e r  h an d  a n  u p p e r  
bou nd i s  o b t a i n e d  b y  t a k i n g  a l l  m ovements a s  b e i n g  s i n g l e  m o v e m e n ts .
I f  t h e  number o f  m ovem ents f o l l o w s  a P o i s s o n  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  t h e n ,  s i n c e  we 
know t h e  mean number o f  m ovem ents i n  z o n e  Z fro m  o u r  s t a t i s t i c s  a s  
m ( Z ) ,  we may c a l c u l a t e  t h e  num ber o f  s i n g l e  m ovements a s
P r o c e e d i n g  on t h i s  b a s i s  i t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  a b o u t  f i v e  t o  n i n e  p e r c e n t  o f  
t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  move o u t  o f  t h e  n o i s y  z o n e s  on a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  n o i s e ,  
w i t h i n  a d e c a d e  o f  t h e  a r r i v a l  o f  t h e  n o i s e .  T h e  som ew hat h i g h e r  t u r n o v e r  
f i g u r e s  a r e  o b t a i n e d  i n  t h e  z o n e s  w i t h  a h i s t o r y  o f  h i g h e r  n o i s e  l e v e l s .
I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  co m p a re  t h e  movement r a t e s  s u g g e s t e d  b y  t h e  a b o v e  
a n a l y s i s  a n d  t h e i r  t im e  p r o f i l e ,  w i t h  t h a t  p r e d i c t e d  b y  t h e  u s e  o f  t h e  
R o s k i l l  m o d e l .  To do t h i s  we n eed  t o  c a l c u l a t e  t h e  n o i s e  c o s t  f u n c t i o n  
f o r  e a c h  y e a r  a f t e r  t h e  n o i s e  h a s  b e e n  i m p o s e d .  T h e  a s s u m p t io n  on w h ic h  
t h i s  was d o n e b v  t h e  R o s k i l l
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Model is discussed in some detail in chapter 3 but briefly it
involves taking the distributions of the noise annoyance
scale (NAS) on each noise zone, and associating with the median point of
that scale the depreciation that would be observed in that noise zone.
After this is done for the first year the noise function is constructed
by joining up the points obtained from the medians in each distribution
of NAS. Then, using the rule that if movement costs plus depreciation
plus surplus is less than the noise costs the households for whom this
is true move out, we obtain a new distribution of the NAS for earh noise 
1 R
zone . The noise function may then be recalculated for the following 
year with these new distributions ajnd with the further assumption 
that owing to the income elasticity for quiet being greater than one, 
household depreciation is growing 2% per annum faster that movement 
costs, surplus, income, and expenditure on housing, all of which are 
growing at the same rate. This latter assumption is in fact taken 
from the Roskill Report. The details of the initial data for the first 
round calculations are given in the Appendix to Chapter 3. In graph 2 
we plot the calculated noise cost function for years one to four and year 
eight as obtained by the above procedure. In the table below we give 
the implied movement rates due to noise, year by year, for the first ten 
years.
\  YEAR 
NEF \
! i
1 i 2
11
1
!
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 Total
2 2 . 5  | 9 . 1
_______ J______
5 . 8  j 0
|
.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 . 9
2 7 . 5 1 0 . 1 2 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O 1 2 . 1
3 3 . 5 4 . 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 . 8 0 0 5 . 9
3 7 . 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
percentage movement rates per annum implied by Roskill Model
T h e s e  movement r a t e s  a r e  n o t  c o m p l e t e , -  a s  o v e r  t im e  t h e  n o i s e  c o s t s  w i l l
1S£tend to rise faster than movements costs plus depreciation and consequently 
over a very long period (100 years?) the whole noise zone must become 
populated by imperturbables . However these figures offer an interesting 
comparison with observed rates. In doing this it must be remembered that
Y/I
U/
*,
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t h e  o b s e r v e d  r a t e s  a r e  o b t a i n e d  f o r  a d i f f e r e n t  n o i s e  p r o f i l e  o v e r  t i m e ,  
w h e r e a s  t h e  a b o v e  c a l c u l a t i o n s  a r e  b a s e d  on an a s su m e d  c o n s t a n t  n o i s e  
l e v e l .  From  t h e  way t h e  R o s k i l l  model w o r k s  h o w e v e r i t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  i f  
n o i s e  w e re  g r o w in g  a s  s u g g e s t e d  s a y  b y  t h e  S y d n e y  e x p e r i e n c e  i n  t h e  
s i x t i e s ,  t h e n  t h e  R o s k i l l  m odel w ou ld  g e n e r a t e  r a t h e r  lo w e r  movement  
r a t e s  t h a n  we p r e d i c t  i t  t o  d o .  F u r t h e r m o r e  we h a v e  a s su m e d  an i n i t i a l  
d e p r e c i a t i o n  l e v e l  o f  1 . 4  p e r  c e n t  o f  t h e  h o u s e  p r i c e  p e r  N E F .  T h i s  
i s  p r o b a b l y  a b o u t  r i g h t  f o r  t h e  l a t e  s i x t i e s / e a r l y  s e v e n t i e s  an d  t o o  
h i g h  f o r  t h e  e a r l y  s i x t i e s .  So a g a i n  u s i n g  t h e  R o s k i l l  model t o  r e p l i c a t e  
t h e  e a r l y  s i x t i e s  b e h a v i o u r  we w o u ld  f i n d  i t  g e n e r a t i n g  r a t h e r  l o w e r  
movement r a t e s .  ( R e g a r d i n g  t h e  c h o i c e  o f  t h i s  i n i t i a l  d e p r e c i a t i o n  
r a t e  i t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  remember t h a t  t h e  a n n u a l  m ovement v a l u e  i n  t h e  
R o s k i l l  m odel a r e  r a t h e r  s e n s i t i v e  t o  t h i s  n u m b e r .)
W ith  a l l  t h e s e  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ,  h o w e v e r ,  i t  d o e s  seem t h a t  t h e  R o s k i l l  
m odel d o e s  g e n e r a t e  w h a t  i s  p o s s i b l y  a  l i t t l e  to o  h i g h  a  movement r a t e  
i n  t h e  l o w e r  n o i s e  z o n e s ,  an d  v e r y  l i k e l y  t o o  low  a movement r a t e  i n  t h e  
h i g h e r  n o i s e  z o n e s .
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 5
1 .  F o r  a d i s c u s s i o n  on m e a s u r e s  o f  t r a f f i c  n o i s e  s e e  L a n g d o n  a n d  S c h o l e s  
( 1 9 7 3 ) ,  a n d  S c h o l e s  ( 1 9 7 0 ) .
2 .  I f  t h e  n o i s e  i n d e x  i s  c o n s t r u c t e d  u s i n g  N r a t h e r  t h a n  l o g  N t h e n  t h e  
m a r g i n a l  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  n o i s e  l e v e l  w o u ld  be a  c o n s t a n t ,  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  
t h e  num ber o f  a i r c r a f t  a n d  t h e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  c o n c e n t r a t i n g  a i r c r a f t  
a c t i v i t i e s  a s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  c h a p t e r  w o u ld  no l o n g e r ' h o l d , ■ jJF  
t h e  p r i c e  p e r  u n i t  o f  q u i e t  w e re  s t i l l  e s t i m a t e d  t o  b e  c o n s t a n t .  W h e th e r  
o r  n o t  t h i s  w o u ld  be t h e  c a s e ,  w o u ld  d e p e n d  on how s e n s i t i v e  t h e  e s t i m a t i o n  
t e c h n i q u e s  f o r  t h e  p r i c e  o f  q u i e t  w e re  t o  s u c h  a c h a n g e  i n  a s s u m p t i o n .
3 .  T h i s  f i g u r e  i s  q u o t e d  b y  M r s .  P a u l  ( 1 9 7 1 ) ,  and t a k e n  fro m  t h e  R o s k i l l  
R e p o r t .
4 .  F o r  an  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  NEF i n d e x  a n d  i t s  v a l i d a t i o n  s e e  T r a c o r  ( 1 9 7 0 ) .
5 .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y  i t  h a s  n o t  b e e n  p o s s i b l e  t o  o b t a i n  a c o p y  o f  t h i s  s u r v e y .
6 .  T h i s  g r a p h  i s  draw n fro m  d a t a  t a k e n  fro m  W a l t e r s  ( 1 9 7 4 )  T a b l e  6 3 .  T h e
b r o k e n  l i n e s  i n d i c a t e  e x t r a  e x t r a p o l a t i o n  t o  l o w e r  v a l u e s .
7 .  T h i s  f o o t n o t e  h a s  b e e n  e x c l u d e d  fro m  t h e  t e x t .
8 .  T h i s  f o o t n o t e  h a s  b e e n  e x c l u d e d  fro m  t h e  t e x t . ......
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10. Walters (1974) page 111.
11. In our view this is the best way to interpret householder surplus. It 
may seem somewhat restrictive in that certain features that make one dwelling 
desirable relative to another are not priced (e.g. friends, local amenities 
etc.). However, if an individual can trade these off against some money 
value'then there must be some underlying way of valuing these things, such
that different locations involve different costs of conducting'certain activities. 
For convenience we refer to their activities as measurable with a unit implicit 
price.
12. For details of this calculation the reader is referred to Chapter 3 
pages 13 and 14.
13. The survey methods used are discussed in Roskill (1970) and the distribution 
of surplus obtained is given™ their report, “Commission on the third Lc-ndon 
airport", Vol. VII Table 20.1
14. The Urban Motorway Project Team’s survey methods and results are reported in
Urban Motorways Study Group (1973).
s
15. Walters (1974) page 127.
16. McKenna! 1 (1973), Appendix to the Report on Aircraft Noise Annoyance 
around London Heathrow Airport.
17. A Poisson distribution for the number of changes of occupancy was 
suggested by Walters. We have been able to find no published evidence for
this although casual observation on turnover data suggests a J shaped distribution 
We attempted to derive some direct evidence Rearing on this question by ' 
considering some British data from the Genial Household Survey (1973),in table 
5.52, this gives the distribution of the number of moves undertaken in the 
past five years by a sample of households. If we assume that a household 
moving m times in 5 years moves every 5_ years then we may construct a 
distribution in the number of changes of occupancy as follows:
Let the proportion of households moving every m years be P(m), and let 
the percentage of an initial population in year o that moves in year t Le 
qt> Then
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q t
P(m)
T h e  h o u s e s  v a c a t e d  f o r  a n  j  t h  t i m e  i n  y e a r  k ( k ^ , j )  a r e  g i v e n  by
V . L w h e r e  „ . ,Jk  / ( - i n
Vjk I  P(n>)Vm=l j - 1 , k - m
T h e  u p p e r  l i m i t  a r i s e s  b e c a u s e  we do n o t  a l l o w  f o r  more t h a n  o n e  move a 
y e a r .  T h i s  i s  a r e c u r s i v e  e x p r e s s i o n ,  w h er e V - ^  =  q t . F i n a l l y  
t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  h o u s e h o l d s  t h a t  a r e  v a c a t e d  n t i m e s  a l t o g e t h e r  i n  
f i v e  y e a r s  i s  g i v e n  b y  h ( n )  w her e
5 k + 1
m  = 'L V ( 1 -  J L  P(m)>
k=n m=l
A d m i t t e d l e y  t h i s  i s  a c r u d e  method o f  c a l c u l a t i n g  h ( n ) ,  a s  i t  d o e s  
n o t  a l l o w  f o r  m u l t i p l e  moves w i t h i n  one y e a r ,  and a s s u m e s  an e v e n  
s p r e a d  o f  moves f o r  t h o s e  who s a y  t h e y  move m t i m e s  i n  f i v e  
y e a r s .  ' N e v e r t h e l e s s  i t  s h o u l d  g i v e  us some i d e a  o f  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
o f  o c c u p a n c i e s  o f  a g i v e n  h o u s e .  I n  t h e  t a b l e  b e l o w  we g i v e  t h e  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t h e  number o f  moves i n  t h e  p a s t  f i v e  y e a r s ,  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n ,  
o f  h o u s e s  c h a n g i n g  h a n d s  n t i m e s  i n  t h e  p a s t  f i v e  y e a r s ,  a n d  t h e  
P o i s s o n  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  c h a n g e  o f  o c c u p a n c y  b a s e d  on t h e  mean o f  t h i s  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  b e i n g  c a l c u l a t e d  b y  t a k i n g  t h e  e s t i m a t e d  p e r c e n t a g e  
o f  h o u s e s  c h a n g i n g  h a n d s  a s  g i v e n  b y  t h e  sum o f  c o l u m n  2 .
I I I I I I I V  '
n % o f  h o u s e s  m o v i n q % o f  h o u s e s  c h a n g i n g P o i s s o n  d i s t r i b u t i o n
n t i m e s h a n d s  n t i m e s o f  I I I
0 6 4 . 6 6 4 . 3 0 6 9 . 9 7
1 2 3 . 4 • 3 3 . 9 7 2 5 . 0 0
2 6 . 7 1 . 7 2 4 . 4 5
3 3 . 2 0 . 0 1 0 . 5 3
4 1 . 1 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 5
5 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
S o u r c e r G e n e r a l  H o u s e h o l d  S u r v e y  ( 1 9 7 3 )  T a b l e  5 . 5 ? .  S a m p l e  S i z e  1 1 , 8 9 9 .  
C l e a r l y  t h e  number o f  c h a n g e s  g i v e n  b y  t h e  P o i s s o n  d i s t r i b u t i o n  f a l l s  
more s l o w l y  t h a n  t h e  s a m p l e ,  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  i t  u n d e r e s t i m a t e s  t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  
o f  t h e  o r i g i n a l  p o p u l a t i o n  t h a t  move o u t  due t o  n o i s e .
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However., ’ i t  c a n  o n l y  be s t r e s s e d  t h a t  t h e s e  numbers a r e  s u g g e s t i v e  -  t h e y  
do i n d i c a t e  a s h a r p l y  d e c l i n i n g  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  c h a n g e s  i n  o c c u p a n c y ,  w i t h  
t h e  P o i s s o n  d i s t r i b u t i o n  u n d e r e s t i m a t i n g  t h e  r a t e  o f  d e c l i n e .
1 8 .  I n  c o n s t r u c t i n g  t h e  new d i s t r i b u t i o n  we a s s u m e  t h a t  a l l  i n m o v e r s  due  
t o  n o i s e  a r e  i m p e r t u r b a b l e s . T h i s  a s s u m p t i o n  i s  p r o b a b l y  v a l i d ,  g i v e n  
t h e  s m a l l  movement r a t e s  and  t h e  numbers o f  h o u s e h o l d s  w i t h  a z e r o  
n o i s e  a n n o y a n c e  s c o r e .  I n  f a c t  e v e n  i f  some o f  t h e  m ov e r s  h a d  a n n o y a n c e  
s c o r e s  o f  1 o r  2 t h i s  w o u l d  make no d i f f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  movement r a t e s .
1 9 .  T h e  movements c a u s e d  b y  t h e  r i s i n g  v a l u a t i o n  o f  q u i e t  a r e  t h e  
l o n g  t e r m  m o v e m e n t s .  T h e s e  a r e  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  f r o m  t h e  s h o r t  t e r m  
m o v e m e n t s ,  w h i c h  a p p e a r  t o  be c o n c e n t r a t e d  i n  t h e  f i r s t  two y e a r s ,  
w i t h  movements i n  t h e  e i g h t h  y e a r  b e i n g  somewhat a m b i g u o u s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  
t o  t h e  d i v i s o n .
\' \
, 1 9 6 ,
C h a p t e r  6 
C o n c l u s i o n
I n  t h i s  t h e s i s  v a r i o u s  a s p e c t s  o f  n o i s e  p o l l u t i o n  h a v e  b een s u r v e y e d .  We 
s t a r t e d  i n  C h a p t e r  1 b y  s t a t i n g  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  s u r v e y  a n d  p o i n t e d  
o u t  some i m p o r t a n t  a s p e c t s  t h a t  do n o t  r e c e i v e  much a t t e n t i o n  h e r e .
U n d o u b t e d l y  t h e r e  i s  a l o t  t o  be d on e on a s c e r t a i n i n g  more f u l l y  t h e  p h y s i c a l  
and p s y c h o l o g i c a l  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  l i v i n g  i n  a v e r y  n o i s y  e n v i r o n m e n t  f o r  
p r o l o n g e d  p e r i o d s .  H o w e v e r ,  s u c h  f a c t o r s  c a n n o t  be a d e q u a t e l y  d i s c u s s e d  
i n  an e c o n o m i c  f ra m e w o r k  and o n l y  when t h e  ' f a c t s '  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  w i l l  we 
be a b l e  t o  t a k e  a c c o u n t  o f  them i n  o u r  e c o n o m i c  m o d e l s .  T h e  c o m p l e m e n t a r y  
r o l e s  o f  t h e  e n g i n e e r  a n d  e c o n o m i s t  a r e  a p p a r e n t  a t  a v e r y  e a r l y  s t a g e  
t o  a n y o n e  w o r k i n g  i n  t h i s  f i e l d ,  a nd i n d e e d  t h e  e c o n o m i s t  w o u l d  h a v e  v e r y  
l i t t l e  t o  s a y ,  had t h e  e n g i n e e r  n o t  d e v e l o p e d  s u i t a b l e  c a l i b r a t i o n s  o f  
v a r i o u s  t y p e s  o f  n o i s e .
I n  C h a p t e r  2 we u s e  a s i m p l i f i e d  t h e o r e t i c a l  model  t o  e x a m i n e  t h e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  
o f  a s p a t i a l l y  d i s t r i b u t e d  t y p e  o f  p o l l u t i o n  on t h e  o pt imum s t r u c t u r e  
o f  t o w n s .  A l t h o u g h  t h e  m o d e l s  u s e d  i n  t h i s  k n i d  o f  a n a l y s i s  a r e  h i g h l y  
u n r e a l i s t i c  t h e y  d o ,  n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  p r o v i d e  us w i t h  some i n s i g h t s  i n t o  t h e  
r e l a v a n t  i s s u e s .  I n  t h i s  c a s e  we o b s e r v e  t h a t  t h e  s p a t i a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  
o f  t h e  p o l l u t i o n  a l o n e  c a u s e  g r e a t  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  o b t a i n i n g  a n o pt imum  
b y p r i c e  m e t h o d s ,  and  e v e n  i f  t h e  o v e r a l l  c o n v e x i t y  c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  s a t i s f i e d  
i n  p r o d u c t i o n ,  a g o v e r n m e n t  a g e n c y  w o u l d  h a v e  t o  be c o n c e r n e d  b o t h  w i t h  
t h e  sum o f  t h e  m a r g i n a l  r a t e s  o f  s u b s t i t u t i o n  b et w e e n  t h e  p r i v a t e  good ... 
and t h e  p u b l i c  b a d ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  t h e  r a t e  o f  c h a n g e  o f  t h e  
sum. M u l t i p l e  e q u i l i b r i a  a r e  v e r y  l i k e l y  t o  be p r e s e n t  a nd a p r i c e  
d e c e n t r a l i s e d  economy c o u l d  e a s i l y  s e t t l e  a t  a s u b - o p t i m u m  p o s i t i o n .
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  p r o b l e m s  r a i s e d  b y  s p a t i a l  f a c t o r s  we h a v e  t o  t a k e  
a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  t e c h n o l o g y  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  w h i c h  m u s t  h a v e  i n c r e a s i n g  r e t u r n s  
f o r  some r a n g e  a t  l e a s t ,  i f  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  towns i s  t o  b e  j u s t i f i e d .  C o n ­
s t r u c t i n g  a p l a u s i b l e  t e c h n o l o g y  a nd t a k i n g  r e a s o n a b l e  p a r a m e t e r  v a l u e s  
we e x a m i n e d  t h e  s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  t h e  o p t im um  s o l u t i o n s  t o  v a r i o u s  p a r a m e t r i c -  
a nd  g e o g r a p h i c  a s s u m p t i o n s .  H e r e  we f o u n d  t h a t  t h e  o pt imum s o l u t i o n s  
w e re  r a t h e r  s e n s i t i v e  t o  s m a l l  c h a n g e s  i n  t h e  p a r a m e t e r s  r e p r e s e n t i n g  
p r e f e r e n c e s  and t o  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on t h e  u s e  o f  l a n d  a r e a  a v a i l a b l e .
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A l s o  i t  t u r n e d  o u t  t h a t  t h e  p o l i c y  p r e s c r i p t i o n s  f o r  o p t i m a l  p o l l u t i o n  
c o n t r o l  c o u l d  d i f f e r  g r e a t l y  i f  t h e  town s i z e  c o u l d  n o t  be c o n t r o l l e d  
fro m t h o s e  w n i c h  w o u l d  e x i s t  i f  i t  d i d .
From t h i s  r a t h e r  g e n e r a l  a n a l y s i s  we moved t o  c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  
t h e  m e a s u r e m e n t  o f  n o i s e  c o s t s .  T h e  a n a l y t i c a l  f r a m e w o r k  u s e d  h e r e  i s  
a p a r t i a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  o ne w i t h  a l l  i t s  a t t e n d a n t  s h o r t c o m i n g s .  H o w e v e r ,  
w h e re  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  t r e a t  t h e  movement i n  t h e  p r i c e  o f  q u i e t  i n  
r e l a t i v e  i s o l a t i o n  f r o m  o t h e r  p r i c e s  i t  p r o v i d e s  a m o s t  u s e f u l  b a s i s  
f o r  c o m p a r a t i v e  c o s t  s t u d i e s  a s  w e l l  a s  c a l c u l a t i o n s  o f  c o m p e n s a t i o n  f o r  
n o i s e  i m p o s e d .  We c o n s i d e r e d  b a s i c a l l y  two d i f f e r e n t  a p p r o a c h e s  -  one  
s t a r t i n g  w i t h  o r t h o d o x  e c o n o m i c  t h e o r y  a nd a d d i n g  v a r i o u s  b i t s  t h a t  w e r e  
s p e c i a l  t o  t h e  n o i s e  p r o b l e m ,  and t h e  o t h e r  t a k i n g  t h e  R o s k i l l  n o i s e  
model an d s t r e n g t h e n i n g  t h o s e  p a r t s  o f  i t  t h a t  a r e  somewhat s u s p e c t .
I n  t h e  end on e c a n  c o n c l u d e  t h a t  t h e  R o s k i l l  model  was a v e r y  r e a s o n a b l e  
f i r s t  a t t e m p t  a t  t h i s  k i n d  o f  t h i n g ,  a l t h o u g h ,  i f  d one  a g a i n  i t  w o u l d  be
b e t t e r  t o  u s e  t h e  more o r t h o d o x  a p p r o a c h  o u t l i n e d  i n  t h e  f i r s t  p a r t
\
o f  t h i s  C h a p t e r .
I n  C h a p t e r  4 we c o n s i d e r e d  v a r i o u s  p r o b l e m s  r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  
n o i s e .  T h e r e  i s  c l e a r l y  much s c o p e  f o r  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  e c o n o m i c  
p r i n c i p l e s  t o  t h i s  a r e a  a n d  i n  many i n s t a n c e s  a l l  we c o u l d  do was t o  
i n d i c a t e  t h e  s h o r t c o m i n g s  o f  e x i s t i n g  p r a c t i c e s .  T h e  s t a n d a r d  t h e o r y  
o f  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  and P u b l i c  B a d s ,  w h i l e  i t  a p p l i e s  b r o a d l y  t o  t h e  m a t t e r  
o f  n o i s e  p o l l u t i o n ,  c a n n o t  be s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y  t r a n s l a t e d  i n t o  o p e r a t i o n a l  
t e r m s .  T h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n h e r e n t  i n  a p o l l u t i o n  t a x  a r e  d i s c u s s e d  a t  
some l e n g t h  and i t  w o u l d  a p p e a r  t h a t  i n  g e n e r a l  a n y  n o i s e  t a x  w o u l d  be  
r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  p r i c e  o f  q u i e t  a s  w e l l  a s  t o  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b et we e n  
t h e  c o n s u m e r  a nd  p r o d u c e r  p r i c e s  o f  t h e  s e r v i c e s  t h a t  one h a s  t o  b u y  i n  
o r d e r  t o  be q u i e t .  What we r e f e r  t o  a s  l o c a t i o n a l  i n c o n v e n i e n c e .  S u c h  
a r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  n o t  s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y  d e f i n e d  a nd w h i l e  i n  some c a s e s  a 
s i m p l i f i c a t i o n  may be o b t a i n a b l e ,  t h e r e  a r e  c o n s i d e r a b l e  d a t a  p r o b l e m s  
i n v o l v e d  i n  c o n s t r u c t i n g  a  s a t i s f a c t o r y  n o i s e  t a x .  T h e  r e l i a n c e  t h e r e f o r e  
on d i r e c t  c o n t r o l s  p l a c e s  a l l  t h e  more i m p o r t a n c e  on h a v i n g  a go od m et ho d  
o f  m e a s u r i n g  t h e  c o s t s  o f  i m p l e m e n t i n g  n o i s e  ( o r  e q u a l l y  t h e  b e n e f i t s  o f  
r e d u c i n g  i t ) .  I t  i s  o n l y  b y  t h i s  means t h a t  a r e a s o n a b l e  d e c i s i o n  c a n  
be made r e g a r d i n g  t h e  c h o i c e  b e t w e e n  v a r i o u s  n o i s e  a b a t e m e n t  p r o c e d u r e s .
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I n  C h a p t e r  5 we d i s c u s s e d  v a r i o u s  b i t s  o f  e m p i r i c a l  e v i d e n c e .  H e r e ,  t o o ,  
t h e r e  i s  g r e a t  n e e d  f o r  good s t a t i s t i c a l  and e c o n o m e t r i c  w o r k ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
w i t h  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  m e a s u r e m e n t  o f  h o u s e  p r i c e  d e p r e c i a t i o n  d ue  t o  n o i s e .  
T he p r i c e  and i n c o m e  demand e l a s t i c i t i e s  f o r  q u i e t ,  c o n s t r u c t e d  f r o m  
t h e  a v a i l a b l e  d a t a  a r e  a t  b e s t  o n l y  i n d i c a t i v e  a n d  t h e s e  e s t i m a t e s  c o u l d  
be i m p r o v e d .  N e v e r t h e l e s s  some r e s u l t s  h a v e  b e e n  a c h i e v e d ,  c o n t r a r y  to  
t h e  s c e p t i c i s i m  o f  many p e o p l e ,  a nd  t h o s e  r e s u l t s  a r e ,  b r o a d l y  s p e a k i n g ,  
c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  e a c h  o t h e r .  S u c h  w o r k ,  a nd t h e  a n a l y s i s  i n  t h i s  
d i s s e r t a t i o n ,  shows t h a t  e c o n o m i c  t h e o r y  and e c o n o m e t r i c s  h a v e  a g r e a t  
d e a l  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  i n  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  p o l l u t i o n  p r o b l e m s .
\
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